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**President:** Mr. Edvard HAMBRO (Norway).

**AGENDA ITEM 22**

**The situation in the Middle East (*continued*)**

1. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The unstable situation that has prevailed in the Middle East for more than two decades as the legacy of the problem which originally was called the "Palestine Question"—and when that question was considered in the United Nations it should not be forgotten that my country maintained an independent attitude; that situation I say worsened in the spring of 1967—and I am sure that all of us recall this fact with a feeling of sadness—until it culminated in an armed struggle of serious proportions.

2. Since that time Mexico has tried to contribute to the utmost of its ability to the restoration in that part of the world of a peace based on justice and international law, as is prescribed by the United Nations Charter. The immediate result of its efforts, together with those of other Latin American delegations, was reflected in the joint draft resolution which was contained in document A/L.523/Rev.1 of 4 July 1967<sup>1</sup> and which, although it commanded the largest number of votes of all the general texts submitted to the fifth special emergency session of the General Assembly, failed, unfortunately, to win the two-thirds support required by the Charter for its adoption.

3. The unselfish goals that we were pursuing and the principles which guided our action were summed up in the annual report made by the President of Mexico to the Congress of the Union of Mexican States on 1 September 1967 in which he said, *inter alia*:

"In this world in torment in which we live, we frequently find that emergency situations arise that at times endanger universal peace and cause great moral and material damage which is difficult or impossible to repair, in countries which, although not far removed in geographical terms from our own, are alien to the strict solidarity with which we view every human being . . .

"The experience of the past years shows us that any formula, if it is to be really fruitful, calls for the establishment of norms which will enable these countries to live as good neighbours, with mutual respect for their sovereignty, territorial integrity and all of their rights.

"We believe that Mexico has fulfilled a historical and political obligation in condemning the use of force in the settlement of international disputes, and in stating once again that war does not create any rights and that to base a right on the amoral use of physical violence would be tantamount to destroying the very foundations of what humanity has always understood the law to be. We refuse to recognize the alleged validity of the so-called victories won on the battlefields."

4. My delegation considers it an inescapable obligation again to fulfil today what was so ably described by President Díaz Ordaz as "a historical and political duty" by participating in the present debate on the situation in the Middle East.

5. We consider that this situation is incompatible with a number of the fundamental principles of the Charter, particularly if we take into account the definition of its meaning and scope that has been solemnly proclaimed in the Declaration that the General Assembly approved unanimously on 24 October [resolution 2627 (XXV)] and which is undoubtedly one of the most fitting documents to commemorate in fitting fashion the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

6. We also consider the fact that such a situation should not only have been prolonged, but that it should even have worsened seriously, implies non-compliance with the duties and obligations that the Charter assigns to the United Nations, especially to the Security Council and, within that organ, the functions assigned to its permanent members whose responsibilities should be understood to be in direct proportion to the privileged position that they enjoy, as my delegation pointed out for the record at the San Francisco Conference itself.

7. Lastly, we consider that the speedy settlement of this question, although a matter which should be in the first instance of interest to the parties directly concerned, is likewise of interest to all Members of the United Nations. It is of interest to them by virtue of the obligations formally assumed under this multilateral treaty that is the Charter; it is equally of interest to them as a measure of self-defence which would do away with what apparently by general consensus is

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Annexes*, agenda item 5.

described as the most alarming potential situation which exists at present and which, sooner or later, might lead to the outbreak of a conflagration which would involve the two nuclear super-Powers, a conflagration which we know full well would endanger the very survival of mankind.

8. Of course we are not unaware either of the complex nature of the situation nor of the obstacles that will have to be overcome, nor the difficulties that will have to be met. But at the same time we are convinced that the inertia, which, for reasons that I need not go into now, has predominated since 22 November 1967, when the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967), certainly does not constitute the best means for the Council itself to ensure the "prompt and effective action" mentioned in Article 24 of the Charter in entrusting to the Security Council the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . .".

9. From the very outset Mexico has considered that the fundamental principles, for whose approval and implementation we had fought at the fifth emergency special session in 1967, were to be found incorporated in resolution 242 (1967) in a balanced form; we saw with great satisfaction that this resolution is one of the very few of a like nature that have been able to command the unanimous support of all the members of the Council, and we noted now with similar gratification that the parties directly concerned in the conflict have repeatedly stated that they accept the application of the resolution in all its parts.

10. In order to become fully aware of the overriding importance of this unconditional acceptance, which was formally stated in the note of the Secretary-General reproduced in document S/9902 of 7 August last,<sup>2</sup> it is worthwhile recalling *in toto* the contents of the resolution. Accordingly, even though I am well aware that we are all familiar with this text, I should like now to read it out as a whole.

*"The Security Council,*

*"Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,*

*"Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,*

*"Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,*

*"1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:*

*"(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;*

*"(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;*

*"2. Affirms further the necessity*

*"(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;*

*"(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;*

*"(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;*

*"3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;*

*"4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible."*

11. Accordingly, we believe that the guideline of our present and future efforts should be that summarized by the President during the memorable meeting on 24 October, when he said that we should recognize our errors in a spirit of humility, mentioning as the capital sin among those errors the following which he described in masterly fashion, in the following words which, I think, deserve to be quoted precisely:

*" . . . it is clear that even the best of declarations are not enough, if we do not act on the inspiration we derive from them. Indeed, resolutions are a grave danger if they are not acted upon. Ignored principles, broken pledges and empty words may perhaps be the threnode of our Organization." [1883rd meeting, para. 77.]*

12. Thus, we entertain the conviction that the General Assembly should make an effort to ensure that resolution 242 (1967), which unfortunately has remained a dead letter for three years, is applied and fulfilled in all its parts without further delay.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1970*.

13. As was eloquently emphasized by U Thant in the statement he made here on 24 October, my delegation is convinced that, if our Organization is to avoid the sad fate which befell its predecessor, the League of Nations, it is essential that each and every one of its Members, in its relations with other States, should faithfully observe the principles of the Charter and fulfil with equal fidelity and good faith the obligations entailed therein.

14. We venture to hope that in so far as the question of the Middle East is concerned, although this is obviously a difficult task it is certainly a feasible one since a calm and objective study of the lessons of history shows conclusively that in the long run such a course of behaviour constitutes the best defence of the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the earth, whether they be members of large or small, weak or powerful States.

15. In this connexion may I recall what was expounded with such wisdom by Grotius three centuries ago in the prolegomena to the treatise on the law of war and peace,<sup>3</sup> and although I already had occasion to cite those words from this rostrum in 1967 [1587th meeting], I should like to repeat them now, by way of conclusion, because it seems to me that they still remain as relevant and up to date as they were then:

“For since, by his own admission, the national who in his own country obeys its laws is not foolish, even though, out of regard for that law he may be obliged to forgo certain things advantageous for himself, so that nation is not foolish which does not press its own advantage to the point of disregarding the laws common to nations. The reason in either case is the same. For just as the national, who violates the law of his country in order to obtain an immediate advantage, breaks down that by which the advantages of himself and his posterity are for all future time assured, so the State which transgresses the laws of nature and of nations cuts away also the bulwarks which safeguard its own future peace.”

16. The PRESIDENT: The situation now appears to be the following. A new draft resolution sponsored by a great number of countries, has been submitted and will be presented during this meeting in a few minutes' time. Hence it might be best, immediately after that, to postpone the rest of the debate so that we can respect the 24 hour rule.

17. Meanwhile, the representative of Jordan has asked for the floor to speak on the draft resolutions. I should like to ask him whether he would like to speak before or after the new draft resolution is introduced.

He asked for the floor before the representative who is to introduce the new draft resolution.

18. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): With your permission, I should like to speak and make certain points on the statement made by our colleague the representative of the United Kingdom, and also to make a short statement on behalf of my delegation and my Government.

19. My delegation listened with interest to the statement delivered yesterday [1893rd meeting] by Sir Colin Crowe on the Middle East crisis. We recall with appreciation that the British Foreign Secretary, in his policy statement this week, underlined the political aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs. Sir Colin Crowe emphasized the same right and added that any settlement must take account of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinians. Since this is a major foreign policy statement, certain points raised in it call for some clarification.

20. Sir Colin Crowe stated that his Government considers that the international boundary of the former Mandated Territory of Palestine should constitute the frontier between Israel and the United Arab Republic except for the Gaza area, for which special arrangements will have to be made and embodied in the agreement. As for the west bank of Jordan, the United Kingdom representative stated that in some areas the 5 June lines were impractical, dividing villages from their fields and even houses from their gardens.

21. It has been reiterated time and again that withdrawal and boundaries are not related; one is not conditional on the other. But it is worth mentioning that the same question of divided villages and fields and gardens applies to the Gaza area. In Gaza, the refugees live in crowded places. Many of them are economic refugees, having no income because their towns and villages are also divided from their fields, located on the other side of the armistice demarcation line.

22. The international boundary between Egypt and the former Mandated Territory of Palestine was never endorsed as the international boundary of Israel. Israel does not possess any recognized frontiers, but only armistice demarcation lines governed by the United Nations Armistice Agreements. The Palestinians have a vested interest in the territory adjacent to the Egyptian border. Neither the 1948 conflict nor any subsequent conflict took away, diminished or affected the rights of the people of Palestine. Therefore, while the Egyptian international border has been established for time immemorial, the Palestinian territory adjacent to it is subject to the final settlement of the Palestinian problem.

23. To treat this matter otherwise would amount to accommodating the aggressor and making aggression pay. If the Palestinians were, because of military occupation, prevented from exercising their sovereign

<sup>3</sup> Hugo Grotius, *On the Law of War and Peace*, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1925.

right over their own territory, whether in Gaza or elsewhere this does not mean that Israel acquired legal sovereignty over that territory. I am sure that the representative of the United Kingdom is aware of the fact that much of the territory adjacent to the Egyptian border belongs, under the partition resolution [181 (II)], to the Arab State of Palestine.

24. Since the United Kingdom, and indeed the United Nations, recognize the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, it follows that the seizure of territories earmarked for the Arab State of Palestine, under the United Nations resolution, gives Israel no title whatsoever. Certainly, Israel cannot acquire any right by violating the resolution to which it owes its very existence.

25. One other point, which I hope Sir Colin Crowe will clarify for my delegation, is the question of Jerusalem. On the one hand, Sir Colin Crowe is asking the Assembly to protect the delicate balance in resolution 242 (1967). On the other hand, he is saying that Jerusalem is a special problem which calls for separate agreements. I can see some contradiction here. We cannot take Jerusalem out of resolution 242 (1967) without affecting its balance and undermining its effectiveness. I see nothing in resolution 242 (1967) that excludes Jerusalem as a separate and special problem. Jerusalem is part and parcel of the west bank of Jordan.

26. Certainly, we all know that the Israelis tried to make a special problem of Jerusalem when they illegally annexed the Holy City, but we also know that both the Assembly and the Security Council condemned that Israeli action. In four resolutions, two adopted by the Assembly and two by the Security Council, both organs emphasized the cardinal principle enshrined in the Charter declaring the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force; both asked Israel to rescind all the measures taken; both declared such measures invalid; both deplored that Israeli action; and both, in effect, emphasized that Jerusalem is part and parcel of the west bank. There is nothing, therefore, that makes Jerusalem any different from the other parts of the west bank.

27. I know that Sir Colin Crowe is keen about not altering the delicate balance of the Security Council resolution. Jerusalem is the test of this balance and, luckily, the United Nations treated Jerusalem the same way as the Golan Heights, Sinai and Gaza.

28. I now come to another point raised: namely, whether withdrawal should be complete or with minor modifications. In this connexion, I hereby declare and emphasize the following: first, withdrawal must be complete and covering every Arab territory taken by force; second, withdrawal itself is not negotiable; third, I should like to make it very clear that I am available here in New York to discuss with Ambassador Jarring the modalities of withdrawal and not the question of withdrawal. Agreement on a time-table for withdrawal may be needed, but withdrawal itself is not subject to agreement. Fourth, it should also be made clear that withdrawal should start from the Holy City,

Jerusalem, which has been subjected to Israeli occupation for more than three years. It is essential as a first step towards a just peace that Jerusalem, which represents the religious heritage of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, should be relieved of Israeli Zionist military occupation. This is all the more essential since the Israeli authorities, dominated by racist considerations, are actively working to transform Jerusalem into a Jewish city.

29. My good friend and colleague Ambassador Crowe objected to our coming to the General Assembly for a remedy. I hope he realizes that in so doing he is lending support to the contention of the Foreign Minister of Israel, who has never hesitated to attack this important organ of the United Nations. In his answer to a question about the Assembly put to him and recorded for the Israeli radio, and which was broadcast from a recording on 17 October 1970 at 2100 GMT, Mr. Eban said:

“Well, there is almost nothing too unwise to be capable of adoption by the General Assembly. If you read some of the resolutions not only on our questions but on other questions, then I do not believe that the human mind is capable of inventing any folly of which the United Nations General Assembly is not in some cases capable. That refers to all subjects.”

He later said:

“That is one of the reasons why the proceedings of the General Assembly are going forward as though it were the most secret body in the world with total absence of international relevance.”

30. The United States representative, speaking in defence of resolution 242 (1967), emphasized the need for confidence and credibility. My delegation was hoping that the United States would speak about the many violations committed by Israel in the Holy City of Jerusalem, in the west bank, in the Golan Heights and in the Gaza area, which leave no room for confidence in Israeli intentions. The United States should have emphasized that, had they wanted to be fair and unbiased. The daily violations committed in the Gaza Strip and the west bank call for adequate measures to stop such violations and rescind all measures taken in the occupied territories. These are essential steps for the success of the efforts of Ambassador Jarring intended to bring peace with justice. Unless something is done to restore confidence in the American initiative I do not know how Ambassador Jarring can overcome present difficulties. If the American policy continues to take this negative attitude, we wonder for how long that American initiative will continue or how long we would feel that there is an American initiative. The attitude of the United States vis-à-vis the present debate will either bring hope for a just peace or another disaster bringing unforeseen surprises in the Middle East.

31. The revised draft resolution of the non-aligned States shortly to be presented [A/L.602/Rev.1] offers

some hope for progress in the Jarring mission. It needs the support of all Members. Jordan hopes that the United States will not continue to work against this draft resolution.

32. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Nigeria, who has asked for the floor, to introduce some amendments to the draft resolution before us.

33. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria): One of the greatest attributes of the United Nations, and particularly of the General Assembly, is the ability of Members to differ on issues and yet be agreeable in their differences, otherwise the quality of our debate will degenerate to the level of schoolboys' assemblies. The maintenance of this high standard imposes on representatives the great responsibility of weighing carefully the words they use in this august Assembly. The moment words are thrown around carelessly and the opinions of Member States, great or small, are denigrated, we shall begin to lose sight of the main issues and concentrate on abuse. That, of course, may be the aim of those who would assure us earnestly that they want peace in the Middle East but would hesitate to translate their verbal assurances into concrete actions.

34. In order to achieve the desired objective in this debate on the Middle East, which is peace in that area, the debate must be held in an atmosphere of calm and restraint devoid of the use of extreme words which are meant to incite other Members into a similar exercise. The end result of such an exercise can only be to render the United Nations even less effective and more of a laughing-stock.

35. In the opinion of my delegation the situation in the Middle East is so delicate and so explosive that we cannot afford to treat this debate with levity. That is why I consider it most regrettable that the Foreign Minister of Israel—whom I admire personally—has engaged in such a campaign of denigration against the co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/L.602 and Add.1 and 2. My concern is not that the Foreign Minister of Israel disagreed with the draft resolution. That is his privilege. My shock stems from the language in which he couched his disagreement and the imputation of irresponsibility made against representatives of sovereign States, Members of this Organization, who have shown as much concern as Mr. Eban in the maintenance of international peace and security. Perhaps I should point out that no country, however strong and powerful, can pretend to possess all wisdom. Equally, it would be criminally folly for any country to think that all others are wrong while it alone is right.

36. Since the beginning of this debate there has hardly been any delegation that spoke and did not cite the regrettable fact that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 has not yet been implemented. During his intervention on 2 October, at which he introduced draft resolution A/L.603, Ambassador Yost of the United States stated:

“The United States, for its part, remains completely dedicated to the goal of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, based on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts. We are concerned about the slow progress made to date in bringing this about, but we are convinced that it can still be obtained.” [1890th meeting, para. 64.]

37. This concern, in fact, is what has motivated the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/L.602 and Add.1 and 2. We are concerned at the non-implementation of a resolution which by common consent has been regarded as a blue print for the solution of the crisis in the Middle East. That concern is aptly reflected in our original draft resolution, both in its preambular and operative parts. How then can we be accused of irresponsibility just because of the fact that we have elaborated the position which has been widely taken by Member States of this Organization?

38. In his intervention on 30 October 1970, the Foreign Minister of Israel referred to draft resolution A/L.602 as “totally unbalanced”, “offensive” to the principle of Article 12 of the Charter “and even more destructive in its political effects” [1892nd meeting, para. 225]. He further went on to accuse the sponsors of the draft resolution of aiming “to destroy Security Council resolution 242 (1967)” [ibid., para. 226]. That accusation, in his view, arose out of the fact that, as he stated it, resolution 242 (1967) is: “so delicately balanced that the addition or subtraction of a single word . . . would destroy the basis” [ibid.] on which it was drawn up.

39. Those of us who sponsored this draft resolution did not by any stretch of the imagination pretend to be writing resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council all over again. But we were conscious of the spirit of the resolution and the essential ingredients in it. I regret that in making his generalized criticism the Foreign Minister of Israel did not specifically point to any single paragraph, preambular and operative, of the draft resolution which does not aim at a solution of the Middle East problem. In fact, I dare say that if all the operative paragraphs were implemented, that problem would shortly be solved. I should not like to indulge—as he has done with regard to those of us who co-sponsored draft resolution A/L.602 and Add.1 and 2—in the speculation that opposition to our draft resolutions stems from an unwillingness, in spite of the protestation to the contrary, by some delegations to see the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

40. The Israeli Foreign Minister suggested that resolution 242 (1967) should be left alone—that is his attitude. We say that the resolution should be implemented. It is precisely to have the resolution implemented that draft resolution A/L.602 and Add.1 and 2 sponsored by 21 countries specifically calls in its operative paragraph 3 for its speedy implementation and in its paragraph 5, the draft resolution also:



"Calls upon the parties directly concerned to instruct their representatives to resume contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in order to enable him to carry out, at the earliest possible date, his mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts".

41. I emphasized the last phrase of this particular operative paragraph—that is, "in all its parts" because the impression is being given that the sponsors of the draft resolution are being selective in the part of the resolution that should be implemented. That is quite contrary to the facts. How then can anyone who seriously believes in peace through the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) turn around to attack those who have put forward proposals to that end? How then can we be accused of having misquoted the mandate of Ambassador Jarring which is, according to Mr. Eban himself, not to implement the resolution by himself but to permit agreement between the States concerned on its implementation. Our draft speaks of contact between representatives of the parties directly concerned and Ambassador Jarring.

42. It is clear that references by detractors of this draft resolution to its assumed partiality show conclusively the bias with which the draft resolution was approached. Yet, I assure you, Mr. President, that this draft resolution was formulated after the most careful consultations with the principal aim of seeking the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Our draft does not seek to detract from Security Council resolution 242 (1967), but it also does not seek merely to repeat it word for word. To do so would have been to engage in an unnecessary exercise.

43. I am sure that the Foreign Minister of Israel, being an experienced parliamentarian, would realize that there is a great difference between debates in a national parliament where a minister has a majority of members supporting his point of view and a debate in this Assembly where representatives of sovereign States have to be convinced of the genuineness of one's case in the light of the maintenance of international peace and security to which we are all dedicated. Surely, the intervention of Mr. Eban last Friday could not have been calculated to win friends for his point of view. As I have earlier had occasion to mention, I believe that it would be foolhardy for any delegation to arrogate to itself exclusive wisdom and arrogate to other Members of this Organization exclusive folly.

44. *The New York Times* of Saturday, 31 October carried a report which should give food for thought. It stated that of all the 38 speakers who had up to that time spoken in this general debate only the United States and Liberia took the side of Israel. That should be a clear indication of the feeling of the General Assembly and thus of the international community on this very explosive situation. No country can afford to be out of step with the trend of international opinion with countries like South Africa and Portugal, bearing the tremendous responsibility which such intransigence might result in as regards the peace and security of the world.

45. The one constructive criticism that has been made—and it did not come from the Foreign Minister of Israel—in connexion with draft resolution A/L.602 and Add.1 and 2, sponsored now by 21 nations, may be that it does not refer to the cease-fire. Even in this connexion I recall the remarks made by Mr. Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, from this very rostrum on Friday, 19 September 1969, when he proposed that 24 October 1969 should be proclaimed as the day of universal cease-fire. He said, *inter alia*: "Of course the cease-fire does not in itself solve complex issues" [1757th meeting, para. 162]. We agree with him.

46. The sponsors of the draft resolution which I had the honour formally to introduce have kept an open mind towards anything that would be helpful in the situation and have considered, in the usual process of negotiation and consultation, the inclusion of amendments that would improve the formulation and the text of the draft resolution. It is in the light and in the spirit of such consultation and negotiation that I have been authorized by the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/L.602 and Add.1 and 2 to accept the amendments proposed by some friendly delegations. We firmly believe that the incorporation of those amendments will make the revised draft resolution more palatable by restoring the oft-repeated balance and will find ready acceptance by the majority of delegation, enabling them to sponsor the draft resolution or, at the very least, to vote in favour of it rather than to abstain.

47. The revised text<sup>4</sup> which we, the 21 sponsors, expect the Secretariat to reproduce as a document of the Assembly, as a revision of document A/L.602 and Add.1 and 2, should read as follows:

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Seriously concerned that the continuation of the present grave and deteriorating situation in the Middle East constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,*

*"Reaffirming that no territorial acquisition resulting from the use or threat of force shall be recognized,*

*"Deploping the continued occupation of the Arab territories since 5 June 1967,*

*"Seriously concerned that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which was unanimously adopted and which provides for a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East, has not yet been implemented,*

*"Having considered the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East,*

*"1. Reaffirms the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force, and consequently territories thus occupied must be restored;*

<sup>4</sup> Subsequently circulated as document A/L.602/Rev.1.

"2. *Reaffirms* that the establishment of peace requires the respect for and the acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area;

"2. *Recognizes* that the respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

"4. *Urges* the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which provides for the peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East, in all its parts;

"5. *Calls upon* the parties directly concerned to instruct their representatives to resume contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in order to enable him to carry out, at the earliest possible date, his mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts;

"6. *Appeals* to the parties to cease fire for a period of three months in order to facilitate the task of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

"7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within a period of two months, and to the General Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967;

"8. *Requests* the Security Council to consider, if necessary, taking steps, under the relevant Articles of the Charter, to ensure the implementation of its resolution."

48. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Argentina has asked for the floor to introduce the draft resolution to which I have already alluded. However, he indicates that he prefers to wait for a few minutes until the text has been distributed.

49. Meanwhile, the representative of Israel has indicated his desire to speak in exercise of the right of reply. If there is no objection, and if he and the representative of Argentina are agreeable, I shall call on him now. I shall also remind him of the fact that there is a time-limit of 10 minutes for rights of reply in this debate.

50. Mr. EBAN (Israel): I rise to reply to observations made this morning by the representatives of Jordan and of Nigeria. The representative of Jordan is apparently not capable of quoting me accurately. I certainly have referred on many occasions to the negative effects upon the relevance of the United Nations of resolutions which are adopted without reference to equity or to consequence. I will not follow the representative of Jordan in his discussion of ideas expressed on behalf of the British Government both in London and before the General Assembly. Those ideas do not commit or engage my Government and do not have its consent. I will not discuss what was said by the representative

of Jordan on Jerusalem because on this and on other matters our position has been made known to the United Nations on many occasions and has not changed.

51. But these matters are not before the General Assembly. The secure and recognized boundaries to be established in peace between Israel and its neighbours must be established by discussion and by agreement and cannot be dictated from outside. We are available for discussion and we are available for agreement. I note that the British Foreign Secretary and the representative of the United Kingdom here said correctly that it is not possible or desirable to impose solutions. Therefore the details concerning the territorial settlement remain to be discussed and agreed within the context of the peace-making process. What we are concerned with here is the question how to overcome the obstacles which have recently prevented any constructive dialogue on peace. In other words, the issue is negotiation, how to start it and what are the obstacles which prevent it? It is in that connexion that I want to make observations on certain draft resolutions which have also been referred to by those who have spoken this morning.

52. There is the draft resolution contained in document A/L.602/Rev.1 presented by a group of countries, the majority of which do not even maintain normal relations with Israel. That draft resolution, as superficially revised, is partisan. It is one-sided, it is invidious, it is disruptive of the delicate balance of the United Nations jurisprudence which as of this day stands exclusively on Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

53. I repeat what the representative of Nigeria has rightly attributed to me, the statement that resolution 242 (1967) is so delicately balanced that the addition or subtraction of a single word, the attribution of special weight to one principle and not to another, any selective quotation, would be enough to disturb that delicate balance, and draft resolution A/L.602/Rev.1, as superficially revised, does have that effect.

54. I believe that the events of the past week have proved that that draft resolution is not an expression of a United Nations consensus and cannot be the basis of a consensus between the parties. There are three draft resolutions which have been discussed recently within the General Assembly. None of them fully endorses our position, but I would tell the representative of Nigeria that the question which preoccupies me is not whether a position is or is not identical with that of Israel, but whether a specific action would or would not enable the Jarring mission to be resumed, once we were able somehow to overcome the crisis of confidence created by the missile crisis. Of the three texts which have been under discussion, one and one alone, namely, A/L.602/Rev.1 would, if accepted, aggravate the tension and prevent the normal and effective resumption of the Jarring mission even after the missile crisis is overcome.

55. The Israel Government agreed on 4 August and communicated to Ambassador Jarring on 4 August its

consent to an initiative for opening the peace dialogue. We agreed to Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as it stood. We agreed specifically to the procedural framework of the Jarring mission. We agreed to the principle of the establishment of peace, mutual recognition, secure and recognized boundaries, the withdrawal of armed forces to secure agreed and recognized boundaries. Everybody remembers how this agreement by the Government of Israel on 6 August kindled a new hope, which was intensified and reinforced when the cease-fire came into effect on 7 August. But surely it is my duty to tell the General Assembly that this agreement would not be applicable to a United Nations jurisprudence which included the text of draft resolution A/L.602/Rev.1. Therefore this is a text of which the effect would be—and I am discussing effect and not intention—that even if we were able to overcome the missile crisis, the Jarring mission would not be able to work, because the agreed documentary consensus would have been needlessly disrupted by the text of this draft resolution.

56. The meticulous respect shown by all other texts and working papers for Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is not shown in document A/L.602/Rev.1. This is not the resolution to which agreement was given; this is not the Security Council resolution. It is a draft resolution, for example, without the crucial matter of promotion of agreement; it is a draft resolution in which Mr. Jarring's mission is misquoted; it is a draft resolution which ignores such problems as freedom of navigation, problems which have been crucial in two wars which have broken out in the Middle East; it is a draft resolution which gives a new and tendentious formulation to the Security Council provision for a just settlement of the refugee problem; it is a draft resolution which contains an invidious deplo-ration of something, without deploring the fact that the Arab States have not agreed to make permanent peace with Israel as it is. It is not a draft resolution which confines itself to the literal, unexpanded and unrestricted reference to Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and it sweeps under the carpet and completely ignores the necessity to deal with the problem of confidence created by the violations—universally recognized as violations—of the cease-fire.

57. Since its adoption would take the situation many steps backward, since it would create an addition to the existing obstacle of the missile crisis, new obstacles which would impede the Jarring mission even if the missile crisis were overcome, I think it is at least my duty and responsibility to draw the General Assembly's attention to this. After all, there is no law of nature which restricts the General Assembly's action to the text presented by one group of countries, especially, as I have said, when half of them do not even maintain relations with Israel; and perhaps, therefore, there is a subjective as well as an objective impossibility for this group to express a consensus between the parties and the world community.

58. So I repeat, of the three draft resolutions known to us there is one and one alone which creates new obstacles to the Jarring mission in addition to the obsta-

cle—which I hope will somehow be overcome—which arises from the missile crisis. We therefore believe that it is only by the elimination of this partisan text that the way would be opened for the consideration of other possibilities which would, by meticulous fidelity to Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and to the principle of agreement and to a cease-fire genuinely and reciprocally observed, open the way to favourable developments in the future.

59. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Jordan has asked to exercise his right of reply. It is normal to do so at the end of a meeting, but since the representative of Israel has spoken before the end of the meeting, it is probably a more just procedure to let Jordan exercise its right of reply now. I understand that the representative of Argentina has no objection to waiting for another 10 minutes. May I then ask the representative of Jordan to speak and also to observe the 10 minute limit.

60. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): I shall be brief, and I shall finish within the time-limit fixed. Mr. Eban has said that Jordan was not capable of quoting him correctly. I think that if Mr. Eban has any complaints to make, he should make them to the British Broadcasting Corporation monitor, Middle East section, section three. I quoted the hour and the date of the statement made by Mr. Eban himself and monitored by the BBC Monitor Service of the Middle East.

61. The other question is Jerusalem. It is not surprising that Mr. Eban just mentioned Jerusalem and then moved to another question. He said: "Our position is very clear." Yes, it is very clear. The Assembly called upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem. To this Mr. Eban said no. In another decision also taken on the same question—resolution 2253 (ES-V)—the Assembly reiterated its call to Israel. Again Mr. Eban said no. We went to the Security Council. There again the Council deplored the failure of Israel and also considered all steps taken as invalid and called upon Israel to rescind them. To this Israel said no. Again we went to the Security Council and another warning was issued to Israel. To this the answer was negative.

62. When we speak of the possibility of solutions, only behaviour can show the motives and the intentions. In Jerusalem we continue to see more changes being made every day. I have before me *The Tribune* of 17 October. It speaks about the arbitrary measures taken, the violations committed every day, the continued acts intended to change the character and status of the City of Jerusalem, yet we hear Mr. Eban coming here to sing the same old song of peace which he does not mean. There is a recent article of 18 October—last month—which states that: "Over 4,000 acres of land had been confiscated with 90 per cent of that total coming from Arab owners; huge apartment projects are being built on the land for Jewish families; the new buildings are being placed in the crescent around what used to be the eastern border of Jewish Jerusalem before the war." In addition to that, Jerusalem itself



was enlarged to include many Arab towns, such as Ramallah, Bethlehem and others. And Mr. Eban comes here to say: "Our position on Jerusalem is well known." Yes, it is well known: annexation, defiance, ignoring the will of the United Nations and coming here to speak about agreement.

63. With regard to the mention of agreement, certainly the word "agreement" is sometimes misleading. Mr. Eban knows very well that they made many agreements, which they have never implemented or fulfilled. I have in mind the Protocol of Lausanne, which is before me. It is very clear that Mr. Eban, through his representative, Walter Eytan, signed an agreement through the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine on 12 May 1949, in a meeting at 10.30 a.m., attended by the French representative, as Chairman, the Turkish representative, the United States representative and the representative of the United Nations. Mr. Eytan, on behalf of his own Government, signed that agreement. What has happened to that agreement?

64. Speaking of secure borders, again I have the statement of Mr. Shertok before me. Immediately—to be exact, six months after the announcement of the creation of Israel by the United Nations—we find Mr. Shertok, speaking on behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel on 15 November 1948, saying: "The 29 November [1947] resolution was the only"—I repeat: the only—"valid basis for a territorial settlement".<sup>5</sup>

65. Those are agreements, those are obligations, those are undertakings. And before seeking promises for the future Israel should honour its promises of the past so that one can believe that there is an entity which would like to live and let live in peace; that there is a desire to coexist, a desire not to expand, a desire to abide within what the United Nations has allotted to Israel. But speaking about agreements while they violate every single agreement is something which deceives no one except, perhaps, the Israelis who keep repeating the lie in the hope that it will stick.

66. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): On behalf of the representatives of the delegations of Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Argentina, I have the privilege of submitting for the consideration of this Assembly the draft resolution that has just been circulated in document A/L.604.

67. The Latin American countries which are the sponsors of this draft have thought over the whole matter very carefully before submitting the text. They finally decided to submit the text, however, because in view of the continuation of the serious threat in the Middle East the international community represented by the United Nations must exercise the right and the duty

that devolve upon this Organization to make a positive contribution to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region.

68. For our part, we have decided to assume this responsibility and we believe that the best way of making a concrete and constructive contribution is through the submission of a draft which we consider likely to meet with general approval. The experience of 25 years of this international Organization shows quite clearly that, in delicate and controversial political questions—and the case of the Middle East is, undoubtedly, one such case—only those resolutions that have the support, or at least the acceptance, of the parties directly concerned offer the best and most realistic prospects for a solution. Those resolutions that consider the interests of only one of the parties, no matter how many votes they obtain, are destined to fail in practice.

69. In our opinion that criterion is fundamental and should guide the efforts of this Assembly because, in the final analysis, above and beyond the relative measure of satisfaction to be derived from an alleged success in the counting of votes, the settlement of the conflicts between the parties concerned would still remain pending. And if what we are all seeking is peace through negotiation and understanding, there is no doubt that that cannot be achieved without the co-operation and the consent of the two parties involved in the dispute.

70. We have said this because we believe—and we say this with all due respect to the sponsors of the other two draft resolutions that are before the Assembly—that neither the draft contained in document A/L.602/Rev.1 nor that in document A/L.603 offers this guarantee of impartiality, which is a basic prerequisite for general approval. Let us not give Ambassador Jarring an impossible mission. Let us enable him to find a way out on the basis of a resolution that has the support of a vast majority of the Members of the United Nations and, above all, that can as a minimum count on a receptive attitude from both parties. That is the objective which our draft is designed to achieve.

71. In drafting it, the countries in whose behalf I am speaking now have drawn their inspiration from the traditional position of the Latin American Group, which has always given special attention to the evolution of the situation in the Middle East and has tried to act in this respect displaying the balanced and thoughtful attitude, which reflects the fact that our continent, geographically speaking, is far removed from the area of conflict, there are no Latin American interests directly concerned, and our countries maintain cordial relations with both parties to the dispute.

72. Evidence of this objectivity and this will to co-operate is to be found in the active role that Latin America played in the General Assembly in connexion with the 1967 crisis. Everyone will recall the positive elements contained in the Latin American draft submit-

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I, First Committee, 200th meeting, p. 644.*

ted on that occasion.<sup>6</sup> The Under-Secretary for External Relations of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, with his customary lucidity and eloquence, referred in detail this morning to the circumstances attending the submission of that draft and its discussion at the fifth emergency special session. Unfortunately—and in saying “unfortunately” I believe that I reflect the opinion of many groups, and not only that of the Latin American group—this text did not receive the necessary majority vote. But we should not be deceived, because the appropriateness of this Latin American draft is proved by the fact that it provided the basis for resolution 242 (1967) which was subsequently adopted unanimously by the Security Council.

73. In the draft resolution that we are now submitting to the Assembly for its consideration, the Latin American countries have based their text on two fundamental documents: the Charter of the United Nations and resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council. As representatives will note, the third paragraph of the preamble of our draft resolution states that a just and lasting peace, that is essential to the region, should be based on respect for the aims, purposes and principles of the United Nations. We have borne particularly in mind, and we emphatically reaffirm, principles such as tolerance and coexistence in peace as good neighbours, which are touched upon in the preamble of the Charter; the maintenance of international peace and security; the development of friendly relations among nations; the compliance in good faith with international obligations; the peaceful settlement of controversies without endangering international peace and security or justice; refraining from the use or threat of force, and other principles that have been repeatedly recalled.

74. With respect to resolution 242 (1967), draft resolution A/L.604 offers that text its fullest support and advocates measures designed to bring about the speedy and full implementation of the text in all its parts. The draft contains no mention of or explicit reference to the elements contained in resolution 242 (1967), and this is not the result of haste or an excessive desire to be brief. We have thought—and in fact thought much—about the desirability of including words, phrases or principles drawn from resolution 242 (1967) and more than once we were tempted to do this because that resolution contains concepts that the Latin American countries consider fundamental and which are cherished in their best legal traditions.

75. Finally, however, we decided to confine ourselves to reaffirming and endorsing resolution 242 (1967) without commenting on it or paraphrasing it. The balance that that text represents is so delicate—and I would venture to say so fragile—that we were afraid to introduce elements that might alter this equilibrium even in the most involuntary way.

76. Mention in isolation of the elements that make up resolution 242 (1967), whichever element was picked out, would be to the detriment of the others that are also included. Resolution 242 (1967) as a whole—and

only as a whole—constitutes an entity that has received general approval. If any one of its elements is separated out in order to lay greater emphasis on that particular element, the others lose force and beyond question the balance of the whole text is thus impaired.

77. Latin America yields to no one its primacy in the defence of the norms and measures contained in resolution 242 (1967). Its elements constitute principles or are based on principles that Latin America has always supported and that form part of what has come to be called American international law.

78. Accordingly, we emphatically reaffirm that each and every one of the concepts contained in resolution 242 (1967) remain in force namely: the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war; the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security; the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the termination of all states of belligerency or allegations of the existence of their states and respect for and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; the guarantee of freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; the achievement of a just settlement of the refugee problem; and the guarantee of the territorial inviolability and political independence of all States in the area through the adoption of measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.

79. The fundamental purpose that has guided the Latin American countries which have submitted this draft resolution has been, on the one hand, to maintain the careful balance attained in resolution 242 (1967) and, on the other, to facilitate the resumption of the Jarring mission, without setting up directly or indirectly any obstacles, impediments or limitations in its way but rather, on the contrary, by ensuring the creation of circumstances favourable for its success such as, for example, the use of United Nations Observers to supervise the cease-fire, which it is suggested should be prolonged for a reasonable period of time and which should be scrupulously complied with.

80. The Latin American delegations on whose behalf I am speaking are guided by the sole and legitimate desire to contribute in an impartial and positive manner to the establishment of adequate conditions that will permit of the development of negotiations leading to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area. And so doing we believe that we are acting not only in accordance with the aspirations and purposes of the international community but also—and I want to emphasize this in particular—in accordance with the wishes of the parties directly concerned, because we are sure that they, like the other countries Members of this Organization, sincerely desire peace. We believe that the draft resolution we are proposing constitutes a fitting step in that direction.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 5, document A/L.523/Rev.1

81. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The French delegation has just submitted amendments<sup>7</sup> to the draft resolution contained in document A/L.602 and Add.1 and 2. I now call on the representative of France to introduce these amendments.

82. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): A few minutes ago when our colleague from Nigeria presented a revised draft resolution, the amendments to the draft resolution which we intended to submit had already been handed in to the Secretariat. It so happens that the Nigerian draft resolution to a large extent meets our concerns, which is not surprising because, after all, those concerns were recently discussed unofficially; we should like to thank the co-sponsors for their effort to meet our views. However, in order for things to be quite clear and in view of the need for all of us, in this serious debate, to assume our responsibilities, I think it would be useful if I formally introduced the amendments to the draft resolution which we intended to submit.

83. By presenting various amendments to the draft resolution contained in document A/L.602 and Add.1 and 2 submitted by 21 African, Asian and European countries, we are guided by only one consideration, the need to hasten the conclusion of a peaceful settlement based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and, therefore, to afford an opportunity to this Assembly—in quasi-unanimity, if not in unanimity—to bring to bear the full weight of its moral authority on negotiations and peace.

84. Our amendments will surprise no one. They are exactly in line with the statement which we had the honour to make in the Assembly [1891st meeting]. They are designed to give to the draft resolution a balance, a sense of measure which seem indispensable to us if we wish to increase its effectiveness. We think that we are thus taking into account the concerns expressed to us by a large number of delegations. If we had had more time, I believe we probably would have had no difficulty in finding several co-sponsors. But, as I just said, the main thing is that everyone's position should be clear and that everyone should clearly assume his responsibilities.

85. We therefore propose first that, in the preamble the third paragraph should be deleted. This reads: "*Reaffirming* that the territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force." It is not that we have any objection to the idea thus expressed, but that it is more or less repeated in the next paragraph: "*Determined* that no territorial acquisition resulting from the use or threat of force shall be recognized." There was obvious duplication here which had to be eliminated.

Secondly, in the fifth preambular paragraph, we ask for the deletion of the words "by the armed forces of Israel". That reference is not in its proper place, and, because we want a resolution of reconciliation

and of peace, we wish to avoid any reference that could in the slightest degree smack of polemics.

86. In the operative part, we first propose the addition of a new paragraph, after paragraph 1, which would read—it is taken in its entirety from paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 242 (1967):

"*Reaffirms* that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of both the following principles:

"(a) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

"(b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force."

In order to avoid reviving an old quarrel, this must be quoted exactly as it appears in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), that is, the English text in the original English version, the French text in the original French version, the Russian text in the original Russian version, and so on.

87. That paragraph restores balance in the resolution. We explained that at length in our statement: Security Council resolution 242 (1967) contains an indissoluble link between withdrawal and undertakings of peace. By introducing this new paragraph, we are doing away with the criticism that the draft resolution stresses only one of the essential provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Be it said in passing that the latter resolution is reaffirmed *in toto* in one of the following paragraphs of the operative part.

88. Secondly, we did not deem it possible to accept the present wording of the paragraph concerning the Palestinians, because as far as we are concerned there can be no prior condition when it is a matter of peace. But it would have been unthinkable not to mention the Palestine problem in such a debate. That problem is not only a problem of refugees but also a human problem and, therefore, as the President of the French Republic said a long time ago it is a "political problem". Moreover, we note that every delegation, no matter what its views, at least mentioned that element. It is therefore important that respect for the rights of the Palestinians be mentioned in the framework of a resolution which supports a peaceful settlement based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We think that the wording of our amendment should not give rise to any objection on anyone's part. Our wording is based on our concern for justice and realism.

89. Thirdly, it is obvious that in the present situation mention had to be made of the cease-fire at least for a given period. We have therefore introduced a new paragraph, after paragraph 5, which would read as follows:

<sup>7</sup> Subsequently circulated as document A/L.606.

“*Recommends to the parties that they extend the cease-fire for a period of three months in order that they may enter into talks under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967)*”.

90. Finally, in the last operative paragraph, we have replaced “taking steps” by “making arrangements”. Indeed, the Assembly cannot take the place of the Security Council, which alone is entitled to apply the means entrusted to it by the Charter. We cannot pre-judge what procedure the Council will deem it appropriate to use; we must leave it full flexibility and freedom of action.

91. If those amendments were accepted by the sponsors we should be able to vote in favour of the draft resolution. Is it necessary to say that, even with those amendments, the draft resolution is not exactly drafted as we would have drafted it? However, it does meet the main essential elements which are reflected in the statement of the Secretary-General after the dinner of the four Powers: first, implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its provisions; secondly, resumption of the Jarring conversations; thirdly, continuation of the cease-fire for a sufficient period to enable the negotiations to resume.

92. We insistently ask the co-sponsors to accept our amendments as they are. We express the wish that the amended resolution will be approved by the Assembly. This would be the clearest manner for all of us firmly and unequivocally to proclaim our will to see a just and lasting peace established.

93. The PRESIDENT: Apart from the two draft resolutions that have already been introduced [A/L.602 and Add.1 and 2, A/L.603], we now have before us various amendments. We have the amendments proposed by the representative of Nigeria incorporated in document A/L.602/Rev.1, we have the amendments proposed by the French delegation [A/L.606] and we have the new draft resolution presented by a great number of Latin American Republics [A/L.604]. It would probably be a wise procedure for the Assembly to decide now, in accordance with rule 80 of the rules of procedure, to take a pause in order to permit representatives to study those proposals before the debate continues.

94. Therefore, if there is no objection on the part of the Assembly, the meeting this afternoon will be cancelled and the debate will be resumed tomorrow morning on the basis of all the draft resolutions we have received. Since I hear no objection I take it that the Assembly agrees to that procedure.

95. One representative, the representative of Spain, had already indicated his desire to speak before I made my proposal. In fairness, I should ask him whether he prefers to speak at this meeting or to wait until tomorrow.

96. Mr. de PINIES (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation would not have objected to

waiting until our meeting tomorrow, but I believe, however, that in order to leave matters in due and proper form, it would be better for me to speak now, because the purpose for which I wanted to take the floor was to support the proposal made by the representative of France in introducing certain amendments. True, the procedure followed has been somewhat the inverse; that is to say, the representative of Nigeria kindly accepted *a priori* a series of amendments that were submitted for consideration and for an exchange of views. But, for the same reasons that were adduced by the representative of France, I too thought it would be appropriate for me to state our position for the record. We fully support the French proposals. At the same time, I should like to state that in so doing we believe that the original text, contained in document A/L.602 and Add.1 and 2, is considerably improved. Yesterday, we subscribed to that draft resolution. However, we have already indicated that we thought it would be necessary to extend the cease-fire for a further period to be mutually agreed upon—a period which is now fixed at three months—so that Ambassador Jarring’s mission could be speedily set in train.

97. Moreover, my delegation also considers that with the amended or rather the revised text we have not only substantially improved the text but we also reaffirm the basic resolution 242 (1967). In other words, as we see it, the existence of the States of the area, with their full territorial integrity, with the mutual respect that should be entertained by one State for another, is one of the essential elements of the resolution. Now, we do not believe that because the resolution is so perfectly balanced we should remain inactive. The fact is that experience has taught those of us who have been working for three and a half years since the six-days war broke out in 1967. It is three years since resolution 242 (1967) was adopted. But what has happened to that resolution? Yesterday, we drew attention to what has happened. Everyone accepts the resolution as exceedingly balanced; no one wishes to touch it, and apparently nobody wants to carry it out. In our opinion, this is serious, and for that reason we believe that world opinion, as reflected in this Assembly, is the factor that should make its views known. We have stated, and we continue to believe, that the basic resolution 242 (1967) is the text needed, once it is complied with, to resolve the conflict in the Middle East. But if we confine ourselves merely to reaffirming its worth, but do not comply with it, we are getting nowhere.

98. Yesterday, we made an appeal to the effect that at this twenty-fifth anniversary we should, once and for all, settle the conflict in the Middle East. We believe that we should all attempt, we should all make a determined effort, to ensure that the resolution is carried out, so that at this twenty-fifth anniversary we should not be frustrated in our efforts and so that we should at least succeed in imposing a peace which is so badly needed, so that all of the States of the area can live in peace, indeed as is the right of all. Let us make additional efforts in other areas and we shall resolve a good many conflicts, but I do not think that is the matter we are called upon to consider today.



99. The PRESIDENT: There has been no objection to postponing the next meeting until tomorrow, and it will accordingly be held then instead of this afternoon.

100. The First Committee, for its part, is very short of time, and since I understand that it had scheduled no meetings today in order that its members might listen to the debate here, I should like to ask the Under-Secretary-General whether anything might be done from this rostrum, even at this late hour, to arrange for it to hold a meeting this afternoon.

101. The Under-Secretary-General advises me that in fact the First Committee is holding no meetings today not because of this debate but because it had no delegations ready to speak.

102. The representative of Saudi Arabia has indicated that he wishes to speak, and I call on him.

103. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I think that during this session, when we are commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, we should address ourselves much more seriously to our

work than we have done so far. Mr. President, with your permission, may I suggest that the First Committee should meet this afternoon as well as the Fourth Committee and the Committee of Twenty-Four,<sup>8</sup> which also have postponed their meetings. After all, what would be the impact of our work on the outside world if it knew that we have not disposed of even that fraction of the agenda which is expected of us? If someone decides to speak, he may generate other speeches, and I am thus willing to speak today in the First Committee.

104. The PRESIDENT: Unfortunately, it is not for the President of the General Assembly to convene meetings of the Committees. They are convened by the Chairmen of the Committees. It has not been possible to find the Chairman of the First Committee, but I suggest that the Secretariat should try to get in touch with him and that the members of the First Committee should ascertain in the early afternoon whether a meeting has been convened.

*The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.*

<sup>8</sup> Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.