SC 2552nd meeting - the situation in the ME
DOC-E  84
Date  29/8/1984
Collection  UN
Subject  SC 2552nd meeting - the situation in the ME
External Archive Reference  S/PV.2552(OR)

UN Security Council 2552rd meeting

The situation in the Middle East


During a discussion of the situation in Lebanon following the 1982 war and the continuing occupation by Israel, Dia Allah El-Fattal, representative of Syria, in speaking of “the practices of expansionist Zionist colonialism”, mentioned Moshe Sharett and quoted from his Personal Diary. Following is the excerpt concerning Sharett:


Excerpt from statement by Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic)

142  The second stage in this long chronological chain of violence plotted by the Zionist movement that took place in 1954 against the independence, unity and sovereignty of Lebanon was effectively implemented in 1982 because the “appropriate conditions” Sharett, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel and later its Prime Minister, spoke of were actually ripe at the end of the 1970s as a result of the defeatist Camp David conspiracy, which disrupted the strategic balance in the Middle East as a whole.

143  On 27 February 1954, Ben-Gurion, who had by then stepped down from power, wrote an extensive letter to Sharett setting forth his plans and those of his two colleagues Lavon and Dayan. I am quoting from a book entitled Israel’s Sacred Terrorism, by Livia Rokach. The following is taken from the letter Ben-Gurion sent to Sharett:

“The creation of a Christian State is therefore a natural act; it has historical roots and it will find support in wide circles in the Christian world, both Catholic and Protestant. In normal times this would be almost impossible, first and foremost because of the lack of initiative and courage of the Christians. But at times of confusion, or revolution or civil war, things take on another aspect, and even the weak declares himself to be a hero. Perhaps (there is never any certainty in politics) now is the time to bring about the creation of a Christian State in our neighbourhood. Without our initiative and our vigorous aid this will not be done.”*

I would repeat that:

“Without ... our vigorous aid this will not be done. It seems to me that this is the central duty, or at least one of the central duties, of our foreign policy. This means that time, energy and means ought to be invested in it and that we must act in all possible ways to bring about a radical change in Lebanon.”*

144  The plot contained in that letter achieves the demand I have mentioned, that is, the destruction of the unity of Lebanon and the setting up of a sectarian regime through the creation of puppet mini-States. In Sharett’s reply, he said conditions were not yet appropriate in 1954. Allow me to quote from his reply to Ben- Gurion:

“A permanent assumption of mine is that if sometimes there is some reason to interfere from the outside in the internal affairs of some country in order to support a political movement inside it aiming towards some target it is only when that movement shows some independent activity which there is a chance to enhance and maybe to bring to success by encouragement and help from the outside. There is no point in trying to create from the outside a movement that does not exist at all inside”*

—inside Lebanon, that is.

“It is impossible to inject life into a dead body. As far as I know, in Lebanon today there exists no movement aiming at transforming the country into a Christian State governed by the Maronite community.

“This is not surprising. The transformation of Lebanon into a Christian State as a result of an outside initiative is unfeasible today. ... I do not exclude the possibility of accomplishing this goal in the wake of a wave of shocks that will sweep the Middle East ... will destroy the present constellations and will form others. But in the present Lebanon, with its present territorial and demographic dimensions and its international relations, no serious initiative of the kind is imaginable.”*

145  Certainly, members of the Council who read these well-known letters will draw their own conclusions about the significance of these Israeli plans. Yakov Sharett, the son of Moshe Sharett, in Le Monde Diplomatique of December 1983, wrote:

“The time for the achievement of these ambitions was in June 1982 and not in 1978 at the time of the ‘Litani campaign’, which was limited from the beginning - both from the territorial point of view and in its objectives. The State of Israel was then dominated by a ‘revolutionary’ troika par excellence - Begin-Sharon-Eytan - convinced of the political need for the ‘iron fist’ and whom no obstacle could hold back. Did not Mr. Begin state at the beginning of the war that it would bring 40 years of peace to the country? But while in 1956 Ben-Gurion had come up against the refusal of Guy Mollet, Christian Pineau and Bourges-Maunoury to endorse his plans, in 1982 the Israeli leaders managed to win the support of the United States, in the person of Secretary of State Alexander Haig.”

* Quoted in English by the speaker

Source Document 1 
language  eng
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