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FROM : MEMISRAEL WASHINGTON

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recd - 3.3.53

IMMEDIATE

For Roham and Sar.

One - Wld like to analyse relations between Isr USA UK  
Egypt and suggest urgent conclusion

aa) USA UK will work closely together on Suez phase Egyptian  
negs. They may agree evacuation Canal to be unconditional in theory  
but offset by private assurances Egypt will later join Western Defence  
of Canal Zone.

bb) There is chance to get USA UK committed to insist acceptance  
international conventions and resols on free passage but we have not yet  
secured such commitment.

cc) Suez negs may encounter crisis if Egypt declines any avowed  
Western commitment in return for evacuation. More likely some compro-  
mise will be found and agreement reached.

dd) As to what happens when Suez phase finished or advanced  
opinions divided. UK view supported previously by Byroade is that  
MEDO shld be established with Arab States without Isr while role of  
latter decided later. Dulles now committed reject this and insist  
that Regional Defence Org if any must be open all willing join.  
Fentagon sees no logistic value in MEDO with gaping hole in center  
i.e. in Isr. Congress fuss wld arise if such proposal put. I dont  
believe Byroade scheme could get through without our acquiescence.

ee) While increasingly aware question Isr Egypt relations  
must arise some early stage Western policy at present is to go as far  
along road of Egyptian settlement as possible without facing Isr issue.

ff) If this continues we bound be politically weakened and destined  
face Egypt for peace only when latter is strong intimately of Western  
powers able dictate terms. Meanwhile need for Egyptian settlement will  
exclusively dominate Western policy and we at best can play impeding  
negative role on proposals gravely prejudicing our security.

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Two - Am convinced our present diplomacy falls far behind pace of these events. We are

aa) Arguing negatively against certain marginal aspects Egyptian settlement e.g. arms without being centrally positively concerned on issue as such.

bb) Awaiting till we look like getting hurt then reacting.

cc) Pressing our military claims and others irrespective of Western preoccupation Egyptian settlement as first step and their resolve utilise Isr only when such settlement is either reached or proved unattainable.

dd) Collecting list of assurances that USA still loves us as per Republican Platform and intends no betrayal. I do not underestimate value of this but we can increase collection indefinitely with no direct marked effect on separate development Western political strategy in ME.

Three- Am convinced after talk Dulles that we can change this position dramatically and become active central factor.

Four - My proposal is as follows:

We should inform USA UK we regard Egypt Israel peace as urgent for ME and world and Isrs interests do not allow us defer serious effort to that end. Similarly, we regard beginning of work for defence preparation as urgent. Egypt Isr peace and ME defence in that order are central objectives Isr policy for 1953 and we invite USA UK determine these to be their common objective too and to work with us practically and programatically from today onwards. Here we should refuse any idea they can get much further in Egyptian and MEDO settlement without solving Isr Egypt question. Suez solution unlikely without prospect new defence arrangement and latter unworkable without Isr since in war versus north fate canal area will be settled in Isr not in Libya as in 1942.



Five - Having defined objectives we go on to state programme for said peace settlement. Agenda is fairly obvious after Bunche and our own soundings

- aa) Communications viz continuity Arab world
- bb) Refugees viz financial arrangements for Sinai project and rest of Gaza refugees to Syria or Iraq under UN scheme.
- cc) Gaza strip viz possible exchange or letting alone.
- dd) Abandonment blockades boycotts.
- ee) Economic aid regional cooperation ff) Arms agreement.
- gg) Nonaggression clause.
- hh) Part of Egypt and Isr in regional defence.

Procedures available this neg are

Alef - Informal preliminary conversations in Europe.

Beth- Conference called by Isr under article eleven armistice to replace all articles by peace articles. All that is lacking ~~xxxxxxx~~ is incentive to Egypt to come to table and this is role of USA which shld make it primary objective its policy explain American Egypt relations depend thereon as no defence of area likely otherwise and American defence system in Europe threatened by outflanking owing to vacuum south of Turkey and east.

Six - As for defence community we shld work out scheme at least as programatic as above scheme for peace. Let us stop picking holes in SACME and MEDO and say how we repeat we think defence area shld be organized

- aa) If all states cooperate
- bb) If Isr has to be prepared alone for defence.

Add that until defence community established individual projects of Milaid in Isr shld be authorized under MSA 202.

Seven- I then propose we tell Powers we determined raise these matters actively now but willing coordinate with them provided they accept objective. Suggest Dulles appoint representative e.g. Lodge to work with us on timing and procedure of approach. Negs between Westerners and Isr on above ME scheme shld proceed parallel with any Anglo Egyptian negs on Suez.



Eight - Will now summarise advantages this proposal

aa) Objectives Egypt Isr peace and defence community in themselves quite unassailable. Powers will have to agree with us and at most be defensive or cautionary on procedures. We shall have firm basis relations U.S.A. on common objective not mere sentiment and pledges.

bb) In advancing these objectives we are certain public press sympathy while those who oppose or are sceptical will be defensive.

cc) If we succeed then revolutionary improvement take place our own world position. If not we at least enjoy in USA relations same tactical advantage as we had in UN when we were sponsors of peace idea and program. I feel we have lost ground G.A in exact proportion to reduction of our pro-peace initiative.

dd) If we are actually working with U.S.A at high level on details these two plans we have greater political stature if we merely kick around our minor headaches as now.

ee) U.S.A would gain from success enormously in political economic and domestic respects. Manoeuvrability American policy greatly enlarged. Am not discussing British advantage but similar case could be made to their official and public opinion.

ff) Have already cabled you on present acute embarrassment Republican party seeing no prospect any success in international field in Far East or Europe. If we can interest them in feasible this solution then their own interest will ruthlessly override exaggerated sensitivity about pressing Neguib for peace.

gg) Would have little difficulty getting Senate and House groups and influential general and journalists to sponsor this which does not have only Isr. but Western utility.

Nine While as you see I accept foundations Elath's Memo am convinced that defence theme shld be subordinated wider context Egy Isr place program. Moreover high level approaches to Churchill and only useful if content of approaches is arresting and serious. Our trouble is not diplomatic but political not lack of access but lack program. Mere slogan direct negs no longer potent without concrete specification issues and genuine willingness to plunge into ice water peace talks.

Ten I see no alternative to plan such as this except conti diplomacy of marginal reaction and abstract friendship assurances w decisive events fixing destiny ME will go on between Cairo London & DC with ourselves outside.

Eleven Above is not far different from general trend of my current talks Dept and Pentagon but we need to give program formal effect by official submission and request for American study with u concurrent with Anglo Egyptian Negs Suez.

EBAN

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