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on 11/1/53ConfidentialARAB MARAUDING IN ISRAEL1. The extent of Arab marauding in Israel and its affect on national security

The length of Israel's frontier in comparison with its very limited size turns almost every part of the country into a border region easily accessible to marauders. Israel has only 20 square miles of land for each mile of frontier. (By way of comparison, the United States has 800 square miles of land for every mile of frontier.)

1,000 marauding Arabs cross the border into Israel every month.

Most marauders carry firearms resulting in an average of an armed clash nearly every day.

Far from restricting their activities to petty crime, the marauders commit acts of deliberate sabotage such as cutting lines of communication, preparing ambushes and committing indiscriminate murder. Such cases as the murder of the Negev copper mines guards in July 1952 and the constant laying of mines on Negev roads point to central direction beyond the border.

During the year 1952, 2434 marauders were detained by Israel forces and there were ³⁷⁶~~289~~ armed clashes. During the same year there were 1,453 cases of theft, 46 cases of robbery with violence, 226 cases of smuggling, 12 cases of minelaying, 32 cases of thefts on lines of communications and 20 cases of sabotage.

During this period 60 Israelis were killed and 77 wounded by marauders.

Goods and livestock stolen during 1952 included:

- 869 cows, horses and mules
- 13,000 metres of electric cable
- 2,000 metres of irrigation pipes and irrigation machinery.

The total damage to property for the year 1952 amounted to about ~~one million dollars~~. *E.L. 356000*

There is no infiltration from Israel into Arab countries.

2. The effect of Arab marauding on area security

I. Arab marauding in Israel produces the same effects

a) irregular warfare in that :

- it disturbs the peace;
- it engenders an atmosphere of war;
- it harms the economy of the country, both by direct damage and by necessitating extensive security measures;

II. This irregular warfare serves the hostile purposes of the Arab States in that :

It fits in well with the general Arab policy that all possible acts of hostility - short of regular warfare - should be committed against Israel (economic boycott, political campaigns, efforts to exclude Israel from regional organizations, atrocity propaganda drives, etc.).

It is a means of striking Israel in her own territory with a minimum of risk.

It offers the Arab Governments a pretext to disclaim responsibility.

It serves as an outlet for the frustration and indignation felt by the refugees as result of the failure of the Arab governments to relieve their plight.

Measures taken by Israel against marauding are used by the Arabs for atrocity propaganda purposes.

The absence of peace and the open threats of a "second round" encourage marauding. On the other hand, marauding, as a source of border tension, undermines the chances of peace and the stability of the Middle East generally.

Marauding results in the deterioration of Israel-Arab relations and there is always the danger that, if not curbed, it may develop into an actual conflict involving the regular forces of both sides.

3. The attitude of Arab States to marauding

The numbers of intercepted or reported marauders in the month of March 1953 were :

Syrian sector	1
Lebanese "	10
Jordan "	133
Egyptian "	87

These figures show that when a State exercises strict border control, the number of marauders crossing into Israel from that State is almost negligible. This proves that marauding is easily controllable from any Arab State which chooses to take the necessary measures.

The Jordan sector is most open to infiltration. The Jordan authorities do not put any effective restraint upon marauding. This is especially true at the lower levels of administration. In certain areas, it has been proved that local authorities actually co-operate with bands of marauders. A further source of danger on this front is the National Guard which was established for the purpose of defending Arab villages. In fact, the National Guard puts arms in the hands of civilians who are not

responsible enough to carry them; nor has the National Guard any means of ensuring that the arms carried by its members will not be used for their own private ends. In many cases the National Guard has actively participated in the incursions of the marauders and Israel has suffered many losses in driving them back across the border.

In the Egyptian sector, there have been repeated ambushes and cases of minelaying and sabotage. In addition, the Egyptians encourage the settlement of Bedouins on Israel territory. The Bedouins are armed and often commit acts of sabotage on roads in the Negev.

4. Israel defense against marauding

Israel defends itself against marauding with every means at its disposal. However, no campaign against marauders can have permanent effect unless the marauders can be sought out in their bases and suitably punished.

The marauder from an Arab State, having committed his crime, has only to cross the border to be outside the reach of Israel law and to be safe from punishment. He can steal goods in Israel, murder the owner who tries to stop him, and sell the goods openly in the market of a town on his side of the border.

Action against marauders in their bases depends upon the willingness of Arab Governments to co-operate with Israel.

5. Measures for checking marauding

Israel has on several occasions proposed high level talks with Jordan. Israel has also from time to time

proposed measures for combatting marauding. These measures were presented in writing to Jordan on 25 March, 1953. So far no reply has been received.

These measures included :

(a) The removal of refugee camps from the border area and the gainful employment of the refugees. The UNRWA budget for rehabilitation is sufficient to cover this.

(b) Clear demarcation of the frontier and the partition of no-man's land.

(c) The registration of all arms and the confiscation of all explosives.

(d) Insistence on the responsibility of local authorities and local commanders for checking marauding.

(e) The punishment of marauders and frequent searches for stolen goods.

(f) An educational campaign against marauding.

(g) Frequent meetings between local commanders on both sides of the border for the exchange of information, the settlement of current problems and co-ordination of action against marauders.

The failure of Jordan to reply to this last approach and to agree to high level talks follows an increasing tendency on the part of Jordan not to honour the various agreements which were concluded between Israel and Jordan for the purpose of checking marauding. Israel co-operated fully in the implementation of the agreements, but the refusal of the Jordanian authorities to carry them out in the letter and spirit rendered them worthless.

A solution of the problem of marauding is possible only if the Arab Governments themselves are prepared to accept full responsibility for the crimes committed by their people across the Israel border, and to take action accordingly.

Hakirya, 12th May 1953.