**Report H00253**.

***CSOitT***

From: Sgan Aloof Shaoul Ramati **^** (\_ ^ ^

To: Aloof Me Makleff

'Mr. Shiloah Dr. Biran Aganv/Modl י in

**Informal M.A.C. Meeting held at Muntar El JQza on the 24th May,**

1951. י ■fר3|. ^־•.

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Kzin Modi'in, Pikud Hamerkaz.

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tlN: Colonel B.LJ1 de Hidder.

(Lt. Goumard).

HJK: Ahmed Bey Halil

Major Shara.

(Major Izhaq Lt. Dawoud Lt. Mustapha)

Israel: Sgan Aloof Ramati

Rav Seren Adelman (Dr. Biran ׳״ Sgan Aloof Hanegbi Segen Salant

Kzin Agan/Hativa 11 Segen Mishne Danny Matt )6

1. **Before the meeting.** W« reached to the top of ^untar el Joza in command cars. Boulders had been laid so as to block tracks clear only two days previously. On Muntar El **Joza** there were signs of ground being cleared by A!-abs in preparation for cultivation. The border mark had been partly destroyed, and the black cross in the rook, covered with earth. There is no doubt of the tactioal importance

of this height. The Jordanians arrived an hour late, explaining that they had been warned that they might be fired ay if they appeared in the area and had therefore waited for a HIT jeep to see that all was allright, They also complained of the terrible state of the track leading fron Idna to Muntar el Joza though the approach seems easier than from our side״

1. **Meeting,** Col, de Ridder stated he understood this was to be an informal meet, j and he had therefore not brought Miss Tibbett (who takes the shorthand record.) Actually it had been agreed a formal meeting would also be held, but when Mr,

Halil stated that he had as yet no word from Samir Pasha an how to deal with

the outstanding oonrolaints, we did not press the issue!!

Mr. Halil apologized for the District Commissioner not attending, but explained that the Minister of War was in Idna on a visit, and that though they had invited him to come with them, he had declined as ve had not been warned that he would be present. The District Commissioner had had to remain with him.

Mr, Halil then turned to the serious incident which had taken plaoe on the previous day in which, he alleged that 28 Israel soldiers had attacked Idna village a We gave our account of the engagement in the way it had in fact occured. The Jordanians were emphatice that no Legion armoured cars as was alleged by us had taken part in the exchange of fire0 W\* agreed to an immediate enquiry the first part of which was to be conducted by Lt, Goumard and Lt, Daoud immediately after the meeting. We remined the MAC that reports on joint enquiried should be signed by all the members of the enquiry commission and should ofinsist of statements of evidence of witnesses and of facts relevant to the complaint found on the ground by the commission. (Lately joint reports have been increasingly in the form of reports by ־the UN observer to the Chairman of the ס**י**, which is together an undesirable development). This was agreed. When e ,'enquiry later started, Lt. Goumard and Lt. Daoud were met by the Mukhtar of Idna who told them it has not safe to go to the area in question end that patrols were there fighting at all they came across, (ibis is competely untrue as none of our patrols were in the area. It thus soeins that the Arabs were trying to cover up tracks of their armoured cars, preparing "evidence" te show pur troops had penetrated into their area or else that they had not had time to - '<11 a number of their civilians and or national gfiapds who might hade been

Present:

Inside our area harvesting or grazing).

W• remarked to Mr, H lil that from where we were we could see that th« area for which the had asked us to grant permission to the Arabs to harvest had already been illegally harvested. The matter was only treated lightly and not pressed by us0 On the 25th howver, we put in a strong complaint as attabhed!) (The desirability for this was as much to shew the TJN as the Arabs that this was not a matter we could lightly tolerate, especially in view of the prevailing UN attitude that if Arabs have cultivated areas on our side of the line, it is the most natural thinjj in the world for them to harvest such arease)

We hen passed a stern warning to the meeting on infiltration, which despite the efforts we were certain the Jordan delegation was making,

,growing in solas especially in the Qalqilya, Hable, Rant is, Iswas sector!,

We hoped they would give this matter their urgent attention and to bring to the notioe of Samir Pasha that we considered the present situation intolerable^

We still hoped it could be dealt~With Within the framewor£~of the Deputy Chiefs' of Staffa agreement, but if not, would have to consider other measures0 (Later Malar-Sham told me he intended going to the area mentioned personally to tighten up\_measure»\_against infiltrees into Israel). The Jordan delegation thought the warning un justiTiecTby event 8o They were doing their best and returning stolen property. In the south the trouble was due to'thar' fao^that no liaison־~offioer from our side could be got hold of despite our agreement on telephones cto. (This is indeed a scandal. I wxplained to the Kzin Agam the importance of carrying out our agreements which in no way conflict with the desirability of killing the maxi mum number of Arabs whe cross into our area. )

Mr0 E alii asked us to stop Beduins crossing till an arrangement oould be made, as considerable humbers were still being expelled daily. Col. de Ridder was most emphatioef in insisting on the Chief of Staff's part in any arrangements an transfer of people over the Armistioe lines in accordance with the Security Council resolution £■ of November 1950 (this dealt with the Egyptian complaint on the Azazmeh.) Col. de Ridder after his reoent experienme in the Syrian dispute is dangerously "Security Council minded".

(Later in the day I asked Mr\* Rajasooria if in his opinion the above Security Council Resolution gave any rights for the UN Chief of Staff to question any agreements on transfer of people aoross the demarcation line entered inte directly by the 2 parties concerned. Mr. Bajasooria's opinion was definitely n6"« I asked him to mention this to Col\* de Ridder which he taaid he would do).

•After lunch (which was provided by us ~ the first time either side has entertained the other on the Jordan MAC - consisting of army rations beer wine and cognac) we discussed this matter further without the UN. Sgan Aloof Hanegbi explained the difficulty of stopping the Beduins from leaving even if he put a battalion on the line for the specifio purpose of preventing them. Mr. Halil admitted that 3,000 of the Beduins had stated they had left of their own volition. The other 5\*000 however, had claimed that they had been expelled by force or by economic pressure brought to bear on them by the drastio aurtailmentof their movements. Mr. Halil added he would be ready with his estimate of the oost involved in moving these 8,000 and the other

10,000 or 15,000 Beduins who still wished to leave our area to Karak and Ma'an by the next meeting!, Sgan Aloof Hanegbi hold him the transport oasts were practically non-existent as the Beduins were used to moving "under their own steam In years of drought they had often moved from the Sinai peninsula as far north as Beisan. H e thought the maximum expenses which could be considered by us would be 1 to mg pounds per head\*

I showed Major Shara the border "rujm" which had been tampered with to the extent that it was difficult to find it, let alone that it stood auto He promised to inspect the 12 kilometres marked, and see if they could not be demarcated in a clearer manner by driving whitewashed iron slakes into the ground, or perhaps by whitewashed oil drums \*He also stated he was doing his best to get the decision about not continuing with the general demarcation OXMX. of the line reversed!,