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W87/612

TO : MAHAV HAMISRAD TEL AVIV  
FROM : EBAN MEMISRAEL WASHINGTON

sent - 8.4.53  
recd - 9.4.53

GR/O

Sar and I long talk Byroade Waller present:

*Suez* One - Sa r outlined contents note to be shortly submitted stressing Israel interest changes defence planning consequent Egypt gaining control area and necessity assure free passage before committing water way to Egypt control. On latter B. gave assurance our position fully in mind. French had recently raised this strongly in connection with supplies Indochina and UK also concerned. He told us confidentially whole matter be discussed soon by Three Powers jointly. Egyptian ambassador Paris had thrown out idea Egypt and Israel adherence to Suez Canal convention Constantinople. Westerners still exploring various ways of creating formal commitment to keep Canal international after UK evacuation. On other aspects Suez he less specific saying whole prospect early successful Suez negotiation now dubious owing strongly entrenched positions London and Cairo both under public opinion pressur\_e but Israel position arising from British evac certainly should be borne in mind. In tone and manner he implicitly assented we were legitimately interested party but he did not enter substantive merits.

Two - Milaid. Sar asked both for specific provision in MSA not mere Contingent Clause and for actual Milaid to Isr.

On former he confirmed State supported formulation as we had asked last year and this. On actual use of authority when obtained he continued expressed desire see Milaid applied Isr and Arabs in some balance and simultaneity. Familiar argument developed here with familiar inconclusiveness. He said main point was peace and how to get it. He here repeated unanswered question he had put to me previously namely what price could Isr pay and how much was peace worth. For example could we do anything by way of boundary changes. Sar replied peace could only be between States as they are both in area and population. B. argued could not get peace if completely rigid. If Isr would not provide peace plan USA might have to as its own interests dictated necessity for peace and neither party would completely like this plan. Sar warned against such plan including any territorial concessions as USA could not honor such plan without sending armed forces ~~forces~~ moreover Arab delusions would be encouraged. Similar argument developed against B. enquiry if could envisage any gesture offering small number refugges return. Atmosphere here rather tense he repeating there had to be peace plan and if necessary USA would try its hand. Later he stressed USA had no plan at moment and Dulles bringin~~g~~ nothing with him but he discouraged by our lack of forthcomingness. Here we both challenged his assumption that there was not material for

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peace talks without flexibility territory and refugees pointing out Arabs would gain by opening communications across South by free port facilities joint water and other development schemes and compensation plus abandonment self inflicted injuries oil blockade all in context peace settlement. He said all this objectively true but Arabs crazy enough to endure much injury to themselves as long as Isr also injured. We urged him get Arabs understand peace meant peace between existing units but with transformation relations between them.

Three - JSM.Sar explained position of FO move fully saying could not defer already delayed position indefinitely. USA could move its mission or not but we must move our FO before GA session. He said he understood our position but theirs would not be reviewed until after Dulles return. He showed little zeal or interest this problem.

Eban.