

00003287

ב"ט באלול התשי"ג
9 בספטמבר 1953

אע/68/1/4621

282

כמוס - אישי

2414/27/2

2414/27

אל : מר ש. בנדור, מנהל מאה"ב, משרד החוץ

העתיקים: שר החוץ
השגריר

מאת: א. עברון, שגרירות ישראל ושינגטון

הנדון: - שיחת המורשה יעבץ עם מר דאלם

כפי שכבר הברקנו, החקירה ביום 31 באוגוסט ש.ז. שיחה בין המורשה יעבץ ומזכיר המדינה מר דאלם, על מדיניות אה"ב כלפי המזה"ה וישראל. אתמול נפגש מר יעבץ עם סיי קנן ומסר לו רשמים מהשיחה הנ"ל. לומה בזה הדו"ח של קנן על רשמים אלה.

2. לדברי קנן חזר יעבץ והדגיש כמה פעמים שהוא מוסר לקנן את רשמיו על השיחה עם דאלם באופן סודי, וכאזרח אמריקני אחר למשנהו. בשום פנים ואופן אין הוא חפץ כי יראה כמוסר דו"ח לממשלת ישראל. ייתכן כי רקע מחשבתי זה מנע בעדו מלהיות ספציפי יותר בדברו על כוונות האדמיניסטרציה, והסתפקותו ברשמים בלבד. אבקש, איפוא, להתייחס לעובדה פגישת יעבץ - דאלם ותוכנה כאל ידיעה כמוסה ביותר.

3. מעניינת העובדה כי מזכיר המדינה שיתף בשיחה הנ"ל גם את מר ביירוד.

בברכה,

א. עברון
מזכיר שני

אע/ש

החשף לזה"ה, א. מ. צו
וא. מ. מ. צו

23/9

4/13/53

7

There are grounds for alarm. It is not that the Administration plans any specific anti-Israel moves. There is no concrete change in policy; but there is a difference in the climate. Israel is now regarded by the Administration as one of the many countries in the area. The Administration has many other interests - Turkey, Iran, Pakistan. It believes there is a possibility of a Western orientation in other countries such as Iraq if the Administration pursues a vigorous policy.

But the major change lies in the fact that the Administration is not particularly responsive to Israel's position and there is no longer a Mr. Truman to pick up the telephone and order something to be done regardless of the consequences. The principal sticking points seem to be Jerusalem and military aid to the Arab states. It appears likely that the question of Jerusalem will come up at the forthcoming UN session and there is a feeling that something may crystallize soonest on this particular issue. The Administration is not insisting on the original decision of the UN. It would like to find some formula for getting out of that decision. There was a feeling that the Administration had to do something at the UN which it did not necessarily want to do. Thus there was the Arab position to be considered and the protest over the moving of the capital. Accordingly, it appears that the issue would come up. The Administration appears to be headed towards functional trusteeship. If the Catholic countries did not want the issue discussed, then it would not be. Some approach should be made on this particular issue.

There was the possibility that the Administration would attain some certainty on its Near East policy sooner than in other parts of the world, with the approval of the President. The Administration felt a need to dramatize the 3-power declaration. It was looking for an opportunity to do this. However, it was not a foregone conclusion that military aid would be forthcoming to the Arab states. The Administration was not yet convinced that it should be done. There is concern about the possible misuse of such arms.

There is also a feeling that Jewish opposition should not be under-estimated and while it was obvious that no Republican Administration could be elected by the Jewish vote, it would not want to fly in the face of the Jewish people in the US.

The question of arms was tied up with the Administration's desire to turn some of the countries in the area to a pro-Western policy. There is no question, however, about the intention to give arms to Iran. However, if arms were given to the Arab states, they would be modest and not really in an amount to worry about. However, it was agreed that the psychological effect might be bad and the reaction of the Jews and the Israelis would have to be taken into account.

As for economic aid to Israel - while no positive and definite figure had ever been mentioned, it had been the Committee's impression that Israel would get pretty close to the amount it had before. A reason for the lack of definiteness is that German reparations had to be taken into account and it had not been known exactly how much Israel might need for that reason. In view of the Iranian situation, Israel would probably get less than before. The figure might be between 50 and 60 million. However, if the Administration gives less than 60 million, Israel was not getting what it got before, and the content of the program could not be considered to be the same. There was a reference to the report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs which had told Congress that the content of the program would be the same as in the past. Accordingly, if Israel received less than 60 million there would be grounds for protest. While there is doubt that Congress would vote any additional funds, it was possible to transfer money to Iran under the 10% clause, and therefore it would be possible to increase aid to Iran without a drastic reduction in Israel's share.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the money was a gift and that in addition to that the US Government was continuing to make another gift through UJA tax exemption. Another difficulty in connection with the aid program is the Administration's fear that some money might be bogged down by the inability to get the Arabs to cooperate on area projects.

There is a reluctance to speak concretely on the Administration's plans and criticism is voiced of promiscuous and public transmission of information to foreign governments. Hard facts are unobtainable because my friend believes that many Jews in this country are on dangerous ground when they transmit information to the Israel Government. He offers no more than his own impressions and he asks that this be treated with the greatest confidence.

My friend plans to see the President when he returns from vacation, and he will continue his active interest in this entire matter.

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העתיקים: שר החוץ
השגריר

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בברכה,

א. עברון
מזכיר שני

אע/ש

N
החשד שהיה, א. מ. צו
וא. מ. צו
(א. מ. צו)
23/9
4/4/33

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