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CONTENTS

	Page
Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea (<i>continued</i>)	439

Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

**Intervention of the Central People's Government
of the People's Republic of China in Korea
(continued)**

[Item 76]*

CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTEEN-POWER DRAFT
RESOLUTION (A/AC.1/641) (*continued*)

At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Republic of Korea took his seat at the Committee table.

1. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) said that the checking of a bloody struggle constituted a matter of interest to all peace-loving nations, especially if it concerned an aggression suffered by the United Nations forces which had gone to Korea by virtue of a mandate from the Organization and in defence of principles of collective security set forth in the Charter. For that reason, the draft resolution (A/C.1/641), the aim of which was to obtain a cease-fire in Korea, had secured priority in the discussion and almost unanimous approval.

2. The world knew that the aggression committed by the armies of the Peking Government was merely a further evidence of the expansionist strategy of the USSR, and that the final fulfilment of a cease-fire order would depend on the extent to which it suited the purposes of the USSR. The possibility of achieving an honourable and acceptable solution depended on the action of the Soviet Union. Certainly, those who did not wish to witness the destruction of the world and envisaged the possibility of peaceful co-existence and the survival of the United Nations, could not believe in a mere surrender to aggressive force and to the abandonment of the basic principles of the Charter.

3. The United Nations was not dealing with a mere local conflict. The present international situation, of which Korea was merely one aspect, led to one conclusion, which was that, as far as peace was concerned, there were no isolated problems; peace was one and

indivisible. That truth could not lose its value merely because, in the present case, many of the problems seemed to be focussed in one region alone. With those reservations and with some scepticism, the delegation of Chile would support the thirteen-Power draft resolution. It would do so also because of the respect which the sponsoring delegations deserved, and especially out of respect for the pacifying efforts of the delegation of India and for the humanitarian aims which motivated it, and also because of the guarantee implicit in a group over which the President of the General Assembly would preside.

4. The representative of Chile said that, during the discussion, the Committee had very rarely pointed a finger at the only true aggressor. The desire to find an urgent solution for an urgent problem had made the Committee lose its perspective with regard to the great problem with which the Organization was faced. Many members of the Committee believed that the pacification of Korea would immediately relieve the international tension, but, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, Korea was merely one factor in its total strategy of world domination. The world, after having witnessed the Berlin blockade in 1948 and the communist *coup* in China in 1949, was almost on the point of witnessing the absorption of Korea. Formosa (Taiwan) or Indochina might be next, as had been implied in the statement made by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR (415th meeting). The struggle in Korea was the responsibility of neither the Korean and Chinese people alone nor even of the governments of North Korea and Peking; whether there would be war or peace in Korea depended on the interests and desires of the Government of the USSR. In attempting to find solutions to the immediate problems which seriously threatened international peace, the peace-loving nations had forgotten that those events were merely the tactical expressions of one and the same imperialistic and aggressive strategy. All had been carefully planned beforehand, and continued to be planned and synchronized with other world events.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

5. Mr. Santa Cruz declared that the implementation of that policy had been accompanied by an intensive campaign against the United Nations. Representatives of the USSR had repeatedly made allegations that "mechanical voting" had taken place, as a result of Anglo-American pressure, that the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea had been dictated by General MacArthur with a view to justifying the accusations made by both the United Kingdom and the United States representatives, and that various organs of the United Nations, among them the Security Council had taken decisions which were illegal and contrary to the Charter. The Secretary-General himself had been accused of being a puppet of the United States of America. Those allegations constituted a deliberate attempt against the prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of world public opinion.
6. Mr. Santa Cruz declared that the USSR had also used every means imaginable to prevent the democratic world from acting in unison. He referred to the attacks made by the Soviet bloc upon the United States of America and the United Kingdom, especially the attacks upon the former country, which that bloc had accused of exercising an alleged imperialism over economically weak countries under the pretext of aiding them. The said bloc wished to create, in the countries receiving American aid, the belief that they had been delivered over to imperialism, and termed those countries satellites if they admitted being friendly to the United States of America.
7. The European countries which were beneficiaries under UNRRA and the Marshall Plan could give the lie to that myth. The truth could also be discovered by comparing the conduct of the United States of America, on the one hand, and of the USSR on the other, with regard to the economic and social work carried out by the United Nations and the specialized agencies.
8. Instead of persisting in that attitude, the USSR should co-operate in endeavours aimed at strengthening the economic independence of peoples, including the programmes of technical assistance for economically weak countries, and should not, as it had always done, oppose such endeavours.
9. The representative of Chile stated that he was neither impressed nor frightened by the attitude of the representatives of the USSR. On the contrary, his delegation, in its struggle for the achievement of such economic independence, admired what the United States of America had done for the well-being of the world and, particularly, for that of Europe. He also stressed the participation of the United Kingdom in that work and proclaimed his friendship towards the governments and peoples of those countries, in the belief that it was his duty to do so in those trying hours of anxiety and incertitude.
10. The initiative for the thirteen-Power proposal had come from the countries of the Middle and Far East, led by India. Those countries had newly achieved success in their struggle for the realization of their independence. The Soviet Union had observed that political renaissance and was, perhaps, trying to poison the relationships of those Asian countries with Europe and America. The Western countries were trying to achieve an understanding with the Asian world, while the Soviet Union was endeavouring to destroy all constructive effort in that direction. If that aim were to be realized, a vast gulf between Asia and America, or between Asia and Europe, would at that time constitute the greatest victory and triumph of Soviet imperialism.
11. In conclusion, Mr. Santa Cruz said that, although his delegation supported the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/641), it still considered that the solution to the problem of war or peace would lie in the fulfilment of the provisions of the resolution on united action for peace, that is, in the union of all the free and peace-loving world against aggression and misery, and against contempt for the value and dignity of man.
12. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, in its careful study of the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/641), the USSR delegation had borne in mind three factors that had surrounded the drafting and elaboration of the proposed resolution.
13. The first factor was the defeat of the American interventionist troops in Korea as a result of the heroic struggle of the Korean people and of their Chinese friends.
14. The second factor related to the circumstances surrounding the elaboration of the draft proposal. It was interesting to note that one of the sponsors of the draft resolution (A/C.1/641) to which priority had been granted by the Committee was the Philippines, which was not included among the sponsors of the second draft resolution (A/C.1/642). It was not too difficult to guess the reason for that notable absence from the second list of sponsors. Actually, the first draft resolution had been to the liking of the United States of America and the Philippine representative had been forced to exert much effort in order to impose such a draft on the other sponsors. As a result of those efforts, two drafts had emerged.
15. Bearing in mind the practice of the United Nations in the elaboration of joint drafts, it was quite clear that two drafts were submitted, as in the present case, only when those drafts had to be submitted as alternatives and when some of the sponsors were profoundly in disagreement with one of them. In the circumstances, it was clear that under the pressure exercised by the United States and Philippine representatives, the sponsors had been compelled to resign themselves to two alternatives, the first of which was agreeable to the United States of America, and the second was less agreeable.
16. Turning to the third factor, Mr. Malik quoted several remarks made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States in the course of their statements at the 415th meeting and observed that they were both concerned not about the situation of the Korean people and the threat to peace and security in the Far East, but solely with securing a cease-fire, inasmuch as they wanted to save their troops who were in a serious predicament in Korea. The United Kingdom representative himself had explained that such action would be "a very tentative first step". Indeed, it would be a very tentative first step which the Anglo-American aggressors in Korea, headed by General

MacArthur, wished to take with a view to obtaining a breathing spell and to gain an opportunity for their forces to regroup and later to attack the North Korean troops and the Chinese volunteers who had come to their aid. In support of that contention, the USSR representative quoted Mr. Younger as saying that a cease-fire would form the basis which would "safeguard the United Nations troops in Korea". Moreover, Mr. Younger had stressed the fact that "it is on that strictly practical basis, and without wishing to raise any wider issues . . ." that he would support the draft resolution. It was evident, therefore, that Mr. Younger was interested only in that strictly limited objective.

17. The USSR representative then recalled that Mr. Austin had likewise sought only one purpose: the protection of United States armed forces. Furthermore, the United States representative had stated (415th meeting) that the cease-fire should be carried out prior to any attempts at a settlement of other political questions. Thus, the objective sought by the United Kingdom and the United States representatives boiled down to the narrow aim of obtaining a cease-fire. In view of the stand of those representatives on the Korean question and bearing in mind the stage which had been reached in the consideration of the question, the only conclusion possible was that the proposal for a cease-fire constituted merely a hypocritical and camouflaged attempt to obtain a breathing spell before embarking upon further military action.

18. Mr. Malik said that he did not wish to be construed as attributing that intention to the sponsors of the draft resolution. He was sure that they had been motivated by good intentions. But, bearing in mind the circumstances underlying the emergence of two draft resolutions and the insistence on the priority to be granted to one of them, one could not conclude but that the first draft would redound solely to the benefit and interests of the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

19. The representative of the USSR recalled that Mr. Austin had expressed concern primarily about the safety of the United States armed forces in Korea, and then, in passing, about the safety of the Korean population. The way in which the American aggressors defended the safety and interests of the Korean people could be judged from the cablegram which the Foreign Minister of the Korean People's Democratic Republic had sent on 7 December to the Security Council (S/1934). In that cablegram, Mr. Pak Hen En proved clearly that the United States interventionist troops in Korea, employing the technique of the total war of annihilation, had been systematically bombing civilians and destroying all industrial enterprises. That was how the Americans had been caring for the interests and welfare of the Korean people.

20. Mr. Malik reminded the Committee that the United States representative had stated (415th meeting) that the issue in the Far East was war or peace. But the USSR had raised that particular question in the Security Council at the beginning of the month of August.¹ Blinded by their ephemeral successes, however, the United States aggressors had brushed aside

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year*, No. 25, 483rd meeting.

the USSR proposal for the peaceful settlement of the question. The representative of the USSR asked what the United States and United Kingdom delegations now proposed. They were still not proposing a peaceful settlement but, as Mr. Younger had made clear (415th meeting), only a tentative and limited cease-fire in order to rescue and regroup their defeated troops to press forward again with their intervention. If the United States Government was really interested in peace in the Far East, the first prerequisite would be the cessation of United States aggression in Korea, China and the whole of the Far East. But Mr. Austin had made clear in his statements that no such intentions were nurtured by his government.

21. As to the thirteen-Power draft resolution, Mr. Malik remarked that it proposed the setting up, by the President of the General Assembly, of an unknown group of unknown membership. In that connexion, it was noteworthy that the President of the General Assembly had had a rather sad experience in the appointment of committees on instructions from the General Assembly. Everyone knew the great efforts that had been required of the President in the solution of a similar problem, the difficulties that had beset him in that task, and how finally he had been forced to comply, under American pressure, with the idea that the membership of such a committee should include five pro-United States members and only two members not to the liking of the United States.

22. Under those circumstances, there was reason to believe that the same story would be repeated in the establishment of the proposed group of three members. A committee so set up, therefore, in strict conformity with the wishes of Messrs. Austin and Younger, would work out a cease-fire satisfactory to the United States and British armed forces. If that were not so, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom would not have so eagerly supported the present draft resolution and would not have made it clear that their only objective was a cease-fire.

23. Moreover, it was quite clear that one of the hidden intentions of the proposal was to exclude the representative of the Chinese People's Republic from participating in the solution of the Korean problem. Such a course was not only naive but also harmful. One could not expect that the solution of any Far-Eastern problem could be achieved without the participation of the Central People's Government, which represented 475 million Chinese, and without taking their vital interests into account. China constituted the centre and crux of all Far-Eastern problems.

24. Regarding the Attlee-Truman *communiqué* on 8 December, Mr. Malik asserted that it signified to the world the intention of its authors to embark upon a mad armaments race and to prepare for a new war. The *communiqué* did not offer a basis for the solution of Far-Eastern problems.

25. The representative of Chile, Mr. Malik went on, had diligently defended and championed United States imperialism while lashing out against the Soviet Union with slanders and insults; so much so, that one wondered whether the speaker was the Chilean representative or an employee of the United States Department of State. Those slanders accusing the Soviet Union of

imperialism and aggression had not convinced anyone. If the Chilean representative had studied the real facts, as expressed in various documents, he might have done well to advise the ruling circles of the United States to call a halt to their aggression against the Korean and Chinese peoples who, like the other peoples of Asia, were aspiring for freedom and independence. The more speedily United States imperialism ended its aggressive policies and attempts to halt the inevitable tide of history, the more speedily would peace and security be ensured in that area.

26. The representative of Chile, like some other members of the Anglo-American bloc, had accused the USSR of violating the United Nations Charter. While there was no basis for that accusation, Mr. Malik stated that he was in a position to cite many such violations by that bloc itself. They included the adoption of the United States proposal on united action for peace (A/1481, resolution A), which bypassed the Security Council; the continuance in office of the Secretary-General without the recommendation of the Security Council; and the misrepresentation of China in the organs of the United Nations. Those were only three of many such violations.

27. The Chilean representative had also slandered the Soviet Union with respect to its position on technical and economic assistance to under-developed countries. Mr. Santa Cruz did not and could not comprehend the total devastation which some countries, such as the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR, had suffered at the hands of fascist soldiery during the last war. With tremendous labour and sacrifices, however, the people of the Soviet Union had succeeded in reconstructing and rehabilitating their land, even improving upon the pre-war condition. Had the representative of Chile pondered those facts, he would have approached the matter in a different manner. The Soviet Union had never opposed the extension of economic assistance to under-developed areas, as the Chilean representative had alleged. Actually, the delegation of the USSR had firmly approved the principle of extending assistance to under-developed areas, but only through the United Nations, without any political, economic or military strings attached to such assistance. The Soviet Union was opposed to the kind of assistance exemplified by the Marshall Plan, which had transformed Western Europe into a branch of the United States and had thus enslaved the recipient parties. The USSR favoured genuine economic assistance to under-developed areas but opposed the transformation of such areas into colonies of American monopolies under the guise of assistance. Therein lay the fundamental and deep-rooted difference between the Chilean delegation and that of the Soviet Union.

28. In conclusion, Mr. Malik observed that a correct solution of the Korean question could be found only through the evacuation of all foreign troops from Korea, which would enable the Korean people to settle all issues and problems relating to the future of their country. In fact, the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/640) was in conformity with that overriding objective, and laid down the basic conditions for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and for the restoration of peace and security in the Far East.

29. The people of the USSR knew from their own experience the meaning of foreign occupation and intervention. The truth was that, throughout history, interventionists and aggressors, in order to cover up aggression, had always availed themselves of the theory that they were defending the populations of the areas they had occupied. It would not be possible to think and talk seriously of the settlement of the Korean question until all foreign troops had been withdrawn.

30. The delegation of the USSR had objected from the very outset to the inclusion in the General Assembly agenda of the item imposed by the Anglo-American bloc concerning the alleged intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea. Moreover, the USSR would vote against the adoption of any draft resolution which had implicit in it the maintenance of foreign troops on Korean territory, and the continuance of aggression.

31. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) stated that the French delegation completely favoured bringing about a ceasefire, as proposed in the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/641). He noted that the draft also took into account certain new aspects of the situation which had developed after 25 June in Korea. In the circumstances that prevailed, the preliminary procedure specified in that draft was necessary to ensure the effective cessation of hostilities by the two conflicting parties at the time and under the conditions to be defined. The first task faced by the proposed three-member committee would be to define the military conditions of the truce and to fix the day and the hour. The committee would establish all the contacts necessary for achieving that purpose. Although that would be a new procedure, it would be acceptable since the situation to be dealt with was also without precedent.

32. The thirteen-Power draft resolution, moreover, offered serious possibilities as regards the preliminary exploration which was vitally necessary, and did not affect the principles on which the United Nations action in Korea had been based. It was sufficient that the task of the conciliation group to be constituted was clearly restricted to an examination of the military aspects of the problem, excluding its political aspects. Mr. Malik in his deliberations had attached little importance to stopping the shedding of blood. Did he then consider that bloodshed could be the means of political bargaining?

33. In conclusion, Mr. Chauvel declared that the French delegation approved the draft resolution together with the drafting suggestion made by the representative of Greece (415th meeting).

34. Mr. SHARETT (Israel) declared that Israel, throughout all the vicissitudes of the grave issue of Korea, had been guided by the major principles of its policy in international affairs, namely, the preservation of world peace, the prevention of aggression and the strengthening of the United Nations as an instrument of world peace and security.

35. The implications of the Korean conflict were such that realistic statesmanship forbade treating it in isolation from its wider context. With its worldwide repercussions, that problem concerned not only the

fate of the Korean people, but directly affected the precarious balance of world stability.

36. Even the revolutionary political transformation affecting the destiny of hundreds of millions of people in China, which was the outcome of a titanic struggle, had not precipitated an acute international crisis as had the recent events in the small country of Korea. The latter events had posed issues of war or peace for the whole world and confronted the United Nations with supreme tests of statesmanship. While the problem of the governmental régime in China, for all that country's vast size, had never become a matter of direct international concern and adjudication, the events which had occurred in Korea had shaken the international community to its very foundations. The reason for that astounding contrast lay not in logic but in factual evolution.

37. Korea, ever since its emergence from Japanese bondage, had been a subject of various international arrangements, first through an agreement between the major world Powers and later in a series of resolutions adopted by the United Nations (General Assembly resolutions 112 (II), 195 (III), and 293 (IV)). Each Korean settlement had been thus woven into the fabric of international stability and had become an integral part of the structure of organized peace. Consequently, it would be impossible to upset any such settlement without subjecting the entire structure to imminent peril. That fundamental characteristic of the Korean problem explained the revulsion of the civilized world when South Korea had been attacked by North Korea in June 1950. While the war in China, despite all its fury and gigantic proportions, had been confined to that country, the aggression in Korea had constituted a blow to world peace and challenged the authority and effectiveness of the United Nations. Hence, the reaction of the overwhelming majority of the United Nations Members.

38. Against that compelling background, the argument that what was happening in Korea was merely a civil war, in which the United Nations had no business to interfere, sounded hollow. Nor could the invasion of South Korea be considered a move to liberate the country from foreign yoke or an attempt to reunite its torn parts. To impose a particular social or political régime upon a people, at the point of a sword and with outside help, was not national liberation.

39. The majestic march of Asian peoples toward complete political emancipation did not need to take the form of the expansion of one specific social order. It was the basic duty of the United Nations to foster and promote national liberty, but in doing so it had to ensure that the shaping of the internal order be left to the discretion of the people whose national liberty the Organization was protecting. Nor was it possible or proper for the United Nations to divest itself of the responsibility it had assumed.

40. For all those reasons, the Government of Israel had condemned unreservedly the aggression committed in Korea and had lent such modest assistance as it could to the United Nations forces. The Israeli delegation, for the same reasons, had voted for the General Assembly resolution of 7 October (A/1435) which en-

abled the United Nations forces to cross the 38th parallel. The considerations that had prevailed with the Israeli delegation in regard to that decision were three-fold. First, from a purely military standpoint, it was clear that an advancing army could not, without exposing itself to grave peril, unilaterally arrest its progress at a straight line drawn arbitrarily on the map. Secondly, it seemed politically essential to give the United Nations forces the indispensable latitude to consolidate their position, to ensure their substantial control of Korea, and to prevent or render remote the threat of renewed aggression. Thirdly, and on the purely moral side, the concept of the 38th parallel seemed already to have lost its validity following the initial violation by the aggressor.

41. Mr. Sharrett pointed out that, during the considerations of the Korean question in the First Committee (346th to 353rd meetings), the Israel delegation had first supported the Indian proposal (A/C.1/572) which had sought to achieve a solution acceptable to all parties, and, upon its rejection (353rd meeting), had itself presented an amendment (A/C.1/573) to and associated itself with the majority draft resolution on Korea (A/C.1/558). Above all, however, the Israeli delegation had been concerned with the need for restraint in the military sense and had urged the exercise of the utmost forbearance in that regard. Nevertheless, the conflagration had been indeed intensified and the peril vastly increased, with the participation of large new forces thrown in from the North.

42. It was obvious that a cease-fire was now essential. When Israel had been confronted with a similar situation, hostilities had been avoided by a cease-fire, followed in due course by a truce and eventually by an armistice brought about by the United Nations. With that experience in mind, the Israeli delegation, together with a few other delegations, had met informally with the representatives of the Central People's Government of China, with a view to exploring the possibility of resolving the crisis by a similar action taken in a series of successive steps. When that attempt had failed, however, the Israeli delegation had followed with interest and sympathy the attempts made by the representative of India to find a solution, and had made certain efforts on its own initiative to explore the chances of a solution.

43. The Israeli delegation, while it considered an immediate and unconditional cease-fire to be the first condition necessary for a settlement and hoped sincerely for its adoption by the First Committee, felt that the possibilities of agreement went far beyond the matter of a cease-fire.

44. The aim of a free, independent and unified Korea had been defined both in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October (A/1435) and in the draft resolution (A/1426) submitted by the USSR and four associated Powers at that time (294th plenary meeting); both proposals had accepted the principle of United Nations responsibility and concern for the establishment of the Korean State, a responsibility to be expressed through the constitution of a United Nations commission for Korea. Even now it was possible to agree on the composition of such a commission by association of the States bordering on Korea in the

work of the present United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Furthermore, both the adopted resolution and the USSR draft were in agreement on the idea of free elections in Korea, to be carried out in consultation with the representative bodies of both North and South Korea. Finally, the fundamental principle of a unified and independent Korea free of non-Korean forces should commend itself to the United Nations as a whole. In fact, the General Assembly resolution on Korea (A/1435) clearly stated that the United Nations forces should not remain in Korea any longer than was necessary for the establishment of a unified State. Yet, the United Nations forces could not be withdrawn before they had fully discharged the responsibilities which they had undertaken in Korea. A progressive withdrawal, over a period of, say, six months, of all non-Korean forces, for whatever purpose they had entered Korea, could be envisaged as desirable. Other concepts which represented common ground were the economic rehabilitation of a reunited

Korea under United Nations auspices, and the solemn undertaking by all States to refrain from any intervention in Korea's internal affairs. For all those objectives, the unanimous support of the General Assembly could be reasonably expected.

45. The implementation of a cease-fire arrangement undoubtedly would create a favourable atmosphere for the peaceful settlement of all other outstanding questions affecting the relations of the Central People's Government of China with the United Nations.

46. In conclusion, Mr. Sharett affirmed Israel's support for the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/641) and invited all other delegations to reflect on the approach which his own delegation had tentatively outlined, taking into consideration not merely the rights and wrongs of the origin of the crisis, but primarily the ensuring of world peace.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.