Warning to the West: Don’t Arm the Arabs
Interview with
EDITOR'S NOTE: Is a new war about to break out in the
What should the
For
Each statesman gave his views without knowledge of the other's answers.
Q Mr. Prime Minister, since arriving in Israel, I have heard constant denunciation of the American plan to supply arms aid to
A If the Arab states realize, as they are now in the process of doing, that, peace or no peace, they can get arms, why should they make peace? The giving of arms to Arab states which refuse to make peace becomes a premium upon their policy of permanent warfare against
Q If we don't provide arms to the Arab states, how do we build up Middle East defense against
A There is, first of all, the question of whether the Arab states can at all be relied upon to play an effective part in any war on the side of the Western powers or, for that matter, on the side of anyone.
The Arab states have a time-honored tradition of sitting on the fence. They did very little to fight
You see, their reasoning is fairly simple. They say, "There are two sides to the conflict - one must be strong, and the other weak. The strong party does not need our help; the weak party does not deserve our help. It is only at the very end of the conflict that we can ascertain which party is stronger and which weaker. Therefore, let us bide our time . . ." There is no democratic idealism whatsoever throughout these countries. Democracy is not something that they would feel so precious as to be worth fighting for.
So, from the point of view of defending democracy, I think the Western powers should be warned against squandering their resources on the arming of Arab states.
Q What's the alternative?
A On that, opinions may differ. But as far as
This creates an armed preponderance in the
We are at a loss to understand how the
Q Mr. Prime Minister, I've also heard considerable opposition here to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement for withdrawal of British troops from the
A I think we are justified to feel apprehensive because, first of all, the accord as such is bound to strengthen
The whole issue depends upon whether the occupation of the
Q Couldn't the danger to
A The question is whether it would be corollary.
Q Not necessarily gun for gun, but enough to preserve a safe balance of power between the Arabs and
A I think it would be safer if no arms were given to
Q And
A No arms to
Q But, Mr. Prime Minister, can the United States postpone any program of military aid or build-up of defenses in the Middle East until there is a settlement between the Arabs and Israel - a settlement which, you concede, may be indefinitely delayed?
A I did not suggest that. I simply do not see what
Q Perhaps it's necessary for
A A calculated risk is justified, perhaps, when there is no past experience to prove that it is not justified. But we have a concrete experience to go upon. We know exactly how the Arab states behaved on such occasions in the past.
Q What is the practicality of the Turkish-Pakistan pact if we do not bring countries like
A I don't see the practicality of bringing them in - that's all. I don't see the advantage or usefulness of it. I don't think it is going to yield the expected fruit. I think it will end in a fiasco. Arms given to states inherently unstable will not make for consolidation but serve to intensify internal strife and conflict. The arms will not help to defend the
Q You contend, Mr. Prime Minister, that we could not count on the Arabs to be on the side of the West in the event of war. Could we count on
A It is not so much the question of your counting on
I think it is true to say that from Gibraltar to
Q In that case, why isn't there more active collaboration between
A I believe that question should be put to the
Q Israel, then, is ready to enter into alliance with the
A
Q In your opinion, what is the Russian game in the
A I am not in the confidence of the Soviet Government. I can only judge by the outward symptoms of Soviet policy. You know that of late they have very nearly paralyzed the United Nations Security Council in Middle Eastern affairs by the use of the veto. The use of the veto had a very clear purpose and that was to court the friendship of the Arab states, at the expense of
But I am afraid the United States Government is, to some extent - again judging by outward symptoms - pursuing the same policy. It is ready to woo the friendship of the Arab states, maybe not intentionally against
Q What was the reaction here in
A There was a very violent revulsion of feeling. We condemned that trend in the strongest terms. It was our condemnation which caused a rupture of our relations with the
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
Q Are the Communists making much headway in this part of the world?
A Naturally, there is a certain amount of propoganda. There are small Communist parties - legal in
Q The Communists here in
A They are proportionately stronger among the Arabs than among the Jews. You have 2 Communist members of the Knesset [
Q What's the reason for that disparity?
A The chief explanation is that Communism in
Q In IsraeI?
A Yes, in
Q When will that be?
A About a year from now.
Q Mr. Prime Minister, what is the cause of the increasing tension on
A You see, precarious situations very seldom stay put. They either show signs of improvement and of progress toward a normal state of affairs or they deteriorate still further. Unfortunately, in our case, the latter has been happening. If you ask me for the root reason of it, it all goes back to the persistent refusal of the Arab states to make peace with Israel and to establish or restore normal relations of peace and stability within the Middle East.
Q Do you see any danger of this deterioration leading to a renewal of hostilities?
A Not immediately, because
But if this state of "no peace" continues while the Arab states are armed or arming themselves and enhancing their military might, a time may come when they will feel possessed of sufficient superiority of armed strength to try again their luck with a war of invasion and aggression against
Q But what about demands you hear in
A Naturally, people get impatient, but it is not the policy of
Q Is this no-peace-no-war policy of the Arabs interfering with your development here in
A Of course, it is a handicap. We have to devote a considerable portion of our resources to the upkeep and constant improvement of our defense forces. In the border zone, you find settlers taxed very heavily by their watch duties. The Arab economic warfare that takes the form of boycott and blockade is causing us certain losses. We don't enjoy the markets of the neighboring countries, nor do we benefit from the nearby sources of supply. We have to bring our oil over long distances from oversea sources, instead of having it flow through the pipeline from
Q What are they?
A Well, the second side of the picture is the way all this affects the Arab countries. Financially, they lose more than we because we have always, in years gone by, been buying more from them than we used to sell them.
Q What sorts of things?
A Particularly agricultural produce to feed our growing population; also certain raw materials. Our own food production has not in all fields kept pace with the rapid and steep increase of our population in recent years. Had the Arab countries been open to trade with
You see, instead of buying meat in
Take another thing: the tourist traffic. That is very much handicapped, not only for us, but also for
Take
Q Would you still be willing to grant Jordan free port facilities at Haifa as part of a general peace settlement?
A Definitely. As soon as they would stop the boycott and open their country to trade with
Q Even short of a formal peace settlement?
A That's right. As soon as they stop their economic warfare and establish relations of economic reciprocity - not by way of an unrequited present from us, of course. Now they use the
ISRAELIS GROW STRONGER
Q You said there were two other sides to that picture of the effects of the Arabs' no-war-no-peace policy. What's the third side, Mr. Prime Minister?
A Now, what you have called the "third side" of the picture is the way we react to this challenge. It is the test of the health of a system - whether it succumbs when hit, or whether it resists and overcomes the threat. If it is healthy enough to overcome the danger, it gets stronger in the process. It emerges stronger from that trial than it was before, and that is, I think, exactly what is happening in our case.
Q You mean, in the long run, the Arabs' policy may make
A Precisely. Don't you see, faced with this attempt to strangle us economically, we have had to exert ourselves to the utmost to attain the maximum degree of economic independence, to intensify our drive for self-sufficiency in food, ;Also to foster economic and trade relations with countries farther afield. When we found the nearby markets closed to our industrial products, we had to look for markets elsewhere. We now export goods to Scandinavian countries,
Q Haven't you also been compelled to build your own merchant fleet as a result of the blockade?
A Exactly. We had very rapidly to develop our merchant fleet so as not to depend on the ships of countries which might be bullied by Arab threats into avoiding our ports. So, we have built up a merchant marine which is quite sizable for a country of our dimensions.
In 1948, we had a total tonnage of 6,000 tons; today, we have over 120,000 tons. It is an increase of twentyfold, and I think we have a Iarger merchant fleet than the combined fleets of
Q Mr. Prime Minister, do you see a possibility that these economic consequences of the blockade - the adverse consequences to the Arab states, that is - may in time induce them to make peace?
A We think that in the end, sooner or later, the long-term economic interests of aII these countries are bound to prevail There will be a pulling down of barriers, kept up only by political prejudice, and a triumph of social and economic interests - the day-to-day interests of the masses of people, who are anxious to raise their standards of living and to earn their bread in greater comfort. I say sooner or later that logic, which is inexorable, is bound to prevail. We shall then have the benefit of direct intercourse with the neighboring countries, but we shalI by this time have built up positions and relations of trade with more distant climes, which, we hope, will always remain ours. At the end of the process, we shall have won and not lost by the blockade. Of course, this is no reason for wishing it to continue.
Q What, in your opinion, are the prospects of an early peace settlement - an over-all settlement?
A I do not see the possibility of a compIete settlement at an early stage. I do see some possible progress toward it, but that depends a great deal - maybe to a decisive extent - on the major world powers, and particularly on the
Q How does the
A First, the most profitable direction in which progress could be made is the resettlement of the Arab refugees. In that, the
Q But
A I think there has been some unfreezing of that attitude.
USING WATERS OF
Q Do you consider the Eric Johnston plan for developing the waters of the
A Definitely. I would not associate myself with the Johnston Plan in all its features, but I would say that the
The idea of negotiating by American mediation an aIl-round water settlement is eminently sound, both for its own sake – that is, for the sake of the water settlement – and as a means of getting the parties concerned to realize that they can only achieve something worth while if they pull together and not apart. So, from both those standpoints it is the right approach.
Q Is
A As far as we are concerned, everything depends on the details of the actual plan. That means primarily on the allocation of the waters. If water is going to be used as a political bribe, no agreement will be possible. But if the water will be allocated on the principle of how much water each state actually needs and how much water it can put to beneficial use, that is another thing.
Q That's a tricky question to decide. Who's to make the decision?
A It is a matter of give and take. As things stand at present, Mr. Johnston goes around and consults each party. Let us hope that in the end he will sort of hammer out something which may prove acceptable to all parties. .To
I would like to make one more point on this matter of resettlement of the refugees. For the time being, what is being discussed is resettlement in the
Q But isn't this merely a first step?