



CONTENTS

Agenda item 66:	
Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956 (continued)	1213
Agenda item 56:	
Question of amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council (concluded)	1224
Agenda item 57:	
Question of amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to increase the membership of the Economic and Social Council.....	1224
Agenda item 58:	
Question of amending the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations and Article 69 of the Statute of the Court, with respect to an increase in the number of judges of the International Court of Justice.....	1224
Agenda item 37:	
Question of South West Africa: report of the Committee on South West Africa	
Report of the Fourth Committee.....	1224
Agenda item 13:	
Report of the Trusteeship Council	
Report of the Fourth Committee.....	1224
Agenda item 40:	
Question of the frontier between the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration and Ethiopia: reports of the Governments of Ethiopia and of Italy	
Report of the Fourth Committee.....	1224
Agenda item 27:	
Economic development of under-developed countries:	
(a) Question of the establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development: report of the <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee;	
(b) International tax problems: report of the Economic and Social Council;	
(c) Industrialization of under-developed countries	
Report of the Second Committee.....	1229
Agenda item 26:	
Programmes of technical assistance (concluded):	
(a) Report of the Economic and Social Council;	
(b) Confirmation of allocation of funds under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance	
Reports of the Second Committee and of the Fifth Committee	1231

President: Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON
(Thailand).

AGENDA ITEM 66

Question considered by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly from 1 to 10 November 1956 (continued)

1. Mr. ULLRICH (Czechoslovakia): On 2 February 1957 the General Assembly adopted a resolution [1124 (XI)] in which it deplores the attitude of Israel which even after six appeals by the General Assembly did not withdraw its troops from the Egyptian territory, and in which it urges again immediate and complete withdrawal of the aggressor's forces behind the armistice line. But even this resolution of the General Assembly remains, after the elapse of more than three weeks, unfulfilled. Thus for many months Israel is frustrating by its delaying manoeuvres the implementation of the basic prerequisite of a peaceful settlement of the serious situation which arose as a result of the armed aggression against Egypt. In order to remove completely the disastrous consequences of this aggression and to restore normalcy in the Suez Canal area, it is absolutely necessary to ensure the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Israel troops from the occupied territory. The attitude of Israel provokes indignation not only in the Arab countries, but everywhere, where people are sincerely desirous of a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

2. The Secretary-General's report of 11 February 1957 [A/3527] shows clearly that Israel not only consistently refuses to withdraw its forces from the Egyptian territory, but refuses also to discuss earnestly with the Secretary-General the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions. Instead of answering a clear-cut and simple question whether or not it is willing to withdraw its troops without any further delay, Israel continues its delaying tactics and is advancing again and again new demands, once in the form of "conditions for withdrawal", or again in the form of "seeking clarification". The course taken by Israel, obviously, does not contribute to the clarification of the situation. On the contrary, it follows the aim of complicating the whole matter and making impossible for the Secretary-General to fulfil his task. The Secretary-General states in paragraph 4 of his report Israel's request for various clarifications "leaves open the question whether it involves a willingness to comply with the demand for withdrawal in resolution 1124 (XI), even given a positive response by Egypt".

3. Analyzing the attitude of Israel during the negotiations with the Secretary-General as well as in the correspondence with him, the report states that the position of Israel equals an outright refusal to comply with the resolution of the General Assembly.

4. However, Israel goes even further. It not only advances ever-increasing demands as conditions, but avoids even to state clearly its stand towards the request for withdrawal even given an acceptance of its demands. In paragraph 8 of the report we read for

instance that "the representative of Israel in his latest communication has stated only that his Government 'would formulate its position on all outstanding questions in the light of Egypt's response'."

5. In the letter of 5 February 1957 to the Secretary-General, the representative of Israel stated:

"Accordingly, on the clarification of these basic matters, a position would be created in which the other questions which you raised at yesterday's meeting could be considered in a more practical way" [A/3527, annex II].

Is it not clear to everybody that all these tactics have only one aim, namely, to enable Israel to secure gradually, step by step, ever-increasing advantages out of its aggression without itself assuming any obligations whatsoever in any respect?

6. Israel repeatedly pretends that it has no assurance that Egypt will abide by the armistice provisions. This reference by Israel to the Armistice Agreement sounds strange when we keep in mind that in the past it was Israel itself that systematically violated this agreement—as the United Nations organs have ascertained repeatedly and as has been stated in several resolutions of the Security Council—and which finally perpetrated the armed invasion of Egypt. Egypt, on the other hand, has always complied with the armistice terms and also today, as follows from the report, reaffirms "its intent to observe fully the provisions of the Armistice Agreement" [A/3527, para. 15].

7. The attitude of the Israel Government continues, as stated in the last report of the Secretary-General, to be negative. Asked by the Secretary-General about the position of his Government on the Armistice Agreement, the representative of Israel stated that the Israel Government considers the armistice as non-existent and referred to the declaration of the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Ben Gurion, to the effect that the Armistice Agreement "has been broken and is beyond repair."

8. Israel's refusal to withdraw its forces from the occupied territory under the pretext that it requires assurances of Egypt's observance of the armistice is really paradoxical. The Secretary-General justly states in his report that the real and ultimate reason for the present situation is the fact that Israel requests assurances from Egypt concerning the cessation of all belligerent acts "while Israel itself, by continued occupation, maintains a state of belligerency which, in the case of Gaza, it has not indicated its intention fully to liquidate" [A/3527 para. 9].

9. Thus a situation has been brought about where Israel, condemned for its aggression against Egypt, wishes to dictate conditions both to the victim of the aggression, Egypt, and to the United Nations. The Israel Government would never dare to advance its provocative demands if it were not backed by the imperialist forces, which tried by their aggression against Egypt to stop the process of liberation of the nations of the Near and Middle East and now after their defeat are endeavouring to exploit as much as possible the situation that has arisen there for their plans of colonial domination in this part of the world. The attitude of the Israel Government has to be considered in connexion with these new plans formulated in the so-called Eisenhower doctrine, which have seriously complicated the situation in the Near East.

10. The substance of the so-called Eisenhower doctrine is that the United States is trying to use, without

the consent of the United Nations, its armed forces for interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East and to offer them so-called economic assistance under political conditions incompatible both with the dignity, inalienable rights for freedom, independence and sovereignty of these countries, and with the principles and objectives of the United Nations Charter. From this policy of the United States Government follows also its attitude on the question of the withdrawal of Israel forces from Egypt. On the one hand, the United States Government is declaring that it stands for the consistent implementation of the General Assembly resolutions for the unconditional withdrawal of the aggressor's troops, against whom it formerly proposed sanctions in the Security Council. Thus it tries to create the impression that it is backing the justified demands of Egypt and of the other Arab countries. On the other hand, it undertakes, outside the United Nations, actions by which it is trying to secure for itself Israel as a tool of pressure against the Arab countries, while carrying out its plans in the Near and Middle East. This double game is not conducive to a solution of the problem; quite to the contrary, it only creates obstacles which prevent a peaceful settlement.

11. The last declarations of the United States Government as well as negotiations with Israel outside the United Nations are at variance with the position of the General Assembly, namely, that the unconditional withdrawal of the aggressor's forces is an indispensable prerequisite for any peaceful solution of all outstanding questions. They prove at the same time that the United States Government has already set out to realize the Eisenhower doctrine and that, by-passing the United Nations, it is pressing for a solution that will be detrimental to the victim of aggression, will also impair the interests of other countries of the Near East and will serve only the American plans for strategic and economic domination of this area.

12. By its last proposals, the United States Government is meeting the unfounded demands put forward by the Israel Government as a condition for the withdrawal of its armed forces from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip. The United States Government is thus in an ever increasing measure adopting the position that Israel should be rewarded for its aggression against Egypt.

13. In the last few days, this intention has not been concealed either by the official quarters in Washington, or by the American Press. Thus the correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune*, in his report from Washington of 22 February 1957 writes overtly that the aim of the United States proposals is to put Israel in an even better position than she was prior to the invasion of Egypt. The Czechoslovak delegation firmly believes that the General Assembly must not allow the aggressor to draw any advantages from his aggression. It would be a mockery in the face of justice if the aggressor had to be allowed to put forward conditions under which he would be willing to evacuate the occupied territory, or even to raise claims to the detriment of the attacked party. Such a procedure would violate the most fundamental principle of the Charter concerning the solution of controversial questions exclusively by peaceful means and would create a dangerous precedent which would only encourage solution of disputes by violence and aggression.

14. Israel is, under the terms and meaning of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, duty

bound to withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its armed forces behind the armistice demarcation line and it cannot be admitted that the Israel aggression and its consequences may be in any way utilized for pressure to be brought upon the ultimate solution of the situation.

15. Only the full liquidation of the aggression can create the necessary prerequisites for the safeguarding of peace and for a satisfactory solution of the problems in the Near and Middle East.

16. The Government of the Soviet Union proposed on 11 February 1957, to the United States of America, Great Britain and France, the elaboration of a common declaration, in which the main principles regarding the question of peace and security in the Near and Middle East and non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries of this area would be proclaimed. The adoption of such a joint declaration of the four Powers would correspond to the interests of the nations of the Near and Middle East and create favourable conditions for the stabilization of the situation and for the strengthening of peace in this part of the globe. The acceptance of such a declaration would also be in full accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

17. A comparison of the Soviet proposal with the plans of the United States Government shows clearly that they represent two entirely opposite tendencies in questions of principle. For the Soviet Union, economic assistance is incompatible with political conditions, whereas the Eisenhower doctrine is making economic co-operation conditional upon a political, and even military, co-operation. The Soviet Union stands for the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Arab countries and of their non-participation in military pacts. The United States policy rests upon, and is conditioned by pacts. The Soviet Union favours the liquidation of foreign bases and the peaceful solution of all disputes; the United States is ever enlarging its military bases and wants to solve international issues from a position of strength.

18. The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic declared on 15 February 1957 that it supports fully the proposal of the USSR and that, on its part, it is willing to join in the proposed declaration. The Czechoslovak delegation is of the opinion that the United Nations should insist uncompromisingly upon the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Israel forces from Egyptian territory without any further delay and should adopt effective measures against the aggressor which would ensure the ultimate liquidation of the aggression.

19. Mr. JAMALI (Iraq): Israel defiance of United Nations resolutions on unconditional withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line has caused much anxiety to the whole world. It certainly has caused much loss of life and economic dislocation, including economic dislocation in my own country. It has endangered peace and caused great international conflict among the great Powers as well as local unrest. In addition, it has undermined the prestige and existence of this Organization.

20. Israel has made a mockery of this Organization. One resolution after another has been defied; one appeal after another has been rejected. The hard work done here by the Members, seventy-four of which voted for the unconditional withdrawal, has not been heeded. The fine and hard labours of the Secretary-General, with all his devotion and integrity, have not been heeded and have been of no avail. The efforts of that great

man, the great leader of the free world, the President of the United States of America, were defied and made unfruitful.

21. Today, we face a very grave situation not only with respect to the peace of the world, not only with respect to the peace and stability of the Middle East, but with respect to this Organization. To be or not to be is the question for this Organization today.

22. I wish to start where my colleague from Lebanon, Mr. Malik, ended his speech last Friday [659th meeting]. I should like to state that peace in the Middle East is disturbed because the elements of justice have been ignored for the Arabs of Palestine, and the elements of justice have been ignored because the truth about the situation, the whole truth, has been obliterated. The representative of Canada told us today [660th meeting] not to speak of past tragedies. We do not wish to speak of past tragedies, but we cannot hide or ignore the whole truth. Anyone here who does not know the whole truth and who does not strive to embrace the whole truth is not serving the cause of justice in the Middle East. And if he is not serving the cause of justice in the Middle East he is endangering peace in the Middle East, which means endangering peace for the whole world, because the Middle East today is so situated as to affect the peace of the whole world. Therefore, it is for us to know the truth, the whole truth, and to restore justice to the Arabs of Palestine, to preserve peace and to preserve the prestige and dignity of this Organization.

23. What is the truth about the problem before us? Is it a problem between Israel and Egypt? Is it a conflict between Israel and Egypt? I submit that it is not. The problem is not between Israel and Egypt; Egypt here is a second party, acting on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine. The real issue is between the Arabs of Palestine and Israel. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen—all Arab States and many non-Arab States—take part in the issue. They do this not for their own security and not for their own interests; they are acting on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine.

24. Is this Assembly seized of the fate and the tragedy of the Arabs of Palestine? Where are they? Where are their rights? What is their destiny? Are they to be liquidated? Are their rights to be dissipated? Are they to be obliterated? These are questions not of the past but of the present, and our colleague from Canada must apply himself to these questions if he wants to be a neutral, active participant in this Organization.

25. The truth is that the rights of the Palestine Arabs to their homes cannot and should not be forgotten or denied. Arab territories allotted to the Arabs by the United Nations resolution—which was itself unfair to the Arabs—are not being spoken of or thought of. Israel occupies those territories, and denies the right of the Arabs to return to them. The truth is that Israel started with bogus claims to Palestine. It started before the First World War with bogus immigrants, who came to Palestine for spiritual purposes and settled themselves there. Then it obtained the Balfour Declaration and, under the British Mandate, began to increase the number and influence of those immigrants who then came to number something like one-third of the population. Then Israel came to the United Nations asking it to partition Palestine, and it was thought that there must be two nations living in Palestine. The Jews, who were the minority, were supposed to have a State; and the Arabs, who were the

majority, were also to have a State. The partition, of course, was effected in an unfair way because the better and the greater part of Palestine was given to the minority, while the poorer and smaller portion was given to the majority. But Israel, which was behind that partition with the help of certain great Powers, was not satisfied with what it obtained. It proceeded to conquer the best of what had been given to the Arabs of Palestine. It took Western Galilee, Jaffa and Beersheba, just as it took other territories which had been allotted by the United Nations to the Arabs.

26. Thus Israel began to expand its territory and to consolidate what it took, and it assumed that the territory which it thus obtained—which in fact did not belong to it—was finally its property, the ownership of which no one could dispute. Thereafter Israel began a continuous aggression on neighbouring Arab States—recurrent aggression against its Arab neighbours carried out with full military force. It attacked Jordan, Syria, Egypt, then Jordan again, Syria and Egypt again, then Jordan once more, and so on.

27. Several times Israel has been condemned by the Security Council for its aggression. But that aggression was not without meaning or underlying intentions. There were two intentions underlying it. The first was to bring about a peace imposed upon the Arabs by force; the second was to prepare for the next stage of expansion. There are many grave instances of this aggression, the record of which is before representatives to study. No one can forget the butchering of the people of Qibya, men, women and children, and the destruction of houses, mosques and schools. I happened to visit that village after its destruction by the Israelis, and I saw what havoc they had wreaked. After that we heard of Nahhalin, we heard of Hakim, we heard of Qalqiliya, we heard of the Tiberias district, we heard of Gaza, and we heard of many, many other places where Israel aggression with military force has been committed and where innocent human beings were destroyed.

28. Then more recently we have heard and read, of course, as we read in the reports to the United Nations, of the massacres that took place in Gaza and Sinai among the Arab refugees. Over 400 persons were killed. We have also heard of the genocide committed in the Israel village of Kafr Qasim where—as the Israel Premier admitted before the Knesset—some forty-nine Arabs, all innocent men, women and children, were killed in cold blood. Of course, the Premier spoke with great emotion and regret for what had happened. But what happened to those forty-nine—not forty-nine actually, the real figure being ninety-four—is only typical of a policy of mishandling and inhumanity applied to the Arabs of Palestine.

29. I should like to read out to the Assembly two short letters, from a large collection of long letters, describing the way in which Israel is treating the Arab population of Israel. Why does Israel treat the Arab population in that way? Because it wants to see to it that the Arabs, who are the legitimate inhabitants of Palestine, will not want to come back to live in Israel. Israel wants to slam the door in the face of these Arabs. In Israel's view, the more cruel it is to the Arabs of Palestine, the greater will be the likelihood that the Arabs will keep away from Palestine.

30. The first letter is addressed by Mr. Shoukri Khazen to the President of the State of Israel. It reads as follows:

"About seven weeks ago, the Arab landowners of the two villages, Bi'na and Deir el Asad, in Western Galilee, submitted a memorandum to Your Excellency, protesting against the usurpation of their lands by various Government departments. This memorandum was signed by about 200 persons of the two villages and was forwarded by a committee, which was set up to protect the interests of the Arab landowners of Bi'na.

"Instead of dealing with the points raised in the memorandum, and removing the great injustices done to the villagers, the military governor for Western Galilee outlawed the committee and imposed punitive measures against them. They were placed under police supervision, their permits of movement were cancelled, and they were required to remain indoors from 7 p.m. until 5 a.m. and to report to the police station daily at 11 a.m. Moreover, the military governor instructed the police of Haifa to withdraw my travelling permit thereby preventing me from going to my village and spending Easter with my family and relatives.

"It is significant and important to remember that on the 26th of January last, the Prime Minister, Mr. Moshe Sharett, assured the Knesset members in general and the Arab members in particular that: 'The Israel Government will be watchful to make every possible improvement in the situation of the Arab minority'. The conduct of the Military Government and the oppressive measures which were taken against the village committee and myself are flagrant violations of the Prime Minister's assurance, and tend to stifle Arab voices against undemocratic practices and Nazi methods of persecution.

"The words of the Government that 'Israel desires to live with the Arabs in peace and friendship' do not correspond with its deeds, and the cruel measures taken by the military governor are not likely to foster a feeling of trust in, and loyalty to, the State among the Arab inhabitants of Israel. I appeal to Your Excellency and implore Your Excellency and all the Jews in Israel and all the Press in Israel and abroad to urge the Government of Israel to stop the persecution and oppression of the Arab minority in Israel, who are eager to associate themselves with the welfare of the State but are prevented from doing so by the hostile policy of the Israel Government."

31. Copies of the above letter were sent to all the responsible people in Israel, to all the local and foreign Press, to all Members of the United Nations, to all foreign diplomats, and to the Israel Ambassador in New York.

32. I should now like to read out a very short telegram sent by Mohammed An-Naddaf, head of Jalama village, to the President of Israel:

"On August 11, 1953, settlers of Lehvat Haviv kibbutz dynamited our homes in Jalama after the destruction of thousands of our fruit-bearing trees. Despite the verdict of the Supreme Court, your authorities made the aggressors enter our lands and helped them. We complained to the authorities but nobody responded. Are we in a State or among a gang of robbers? Kill us; we hate life under your oppressive yoke. Eighty years old, and I have neither heard of nor seen a more despotic and oppressive people than you. Pay the value of my properties so that I may leave, or kill me so that I may enjoy rest. I complain to God against you."

33. These are just examples of the way in which the Israelis have treated the Arabs who have remained in Palestine.

34. Why is it that these facts and the conditions in which the Arabs of Palestine are living are not known to the world? Why is it that the world is not giving serious consideration to these facts? I submit that the real truth is being coloured by Israel propaganda. The Israelis follow divers lines of propaganda. In these days when we are faced with the present problem, all of us can judge the great pressure of Zionist propaganda and what that propaganda is doing today to the cause of peace and to this Organization. This Organization—including its Secretary-General—is not safe from Zionist propaganda and Zionist pressure.

35. I should like to deal with some lines of Israel propaganda which touch us here directly, and which affect our thinking.

36. Certainly, Zionist propaganda has made the world forget that there are Arabs of Palestine who are entitled to their homes in Palestine. Zionist propaganda has made the world forget that Palestine is not and cannot be Jewish alone: it must be Jewish, Christian and Moslem, equally. The world has been "propagandized" to the extent of forgetting that there are Moslem rights and Christian rights in Palestine, as well as Jewish rights. It is Zionist propaganda which has worked so hard to hoodwink the majority of the Western world and make it forget this truth. The truth is that Palestine is a holy land and will remain a holy land—not only for the Jews, but also for the Christians and the Moslems.

37. It was Zionist propaganda which started by claiming that the Jews were returning to Palestine to live in peace side by side with the Arabs. It was Zionist propaganda which claimed that there was ample land and space in Palestine for both Arabs and Jews, living together. But, as time went on, the Jews began to displace the Arabs, to push the Arabs out.

38. It is Zionist propaganda which states that Israel wants peace. Israel killed Count Bernadotte—but Israel wants peace. Israel killed the Conciliation Commission, which had worked to achieve a settlement of the Palestine question in accordance with the Lausanne Protocol, signed by Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, to the effect that the Palestine problem should be solved in conformity with United Nations resolutions. As soon as Israel had signed that Protocol Israel backed out—but Israel wants peace.

39. In 1952 the General Assembly was seized of the problem of Palestine and there was a discussion about a settlement in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly, but Israel would not have such a settlement. Israel spoke of its peaceful intentions towards Egypt, and then attacked Egypt. Sixteen days before the Israel invasion of Egypt, Mr. Ben Gurion declared that Israel would never attack any Arab State and that the peaceful intentions of Israel had not changed. He said that it would not be Israel that would attack. That was part of the propaganda machinery that can make darkness seem like light, that can make war look like peace and injustice like justice. This is the kind of thing that is happening in the world today with this wonderful Zionist propaganda machinery.

40. According to the propaganda of Israel, the invasion of Egypt was caused by two things: first, the right of free navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba, and, secondly, the fact that Gaza was the source of attacks

upon Israel. As everyone knows, since it has been repeated here, both these claims are challenged by us. First, the right of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba has to be matched with the right of the refugees to return to their own homes, with the rights of the Palestine Arabs to Palestine.

41. I have said before, and I say it again, that Egypt is not acting on its own behalf when it puts a blockade on Aqaba and on the Suez. When it imposes an economic boycott with the other Arab States, Egypt is acting on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine, whose rights to their own country cannot and should not be forgotten. There cannot be peace in the Middle East if these rights are not restored and if they are to be restored, they must not be forgotten, they must be recognized. The Palestine problem cannot be settled by sending the Arabs of Palestine away from their own homes to other lands. They just will not go.

42. We have had nearly ten years of sad experience, an experience which is the result of the compromise philosophy of my good friend, Mr. Pearson. These ten years have not seen the solution of the Palestine problem, they have merely seen it go from bad to worse. Had we recognized from the beginning the spiritual feelings of the Arabs of Palestine for their own homes, we would not have had this tragic situation before us today. Even today there cannot be peace in the Middle East unless we know the whole truth in this way, unless we know the depths of sentiment in the hearts of the Arabs, Moslems and Christians alike for their own homes. That sentiment is not a material thing that can evaporate; it cannot be dismissed lightly. Those of us here who are concerned with world peace must always know the truth, and the whole truth, about the Arabs of Palestine.

43. We should at least remember the lessons of history. We know that Palestine in the Middle Ages was the scene of conflict between Christians and Moslems, and that that conflict was only settled by the natural way to peace, whereby the Moslems went back to their own homes and lived in peace and harmony with their Christian brethren. One cannot go against the course of history, one cannot deny the existence of Islam, just as one cannot deny the existence of Christianity. Islam and Christianity are as attached to Palestine as Judaism. Therefore, Zionist propaganda should not hide the truth or cloud the facts.

44. The question of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba is part and parcel of the Palestine problem. Whether it is a question of blockade or a question of boycott, both should be dealt with in connexion with the whole question of Palestine, and not singled out. Any attempt to deal singly with such issues and to reward Israel for its aggression would certainly be against peace, against justice, and against the very existence and prestige of this Organization.

45. The second line of Israel's propaganda about the cause of its invasion of Egypt speaks of Egyptian aggression and attacks on Israel, but let us look at the records and see who is the aggressor, Israel or Egypt. There are the records of the Conciliation Commission, there are the records of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and there are the records of the Security Council. These records show who was attacked and who was the attacker.

46. Israel complains of the *fedayeen*, but the *fedayeen* are not a cause, they are a symptom. There are *fedayeen* because there are people whose rights to their homes and property are denied, and they would rather die

than remain away from their homes in misery and destitution. It is Israel which brought about the existence of the *fedayeen*. Had Israel given the Arabs their rights and come to terms with them, certainly no *fedayeen* would have emerged.

47. But who started the *fedayeen* policy in Palestine? The *fedayeen* policy in Palestine was started by the Zionists themselves. The Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern gang, what were they? They were certainly Israel *fedayeen*. For those who have been influenced by Zionist propaganda and who wish to know more about the *fedayeen*, I would refer them to two books. One book, *The Revolt* was written by Menachem Begin, the leader of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, and the other, *The Lady was a Terrorist*, was written by Doris Katz. These two books show how the *fedayeen* method was introduced into the Middle East, and they show who introduced that method.

48. Does anyone think that any settlement of the question of Gaza would remove the *fedayeen* threat? I think it would be very naïve and very superficial to think that it would, because, as I have said before, there are 900,000 Arab refugees, and if that problem is not solved, if their rights are not recognized by this world body, thousands of them will turn into *fedayeen*. They are a symptom, and not a cause. The cause is the injustice which has been done to them, the cause is the fact that they have been driven away from their own homes.

49. If we wish to apply Israel's argument about Gaza and the *fedayeen*, by rights the United Nations should occupy the whole of Israel today because Israel is much more a source of aggression and infiltration and danger to the Arabs than the Arabs are to Israel. By the same logic which Mr. Pearson used this morning, not only Gaza should be internationalized, but also the whole of Palestine. Let us not take sides.

50. We may ask: why are the Zionists, why is Israel, so arrogant and so defiant and so aggressive? This is a legitimate question. I am sure that many of us have wondered what it is that makes Israel so defiant. Israel is certainly stronger than the United Kingdom and France. The United Kingdom and France decided that to abide by the resolution of the United Nations to withdraw from Egypt was the better policy, and so they bowed before that resolution and withdrew. But Israel seems to be mightier than the United Kingdom and France. The President of the United States, in his eloquent speech which we heard on 20 February, expressed the view of the United States Government that Israel must withdraw. What makes Israel so strong, so mighty? What makes it defy this world Organization?

51. As far as I can see, there are three causes. The first is that Israel is assured of plenty of arms and plenty of money. Israel prides itself on being stronger than all its neighbouring Arab States combined; therefore, it can attack one State after another. But how does Israel get by? It has great influence in the big capitals of the world. It has business influence, propaganda influence, political influence. It can upset and pull political strings, and all of us here who study the papers every day can see how the lines are being pulled behind the scenes and how the United Nations is being defied, how Israel is having its own way in spite of the policy of this Organization, in spite of the policy of the President of the United States, in spite of everybody.

52. Is the world not going to awake? Is it not going to see what is happening? The free world is being undermined; this Organization is being undermined; peace in the Middle East is being undermined. Are we not going to awake? Are we going to let Israel, month in and month out, attack and get away with it? Why should Israel get away with it? Israel get away with it because this Organization has not stood for its own prestige and its own responsibility. Had Israel been punished for its first attack on Kibya in 1953-1954, there would have been no recurrence of military attacks. Had the Security Council adopted the United States draft resolution asking Israel to withdraw behind the armistice line and providing that if it did not withdraw, economic and military assistance should be suspended, had that draft resolution been adopted instead of vetoed by the United Kingdom and France, we should have been saved all this trouble and the United Nations would have had a more illustrious record.

53. The reason why Israel has continued its aggression and its defiance is that it has money and arms, as well as political influence, and that this Organization has not taken a stand which would make Israel stop defying it.

54. The choice before the Assembly is very clear. Either it must make this Organization function as an instrument for maintaining world peace, or declare its failure. Let us then declare our bankruptcy as an Organization. The choice before us is to decide whether force in settling international disputes and invasions of other countries are to be considered as crimes, or are to be considered as deeds for which the agent is to be rewarded. I am afraid that those who wish to follow the line of Mr. Pearson's speech this morning will have to admit that this Organization must consider Israel as a victor and, therefore, must yield to the conditions which the victor has dictated. If the aggressor is treated as a victor and not as a criminal, this Organization cannot function; this Organization forfeits its very existence. The choice before us is very clear: either aggression is to be punished and the aggressor put in the dock, or this Organization cannot function; peace cannot be preserved by this Organization; let us seek peace outside the Organization; might, and not right, will be right.

55. My delegation has joined five other delegations in submitting a draft resolution [A/3557] which is mild in tone and quite logical. After six resolutions have been defied by Israel, we have submitted a draft resolution which is almost the same as the one submitted last October by the United States, which was vetoed. After the lapse of so many months and the defiance by Israel of this Organization, it seems to me that anything less than this draft resolution would be quite detrimental to the Organization.

56. We will not be doing our duty as members of an Organization serving the cause of peace if we do not condemn aggression and have the aggressor withdraw unrewarded. But there are forces today working against this draft resolution. What are these forces? Let us analyse them. I shall refer to three of them. The first is Zionist pressure in the great Western capitals. We all know how the United States Press and Zionist pressure on members of Congress are working day and night to see to it that Israel gets by with its aggression. There is no doubt that many who are interested in votes and in the political prestige which they might receive from Zionist propaganda may weaken

from this pressure. But in the end this will never lead to peace.

57. Then there are those sources who uphold the old policies of colonialism in the Middle East; they believe that they can seek revenge against the Arab world by supporting Israel and destroying the Charter and this Organization. I wish to submit that these colonial sources are confusing the issue and are hurting their own interests, as well as the interests of peace in the Middle East and in the whole world. To begin with, these colonial sources which are supporting Israel aggression have vital interests in the Middle East itself and I assure them that by their taking a course detrimental to Arab rights and to justice, they are hurting their own cause. They are actually shooting at the goose which lays the eggs for them. They are confusing the issue because of their bitterness against the Arab stand on Algeria and because of their bitterness against President Nasser. They are confusing the issues of Suez and Algeria with the issue of Israel aggression.

58. As regards the question of Algeria and their relations with President Nasser on Suez, these are things which will be solved sooner or later and, I hope, solved peacefully. But their stand for an unjust cause, their stand for aggression by Israel, will certainly leave an indelible effect on Arab minds and Arab hearts; the cause of freedom and the cause of the free world will suffer. Therefore, those sources which are fighting sanctions for colonial motives should view the future brightly and be far-sighted enough to see to it that they do not promote aggression and the settlement of international issues by force.

59. The third group, which is also opposing the draft resolution and which thinks that Israel should go unmolested, comes forward on moral grounds and says: If the United Nations can do nothing against the Soviet Union in Hungary, why should it do anything against Israel? This is very poor moral reasoning.

60. If one has a young son who is strong and who bullies his father and mother and they cannot discipline him, that does not mean that they should not discipline the child when he misbehaves. They should spank him. Certainly the old father cannot beat an elder son who is much stronger than the father himself. But that does not apply to the father spanking a child who has misbehaved, who has robbed and who is a thief. The father should not allow the child to grow up into a criminal. There is a moral duty and this is exactly where we stand. Israel is the child of this Organization and it is a young child; it is not like the Soviet Union. Moreover, President Eisenhower put it well when he said that two wrongs do not make a right. President Eisenhower said the following on 20 February 1957:

"But the United Nations faces immediately the problem of what to do next. If it does nothing, if it accepts the ignoring of its repeated resolutions calling for the withdrawal of invading forces, then it will have admitted failure. That failure would be a blow to the authority and influence of the United Nations in the world and to the hopes which humanity placed in the United Nations as the means of achieving peace with justice.

"... Failure to withdraw would be harmful to the long-term good of Israel. It would, in addition to its injury to the United Nations, jeopardize the prospects of the peaceful solution of the problems of the Mideast. This could bring incalculable ills to our friends and, indeed, to our nation itself. It would

make infinitely more difficult the realization of the goals which I laid out in my Middle East message of 5 January to the Congress seeking to strengthen the area against Communist aggression, direct or indirect.

"The United Nations must not fail. I believe that, in the interests of peace, the United Nations has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions.

"Of course, we still hope that the Government of Israel will see that its best immediate and long-term interests lie in compliance with the United Nations and in placing its trust in the resolutions of the United Nations and in the declaration of the United States with reference to the future."

President Eisenhower also said:

"I do not believe that Israel's default should be ignored because the United Nations has not been able effectively to carry out its resolutions condemning the Soviet Union for its armed suppression of the people of Hungary. Perhaps this is a case where the proverb applies that two wrongs do not make a right."

61. I would like to address a few words to my friend Mr. Pearson, the representative of Canada. I have known him for the last ten years and I have great respect for him. We discussed the matter of Palestine in 1947 when the issue of partition was being dealt with by the General Assembly.

62. Mr. Pearson has two weaknesses in all his thinking on Palestine, as far as I can see. The first is that he has never been to the Middle East nor has he had, as far as I know, any serious discussions with Middle Eastern statesmen. So he does not have a deep enough knowledge of the problem and of the situation in the Middle East, and does not consider both sides; his knowledge is only on the side of Zionist propaganda, which is natural, because it abounds here and in Canada.

63. But ignorance is not the only cause and we come now to the other one. Mr. Pearson thinks that compromise and expediency are the road to peace in international affairs. He forgets that sometimes spiritual values and principles are more abiding and more effective than compromise and expediency. I am sure that when Mr. Pearson, discusses the problem of Palestine, thinks in terms of human beings, of land. In this case, he considers the matter physically and materially. From what we heard today, from the double standard he applied today, we could see that he has not touched the hearts and souls of the Arabs of Palestine; he has not gone to the depths of the spiritual life of the people of the Middle East.

64. A man with these—shall I call them—vacuums in his knowledge and experience cannot be a fair judge or a mediator in the Palestine issue. We welcome his arguments and would like to listen to them, but we must answer him point by point.

65. As for Aqaba and his remedy for the freedom of passage, I have said and I say it again, that Aqaba is part and parcel of the whole Palestine issue. We are not serving the cause of peace and justice if we give Israel more privileges and more rights, while these privileges and rights are withheld by Israel from the Arabs. Passage through Aqaba or through Suez must go side by side with the return of the refugees to their own homes.

66. There is no doubt that the Arabs do use economic boycott; they do use blockade; they do stop the oil

from flowing to Haifa, among other methods to make Israel yield to Arab rights. Israel cannot have its rights and privileges while ignoring at the same time Arab rights. To say that Israel should have free passage through Aqaba without yielding other Arab rights, especially over the territory of Palestine, is certainly taking sides, and this Organization will be undermining its own existence if it continues to encourage and add to Israel aggression and injustice.

67. As for the Gaza Strip and its internationalization, I wish Mr. Pearson had thought of the internationalization of the whole of Palestine. I cannot see how a part of Palestine which is Arab should be internationalized, for some allegations that are unfounded, and Israel should not be internationalized. And if we were to follow this precedent, if Gaza is to be internationalized today, the western side of Jordan also has to be internationalized. And what about the internationalization of Jerusalem? Why did not Mr. Pearson think of that? What made him think of a commissioner for Gaza and not for Jerusalem?

68. Then Mr. Pearson speaks of the sovereignty of Gaza and says that Egypt has no sovereignty over Gaza. Why does he not speak of the sovereignty of Israel over those lands which were not allocated to it by the United Nations, which it occupies today and which belonged to the Arabs of Palestine? Why should Israel not be questioned about sovereignty?

69. In other words, Mr. Pearson, besides ignoring the fundamental basis of the question of Palestine, has not been consistent or impartial in the speech he made this morning. I shall be very happy to meet with him or any other person who wishes to debate the issue with me.

70. I appeal to Mr. Pearson and to everybody here not to think of compromise, not to think of expediency but to think of moral rights, to think of justice. It is expediency and compromise that brought about the partition of Palestine. I remember very well that Mr. Pearson spoke about compromise and expediency in 1947. He was one of those who served the cause of compromise and expediency. But see what tragedy resulted from it, from ignoring the principles of the Charter and the moral rights of the Arabs. This is the tragedy which we have today.

71. If the free world is going to be paralyzed; if those Powers which have interests in the Middle East and their friends and allies are going to continue to take the Israel side and not heed Arab complaints and basic rights; if the great Powers and the Western world are not going to recognize Arab rights to their own homes, and do justice to them—that justice which was repeatedly mentioned by President Eisenhower in his speech—and if Zionist propaganda and pressure are going to be more and more effective in allowing Israel to get what it wants year after year and ignoring Arab rights year after year, we are faced with a great calamity. We must think and acknowledge that the Middle East is lost to us and we must think that we are on the brink of a third world war.

72. Peace and justice in the Middle East require that Arab rights to their own homes must be recognized and that Israel expansionism must stop. We are not satisfied with the fact that Israel expansionism is going to be stopped; also Arab rights to their own homes, at least according to United Nations resolutions, must be respected. As for Israel expansionism, we can see no end to it. If this Organization is going to

agree with some of its members following the line of compromise and expediency, we are going to lose one area after another to the Israelis and we are going to have more and more trouble in the Middle East.

73. I would like to read to you a declaration which I have received which shows what is behind the Israel invasion of Egypt and I sincerely hope that everybody here, including Mr. Pearson, will listen to it carefully.

"Gaza—the southern gate of Israel—has been redeemed. It has been finally claimed by its rightful owner—the people of Israel. Whoever opposes this claim—disputes the Bible, stands against history and mocks the principle of justice.

"Extraordinary pressures are being exerted on the Government of Israel to evacuate Gaza and return it to the murdering gangs of Colonel Nasser, whose declared objective is the destruction of Israel. The butchers of Hungary and enslavers of Kashmir are the editors of the U.N.'s code of 'morality' for the Middle East. The United States State Department is threatening Israel with starvation.

"Indeed the pressure is heavy. But a nation, fighting for its rights and its land, does not yield to pressure. The Government representing this nation, likewise, has neither a legal nor a moral right to yield. We hope this will be the case.

"However, if the Government of Israel will surrender this liberated territory of our country—the Gaza Strip—we shall consider the act to be both illegal and immoral and we shall never recognize the right of any foreign intruder to remain there.

"Gaza, as well as Jerusalem, Hebron, and Bethlehem are as much an integral part of Israel as Manchester is of England and Marseilles of France. We shall never recognize their severance from our State, and together with thousands of Israelis, we shall devote our lives to their permanent liberation."

This is signed by Betar, which means the youth movement of Israel. The declaration continues:

"The above is a declaration which has been issued by the Betar Organization of Israel. We are distributing it to all Senators, Congressmen, UN delegations, American newspapermen, and the American people as a public service. We feel it is in the best interests of Americans and free people everywhere to know, at this time, the true spirit and proud stand of the people of Israel."

74. This is a sample of Israel's thinking. These youths did not invent this kind of thinking. They have got it from their leaders because as far back as 1937, twenty years ago, Ben Gurion said the same thing. I shall quote what he said. In 1937, in the Zionist Congress during the debate on the partition plan suggested by the British Royal Commission (Peel Commission), David Ben Gurion, Chairman of the Congress Executive, explained to the Press:

"The debate has not been for or against the indivisibility of Eretz Israel (Palestine). No Zionist can forego the smallest portion of Eretz Israel. The debate was over which of two routes would lead quicker to the common goal."

Dr. Weizmann, defending the non-inclusion of southern Palestine within the proposed frontier, remarked: "It will not run away."

75. Thus, Israel's aggression and invasion of Egypt has nothing to do with Egyptian aggression. Egypt has never been aggressive against Israel. The Israel

aggressive tendency is there and the sooner we know these facts and the sooner we expose them to the world, the better.

76. The Arabs wish to see this Organization stand for right and justice; they wish to see their rights restored in Palestine, and no more rights and privileges given to Israel until it yields these Arab rights. Much of the turn of events in the Middle East will depend on our decision here. Will this Organization permit Israel to continue its aggression, to continue its defiance and get by? Will it continue to condone and be inactive before Israel aggression. It seems to me that it is time for us to decide. We as a group are at a crucial juncture, not only for the Organization and the Middle East, but also for the peace of the whole world. The peace of the whole world depends on the stand we take *vis-à-vis* Israel for its aggression, for its invasion and for its occupation of a territory which does not belong to it.

77. Is Israel going to be treated as a victor or as a criminal aggressor? If we do not stand by morality and by justice, I am afraid that this Organization and world peace are in danger. Let us work together, let us think together and let us face the realities and make a success of this Organization, and bring back peace and justice to the Middle East.

78. Mr. DEJANY (Saudi Arabia): Twenty-four days ago, on 2 February, the General Assembly, by a majority of 74 votes to 2, adopted a resolution [1124 (XI)] which deplored the non-compliance of Israel with the complete withdrawal of its forces behind the armistice demarcation line despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly, and called upon Israel to complete the withdrawal without any further delay. The General Assembly rejected then, as it has continued to do, the principle of the conditional withdrawal advanced by Israel. The sentiment prevailed in the General Assembly that the withdrawal should be unconditional because aggression could not be rewarded in any fashion or form.

79. The Secretary-General, in paragraph 5 of his report of 24 January 1957 [A/3512] had emphasized the principle that the United Nations "cannot condone a change of the *status juris* resulting from military action contrary to the provisions of the Charter". The Secretary-General went on to say:

"The Organization must, therefore, maintain that the *status juris* existing prior to such military action be re-established by a withdrawal of troops, and by the relinquishment or nullification of rights asserted in territories covered by the military action and depending upon it."

80. As is well known to all of us, and as the Secretary-General has reported both orally at our last meeting and in his latest report, Israel is adamant in its refusal to withdraw its forces unconditionally in compliance with the resolutions of the General Assembly.

81. We have reached the stage in the discussion of this Israel aggression against Egypt where everything that can be said has been said and has been said so many times, because we have met so many times to deal with this dangerous problem. We have reached a stage where no one could attribute haste and impatience to our reaction. In a spirit of compromise we have accepted watered-down resolutions, agreed to the postponement of the discussion and generally conducted ourselves in a manner which leaves no room for criti-

cism. We can say with candour that in some of those instances we felt that we were to some extent acting against our better judgement.

82. Nevertheless we wish to afford ample opportunity to all those who felt that there was a better chance to bring about the desired end in that manner than otherwise. We have reached the stage where the prestige and authority of the United Nations is challenged and indeed threatened by the adamant defiance of a series of important resolutions by the only State which owes its very existence to the United Nations. Everyone has become conscious of the fact that we are no longer confronted with a conflict between Egypt and Israel, but with a matter of the highest order between the United Nations and Israel, a matter which involves a violation of one of the cardinal principles of the Charter, a matter which, if tolerated, might shatter all prospects of international trust and confidence, a matter which might seriously impair the usefulness of the United Nations and ultimately bring about its end.

83. We are confronted with the prospect that any State which alleges a grievance against another may attack the latter and refuse to back out until a settlement of the alleged grievance is made on its own terms. We are confronted with the prospect that one State may legitimately declare war against another on matters of which the basis has not been established even in international law. We are confronted with the unavoidable prospect of other wars being waged in the area, now that Israel's aggression against Egypt seems to have borne fruit.

84. It should be kept in mind that the alleged grievances which Israel advances as a justification for aggression against Egypt are not the only grievances or even among the grievances which prevail in the area. Everyone here is aware of the serious implications involved in this indisputable statement of fact and the consequential threat to international peace and security which will flow from any General Assembly action or inaction which could be interpreted as a tacit acceptance of the principle involved.

85. I should like to invite the attention of the representatives to two important aspects of the grievances alleged by Israel which reduce the force and significance in which the Israelis couched them—as if those grievances were as real and as serious as the Israelis tried to make them. These aspects are also of special significance in relation to the six-Power draft resolution [A/3557] now before the General Assembly.

86. The first aspect stems from Israel's position in the Middle East. Israel is not like any other State Member of the United Nations. I shall not refer to the attitude of the Arab States about this matter, but only to the well-recognized facts. It is a well-established fact that more than one-fourth of the territory under Israel control prior to the aggression against Egypt was annexed by Israel by force in excess of the territory allocated to it in the partition resolution. A good portion of that territory is the land which surrounds the Gaza Strip from the north, east and south, and which was left, according to the terms of the resolution, to the Arabs. The area of the territory surrounding the strip which was occupied by Israel is more than five times the present area of the Gaza Strip. It is important to keep in mind that most of the Arab inhabitants of this area, which was taken by Israel by force, are today among the refugees of the Gaza Strip.

87. Israel's refusal to return this territory which it seized by force, and its adamance to repatriate or compensate the refugees in the Gaza Strip, as it was called upon to do in so many resolutions of the General Assembly, aside from all other factors, explains the nature of the relationship which exists between Egypt and Israel, particularly since Egypt is the Arab country entrusted with the strip and the refugees. Obviously it is unlike the normal relationship existing between Egypt and any other State or between any two other States. Even the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel has not normalized the situation, particularly in view of Israel's continued defiance of the resolutions dealing with repatriation and compensation. It follows that matters of which Israel complains are essentially due to its own conduct in all these instances. If it were not for what Israel has done and for what she stands, these matters might not have arisen.

88. It would have been most unusual for such events to take place between Egypt and any other State or between any two other States. It is both unrealistic and unreasonable to deal with these matters without keeping in mind the abnormal or special nature of the situation prevailing in the area. In other words one cannot review the situation without allowing a margin for this abnormal situation. One cannot expect Egypt to have the same attitude towards Israel as towards other States. The reason for this is obviously Israel's conduct from the beginning which has made the situation so intolerable.

89. The second aspect stems also from Israel's position in the Middle East, and also from its attitude towards the people it had displaced and its defiance of the General Assembly resolutions on the question. At each of the last three meetings of the General Assembly on this item, I dealt with the various aspects of the alleged grievances which Israel advanced in justification of its aggression against Egypt. I explained among other things how exaggerated those grievances were as compared to the very serious grievances of the Arab people, particularly of Palestine, against Israel.

90. I do not intend to repeat what I had said on those occasions. I should like to refer only to one matter which is related to what I had stated before. I wish to bring this matter up because it will show more than anything else the correctness of our position that this matter has been exaggerated by Israel and its supporters out of all proportions to its seriousness and priority in relation to the other issues in which Israel is involved. I wish to bring it up in the General Assembly because its acuteness was so shockingly apparent during the deliberations of the Special Political Committee.

91. During the past two weeks the Special Political Committee has been discussing the problem of the relief and rehabilitation of the Palestine Arab refugees. As is well known, those semi-starved Arab refugees have been kept alive through the generosity of international charity. Seven cents a day per refugee is all that the United Nations has earmarked for food, shelter, clothing, health, education, social welfare, and for the administration of all these services. But that is not the point. This year we heard threats in the Committee that even this seven cents might have to be reduced, that the time was near when it might dry up altogether, that the time was approaching when those almost 1 million Arab refugees who were rendered homeless by Israel could not look forward even to this meagre

contribution which has kept them alive, though on a sub-human level.

92. Faced with these threats which have been made repeatedly during the past three sessions, we stressed to the representatives that most of the refugees, though grateful for this international generosity, are just as eager to do away with it as those who are burdened with paying for it. Last year my delegation drew on facts and figures from Israel officials and other official sources which placed the value of Arab lands under Israel control as between \$5,000 and \$7,500 million. The total annual yield and rent from the main productive classes of these lands and from the buildings owned by the refugees is in the neighbourhood of some £ (sterling) 42 million, or a grand total of about £340 million for the past eight years—almost \$1,000 million from rents alone.

93. I wish to ask the supporters of Israel: is it right, is it just, human, or reasonable for them to uphold Israel's right to free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba under the threat of maintaining the aggression against Egypt when Israel refuses to pay even the annual rent for the property of the Arab refugees who are threatened—actually threatened—with death? Is it practical and moral for the General Assembly to spend over three months on the problem of putting an end to the alleged grievances of Israel when several thousand refugee children born in Jordan since 1951 are denied any rations because of some technicalities; when 110,000 Arab villagers along the armistice lines whose lands are in Israel are also denied relief because of technicalities; when scores of thousands of Arab refugees are denied any relief because of other technicalities? Is it logical to subject these people to the actual threat of death from starvation and want because Israel refuses to permit their repatriation or even the payment of rent for its exploitation of their properties, while we occupy ourselves with the discussion of the freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, a matter which involves essential principles of international law the complexity of which was recognized by the International Law Commission, which accordingly deferred action thereon? Is it not a mockery and an insult to intelligence for the Assembly to tell the world that this problem of free passage should have priority at least over problems such as the payment by Israel of the annual rent to these Arab refugees to enable them to remain alive, particularly in view of the fact that the contributions for their minimal needs have fallen sharply and in view of the constant threat that they may cease altogether?

94. What justification is there to seek assurances which will satisfy Israel on all matters while no calls are made on Israel to meet its minimal obligations, which affect the lives of almost one million Arab refugees.

95. These are the two important aspects which should be kept in mind when discussing the alleged grievances of Israel and its insistence on a favourable settlement thereof as a price for its compliance with the General Assembly resolutions.

96. As we consider this defiance by Israel of the long series of General Assembly resolutions in which Israel was called upon immediately to withdraw its forces behind the armistice line, the events since the cease fire demonstrate convincingly that from the beginning Israel had not intended to withdraw its forces from the Sharm el Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip. It is important to note in this connexion that the Secretary-

General orally informed the General Assembly, on 21 December [632nd meeting], that General Burns and he had informed Israel that a date falling between 13 and 27 January was considered unacceptable for the complete withdrawal of the Israel forces behind the armistice line, in accordance with the General Assembly resolution.

97. This tends to emphasize Israel's intention both to mislead the General Assembly and to stall for time. Both of these aspects have been amply demonstrated by Israel tactics, particularly during the past three weeks. At times, it seemed as if Israel was making a mockery of the whole United Nations. We have reached a stage in the consideration of these problems where it has become very clear that Israel has decided to defy the United Nations on a matter upheld in the General Assembly by the overwhelming majority of seventy-four to two. Israel has made its choice. It does not intend to comply with the General Assembly resolutions which call for the unconditional withdrawal of its forces from Egyptian territory.

98. There is no justification whatever for the General Assembly to delay further in taking decisive action on this matter. My delegation and several others called for such action when the Assembly met to consider the subject on 18 and 28 January. It seemed clear to all delegations then that Israel had no intention of complying with the resolutions of the General Assembly. The time has come for the General Assembly to take immediate remedial action. I said on two occasions before this Assembly and I repeat now that Israel aggression against Egypt is no less serious now than when the invasion against Egypt began. The immediate reaction of the United Nations then was that the seriousness of the aggression and the circumstances surrounding it warranted the imposition of sanctions against the aggressors. The sanctions were defeated then by the veto of two of the three aggressor States that invaded Egypt and tried to cripple the functioning of the United Nations organ entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security. Every conceivable approach to bring an end to the Israel aggression was tried, but in vain.

99. The people in our part of the world and hundreds of millions of others now have their eyes fixed on the United Nations. They are anxious to see whether the United Nations will again permit Israel to exploit the policy of the accomplished fact. They recall with great apprehension and grave concern how Israel was allowed to annex by force almost one-half of the area of Palestine that was left for its Arab inhabitants and to retain that area on the basis of the principle of the accomplished fact. They recall with horror how almost all of the Arab inhabitants in Palestine were chased out of their homes and that after nine long years they are still being barred from returning to their homes on the basis of the same principle of the accomplished fact. They recall how Israel has been fortified in those grave acts by this principle that became a standard pattern for its future practices and policies in all matters pertaining to Palestine and its Arab people.

100. All those watchful eyes are today turned toward the United Nations. The Arab peoples in particular are eager to find out if the factors which contributed greatly to the policies and acts which led to the meting out of so much injustice to the Arab people of Palestine have undergone any substantial change. They feel that the world has had ample opportunity during the past four months to witness those elements in

Israel's policy which made the Arabs, from the beginning, so violently opposed to it and which emphasized the aggressive and expansionist tendencies of Israel—those elements of denying and ignoring completely the rights of the Arabs; those elements of arrogance and defiance of the collective will of such an overwhelming majority of the delegations in the United Nations on the observance of such an elementary principle of the Charter; those elements which are capable through propaganda and pressure of converting white into black and right into wrong. On the whole, the world has witnessed and is witnessing what this State, created by the United Nations in the heart of the Arab world, really stand for—a decisive confirmation of our apprehension and mistrust.

101. If, after all this, hesitation should prevail as to what the General Assembly should do, frustration and bitter disappointment would overwhelm the Arab people and hundreds of millions of other peoples throughout Asia and Africa. They would view it as a capitulation by the United Nations, and particularly by the West, to Israel, the same capitulation that was achieved when Israel occupied four-fifths of the territory of Palestine and made destitute refugees out of almost all its Arab inhabitants. This will dash all hopes and expectations which have been nurtured and fortified for a solution to the Palestine problem.

102. It would be tragic for all concerned if our warnings went unheeded, as they went unheeded almost ten years ago when the General Assembly took action on the partition of Palestine and created this tragic legacy which has embroiled the whole Middle East in a variety of problems constituting an ever-present threat to the peace and security of the Middle East and indeed, as may be recalled from recent events, to the peace and security of the whole world.

103. The time has come for the General Assembly to condemn Israel for its aggression against Egypt and for its failure to comply with the General Assembly resolutions calling on it completely to withdraw its forces behind the armistice demarcation line. As I pointed out in my last intervention on the discussion of this item, the only time when Israel's defiance was successfully met was in 1953 when Israel discovered that it could not defy the United Nations and, at the same time, expect foreign aid and assistance to continue. In a matter of hours Israel's defiance came to an end. We sincerely believe that this is the time for the General Assembly to take a similar decisive action.

104. We believe that the joint six-Power draft resolution, if adopted and implemented, will bring about compliance by Israel with the resolutions of the General Assembly. We shall support that draft resolution because in the view of my delegation it is the only choice left to us which may bring about compliance by Israel with the resolutions of the General Assembly. We appeal to all other delegations in the circumstances to support the draft resolution.

105. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): We have just received the Secretary-General's note [A/3563] a few minutes ago and I have just had a chance to read it. It seems to me to be a very interesting and perhaps also an important document for our proceedings. I therefore ask the President if an opportunity will be given to us later on to discuss the contents of this document at some length. We have not yet had the time to study it fully, digest it and ponder its bearing upon our proceedings, but from a first reading it seems to me to be a document of some importance. Therefore,

I raise this point of order in order to reserve our right to comment on this document at a later stage.

106. I ask the President whether he intends to open a debate on this document later in the proceedings and whether the Secretary-General will wish to make any comments on this particular note in addition to what he has embodied in it.

107. The PRESIDENT: The reply is in the affirmative. Members of the Assembly will certainly have an opportunity to discuss the report. As I announced this morning, the discussion on this item will be resumed later.

AGENDA ITEM 56

Question of amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council and the number of votes required for decisions of the Council (concluded)

AGENDA ITEM 57

Question of amending the United Nations Charter, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter, to increase the membership of the Economic and Social Council

AGENDA ITEM 58

Question of amending the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations and Article 69 of the Statute of the Court, with respect to an increase in the number of judges of the International Court of Justice

108. The PRESIDENT: I am informed that there is general agreement to postpone the consideration of these three items until the twelfth session. As there is no objection, this will be done.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 37

Question of South West Africa: report of the Committee on South West Africa

REPORT OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE (A/3541)

AGENDA ITEM 13

Report of the Trusteeship Council

REPORT OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE (A/3554 AND ADD.1)

AGENDA ITEM 40

Question of the frontier between the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration and Ethiopia: reports of the Governments of Ethiopia and of Italy

REPORT OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE (A/3555)

Pursuant to rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the reports of the Fourth Committee.

109. The PRESIDENT: The Fourth Committee's report on items 37, 13 and 40 have already been distributed and do not need to be formally presented.

110. Since no representative has indicated a desire to explain his vote on the eight draft resolutions contained in the report on item 37 [A/3541], we shall now proceed to vote on those draft resolutions.

Draft resolution I was adopted by 47 votes to none, with 16 abstentions. Draft resolution II was adopted by 52 votes to none, with 17 abstentions. Draft resolution III was adopted by 55 votes to 4, with 7 abstentions. Draft resolution IV was adopted by 57 votes to 2, with 9 abstentions. Draft resolution V was adopted by 55 votes to none, with 14 abstentions. Draft resolution VI was adopted by 40 votes to 11, with 19 abstentions. Draft resolution VII was adopted by 40 votes to 4, with 23 abstentions. Draft resolution VIII was adopted by 58 votes to none, with 13 abstentions.

111. The PRESIDENT: Draft resolution VIII, which has just been adopted, envisages an immediate change in the composition of the Committee on South West Africa. I am informed by the Chairman of the Fourth Committee that, in order to save time at this stage in the work of the session, the Fourth Committee decided to recommend that Ethiopia and Finland be appointed as members of the Committee on South West Africa, thus increasing the membership to nine.

112. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Assembly adopts the recommendation of the Fourth Committee.

The recommendation was adopted.

113. The PRESIDENT: We turn now to the Fourth Committee's report on item 13 [A/3554 and Add.1]. I shall call on any representatives who wish to explain their votes.

114. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom): I have asked to speak in order to explain the negative votes which my delegation will be casting on draft resolutions III and IV contained in the report of the Fourth Committee now before the Assembly.

115. Draft resolution III "invites the Administering Authorities to estimate the period of time required for the attainment of self-government or independence". It applies to two Trust Territories under British administration—namely, the Cameroons under British administration and Tanganyika. Draft resolution IV deals exclusively with Tanganyika and recommends that the United Kingdom Government, as Administering Authority, "should consider making a statement on the policy it proposes to follow in Tanganyika and should, *inter alia*, include therein the principle that, in accordance with the principles of the International Trusteeship System, the Territory shall be guided towards self-government or independence and shall become a democratic State in which all inhabitants have equal rights".

116. There are, in my delegation's view, other objectionable features in these two draft resolutions, apart from the provisions to which I have drawn attention. Since, however, these two provisions are the principal features of the draft resolutions, what I have to say will be related to them.

117. The objective and intention of Her Majesty's Government in the administration of Tanganyika have been frequently and consistently announced since the inception of our administration under the Trusteeship System. I shall restate it now. It is to continue to administer the Territory in accordance with the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement, until the ultimate goal

of self-government has been reached. Her Majesty's Government interprets the Trusteeship Agreement and Article 76 of the Charter as imposing on the Administering Authority an obligation to provide for the full participation of all sections of the population, irrespective of race or religion, in the progressive development of political institutions and in the economic and social advancement of the Territory. Each section of the population must be enabled and encouraged to play its full part in the development of the Territory and its institutions, in complete confidence that the rights and interests of all communities—both indigenous and immigrant—will be secured and preserved. As the educational, social and economic progress of the African community in Tanganyika continues, the participation of Africans in both the legislative and the executive branches of government is bound to increase. Finally, Her Majesty's Government is firmly opposed to any attempt to regulate the organic growth of constitutional development by setting arbitrary time-tables or time-limits. It will decide on the pace of change in the light of experience gained at each stage and the readiness of the people of the Territory for the next step forward. Where the way ahead to the next objective is clearly seen at any time in a particular field, it will frequently prove convenient and helpful to set ourselves a target for its attainment, but we are not prepared to make any general forecast of the dates by which we would expect to achieve successive stages in the advance to self-government. Nor do we think that it would be useful to attempt any more elaborate statement of our objectives and intentions than the clear declaration which I have reiterated today.

118. Mr. WALKER (Australia): I wish to offer, as briefly as possible, the Australian delegation's views on draft resolutions III and IV contained in the Fourth Committee's report now before the Assembly.

119. As regards Tanganyika, I would only say that we support the position adopted by the United Kingdom representative.

120. I do not propose to speak at length on the matters covered by these two draft resolutions, since the full and considered views of my delegation have been made known repeatedly both in the Trusteeship Council and in the Fourth Committee. I do, however, wish to refer particularly to this question of time-limits.

121. Our obligations as an Administering Authority derive immediately from the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreements to which we are a party, Agreements which—it was never more necessary to recall—were freely approved by this Assembly. We do not hold those obligations lightly. For, if the Trusteeship Agreements designate us as the sole authority which shall exercise the administration of the Territories concerned, they thereby place on our shoulders a heavy responsibility to determine in the last resort what can and what cannot be done in those Territories, and a responsibility to decide what course of action will benefit and what course will harm the interests of the people who, with the approval of this Assembly, are at present under our care.

122. Not only the Australian Government as the Administering Authority for the Trust Territories of New Guinea and Nauru, but also all other Administering Authorities have seriously, and indeed urgently, advised the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council in the past against attempts to estimate the time which will be required for individual Territories

to attain the objectives of the Trusteeship System. We and other Administering Authorities have repeatedly explained that we believe that, quite apart from the legal implications of such action—upon which I do not propose to dwell now—any attempt to establish final time-limits is wholly impracticable. We have also pointed out that any such action would necessarily entail a radical departure from the conception of trusteeship—and, in particular, the conception of the progressive development of peoples under trusteeship which is envisaged in Article 76 of the Charter—and would harm rather than benefit the people of the Trust Territories.

123. The General Assembly should be left in no doubt as to the Australian Government's attitude if, notwithstanding the opposition of all Administering Authorities concerned, this draft resolution calling for time-limits were to be adopted.

124. We have undertaken to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the people of the Trust Territories under our care, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence, as may be appropriate to the circumstances particular to each Territory and to its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned and as may be provided by the terms of each Trusteeship Agreement. We have also undertaken to encourage in these Territories respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction. We do not interpret these obligations as capable of being satisfied by the mere transfer of authority from ourselves to a few selected individuals in the Territories concerned, with the abandonment of the mass of the people to conditions which may be totally incompatible with the modern and essential democratic standards which are the proudest inheritance of our own country and which are reflected in the fundamental principles of the Charter itself.

125. Nor can we regard the provisions of Article 76 of the Charter as requiring us merely to construct in careless haste, whether by force or by pretence, a superficial institutional framework of self-government or independence which would at best be a fiction. The Australian Government, as an Administering Authority, has undertaken to build, and not merely to pretend to build, a self-governing or independent state in New Guinea which will conform to the constructive principles laid down in Article 76 of the Charter and which may be expected, after the termination of our trusteeship, to continue to conform to those principles.

126. That is our interpretation of our obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement, and, whatever may be the opinions of those who believe that the elimination of colonialism necessarily involves the precipitate destruction of the Trusteeship System, we do not intend to abandon our interpretation, nor shall we abandon the people we have undertaken to safeguard and to assist along the road to self-development, for the trust we hold, we hold first and foremost in the interests of the people under our care. We do not propose to prejudice the development of those people who, unquestionably and unquestioningly, place their trust in us, merely to satisfy those whose present attitude reflects trust neither in the Trusteeship System itself nor, apparently, in the Administering Authorities established under that system.

127. In the light of these views, we would urge the General Assembly to reject draft resolution III submitted by the Fourth Committee.

128. Mr. BARGUES (France) (*translated from French*): I should like to explain my delegation's position on draft resolution III concerning the attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories.

129. The French delegation has, in the past, both in the Trusteeship Council and in the General Assembly felt compelled to oppose the *a priori* setting of time-limits for the attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories.

130. That was why we did not vote in favour of resolution 558 (VI) adopted on 18 January 1952, which is mentioned in the third paragraph of the preamble of draft resolution III, now before the Assembly. The Government of the French Republic considered then—and continues to consider—that although it may perhaps be possible to draw up a programme covering a fairly considerable number of years and mapping out the successive stages of a Territory's economic, social and cultural development, it would be rather dangerous to apply the same system to the Territory's political development. It is also a relevant consideration that in the case of economic, social and cultural development programmes, difficulties have often arisen and, while perhaps leaving the essential features intact have undoubtedly hindered their execution.

131. The difficulties likely to arise in the political field are even greater, for there we are no longer concerned merely with material factors which can ultimately be reduced to figures but with the facts of human nature and the life of a community, in other words, with elements which are in their nature uncertain and usually unpredictable and imponderable.

132. I realize that the efforts of the Administering Powers to complete the political training of the masses of the people in the backward countries and to provide them with a constantly improving level of living, have had the effect of promoting the rapid development of the Territories under their charge towards self-government. Nevertheless, the likely speed of future development cannot be precisely estimated. It depends on external events and factors which are almost wholly unforeseeable.

133. The *a priori* setting of a time-limit for a Territory's attainment of self-government or independence may well result in forecasts which are utterly falsified by the facts. The method would, if adopted, run the risk of rousing apprehension in the minds of some, promoting an unhealthy political agitation and, it may be, causing disappointment if the announced goal could not be reached at the appointed date.

134. On the other hand, the attainment of independence or self-government within a period of time shorter than that previously envisaged would place both the Administering Authority and the Territory's population in a dubious position.

135. My delegation raises the problem dispassionately, the more so as the French Government recently gave the Togolese people the opportunity of choosing a system of self-government and as a new Statute, now under discussion, will enable the Cameroons to take a great step forward in its political development.

136. It is perfectly obvious that if the question had been raised, even a few years ago, of fixing a precise date for the attainment of self-government by these two Territories, no one here would have thought that their political development could proceed so fast.

137. It is with these two examples in mind and for the reasons I have just explained that my delegation will regretfully have to vote against draft resolution III.

138. Mr. TAZHIBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): During the Fourth Committee's consideration of the Trusteeship Council's report, the Soviet delegation took the view that the General Assembly should give its attention chiefly to the way in which the main objective of Trusteeship—the attainment of independence by the Trust Territories—is being achieved.

139. Unfortunately, however, an examination of the Trusteeship Council's report to this session of the General Assembly gives rise to the same deductions and conclusions as have been expressed at previous sessions. The position of the indigenous populations of the Trust Territories is still unsatisfactory. The progress of the Trust Territories toward self-government and independence is too slow. At the same time the Administering Authorities disregarding the repeated recommendations of the General Assembly, refuse to fix even approximate dates for the attainment of independence by many of the Territories. They use all kinds of excuses in an attempt deliberately to slow down the political development of the peoples of these Territories; they hinder their attainment of self-government and independence and in various ways continue to practice a policy of colonialism. Instead of developing democratic institutions of all kinds and enacting comprehensive social and economic measures for the benefit of the indigenous population, the Administering Authorities have chosen instead to ignore their interests and even, in some Territories, to introduce a system of mass terror and repression.

140. Needless to say, such a policy has nothing whatever to do with the basic objectives and tasks of the Trusteeship System and it is in contradiction to the historic laws of social development, which has been characterized, in the past decade, by a very widespread movement towards independence among colonial and dependent peoples and their awakening to an active political life. It is time to have done with such a policy. The Administering Authorities ought immediately to enact a wide range of measures to improve the political, social and economic conditions of life of the indigenous populations of the Trust Territories and in all ways to speed up the Trust Territories' advancement towards independence and self-government.

141. The Soviet delegation considers that it has long been time for the setting of precise dates for the attainment of full independence by a large number of Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories. It considers it urgently necessary to grant independence, within a period of three to five years, to the Trust Territories of Tanganyika and the Cameroons under British administration, the Cameroons and Togoland under French administration and Ruanda-Urundi under Belgian administration, and to set exact dates for the attainment of self-government and independence by other Trust Territories. This firm conviction of ours was, as you know, given appropriate expression in a draft resolution submitted by us to the Fourth Committee.

142. During the discussion of this question in the Committee a number of delegations, while supporting the draft resolution, expressed the wish that it would recommend the accession of those Territories to independence and self-government within the shortest possible time, but without stating a precise date.

143. In order to meet the wishes of those delegations, which were echoed by the majority of the members of the Committee, and also in a spirit of co-operation, the Soviet delegation agreed to accept the relevant amendments submitted by the Syrian and Indian delegations. For these reasons the Soviet delegation will vote for draft resolution III recommended in the Fourth Committee's report.

144. At the same time the Soviet delegation hopes that precise dates will, in the very near future, be set for the attainment of self-government and independence by the majority of the Trust Territories, which will fully accord with the aspirations of their peoples.

145. Before indicating its position on the other draft resolutions adopted by the Fourth Committee the Soviet delegation would like first to observe that the obstacles raised by the Administering Authorities are preventing the inhabitants of the Trust Territory from making use of the educational opportunities offered them by a number of States Members of the United Nations in response to General Assembly resolutions 557 (VI) and 845 (IX). In particular, not a single inhabitant of a Trust or Non-Self Governing Territory has been able to take advantage of the very favourable conditions offered by the Government of the Soviet Union. Certain inhabitants of Togoland under British administration and of the Cameroons under French administration who wanted to receive an education in the Soviet Union and were offered scholarships by the Soviet Government were refused exit visas by their Administering Authorities.

146. All this goes to show that the Administering Authorities are hampering the training of qualified personnel among the indigenous inhabitants of the Trust Territories. The USSR delegation therefore wholeheartedly supports the draft resolution adopted by the Fourth Committee regarding the use of educational opportunities offered by Members of the United Nations to inhabitants of the Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories, and will vote for it.

147. The Soviet delegation will also vote for the draft resolutions IV, V and VI submitted by the Fourth Committee.

148. The PRESIDENT: We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolutions proposed by the Fourth Committee in its report [A/3554 and Add.1].

Draft resolution I was adopted by 46 votes to 13, with 4 abstentions.

Draft resolution II was adopted by 55 votes to 3, with 13 abstentions.

149. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now consider draft resolution III. Separate votes have been requested on the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the preamble and on operative paragraph 2.

150. I now put to the vote the fifth paragraph of the preamble.

The paragraph was adopted by 41 votes to 18, with 9 abstentions.

151. The PRESIDENT: I now put to the vote the sixth paragraph of the preamble.

The result of the vote was 36 in favour, 20 against and 13 abstentions.

The paragraph was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority.

152. The PRESIDENT: I now put to the vote operative paragraph 2.

The paragraph was adopted by 42 votes to 18, with 14 abstentions.

153. The PRESIDENT: I now put to the vote draft resolution III as a whole as amended. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Romania, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Ceylon, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland.

Against: Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal.

Abstaining: Spain, Turkey, Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Finland, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Laos, Nicaragua, Peru.

Draft resolution III as a whole, as amended, was adopted by 45 votes to 14, with 16 abstentions.

154. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now proceed to a vote on draft resolution IV.

Draft resolution IV was adopted by 47 votes to 15, with 11 abstentions.

155. The PRESIDENT: Draft resolution V was unanimously adopted in Committee. May I take it that the Assembly also adopts this draft resolution unanimously?

Draft resolution V was adopted unanimously.

156. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now proceed to a vote on the last draft resolution recommended in this report, draft resolution VI.

Draft resolution VI was adopted by 46 votes to 9, with 10 abstentions.

157. The PRESIDENT: We now come to the report of the Fourth Committee on agenda item 40 [A/3555].

158. Mr. GRILLO (Italy): In spite of the late hour, my delegation feels obliged to take the floor to emphasize the importance that we attach to the question of the boundary between Ethiopia and the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration and to state again, and if possible more clearly than we have done in the Fourth Committee, our position.

159. The idea of an independent Somalia was conceived neither by Ethiopia nor by Italy. It was conceived by the United Nations. The Territory is still one of the children of the United Nations and is due to become independent on 2 December 1960.

160. We all share responsibility towards this infant State, not only in regard to its present but also to its future. As for the present, Italy, as Administering Authority, is responsible for its economic, social and political development towards independence. We are glad to have undertaken such a responsibility. Ties of history, sentiment and mutual interest link us to the Somali people. We have made of the Territory a crucible into which we are pouring our experience and

our resources in order to help build the independent Somalia of tomorrow.

161. As for the results of our activities, the report of the Trusteeship Council which the Assembly has just approved speaks for itself. In our actions we shall continue to be inspired by our traditional dedication to the welfare of the Somalis and to the fulfilment of the duty entrusted to us by the United Nations.

162. Mindful of the political welfare of the Somalis, the ability to live peacefully within well-established borders should be considered as part of that welfare. As for the future, the ultimate responsibility rests mainly with the United Nations, whereas Italy's responsibility in that regard is that of one Member State, that is, a collective responsibility.

163. Therefore, looking to tomorrow, the United Nations should take into consideration what we have to say, guide us and formulate plans for the future. What we are endeavouring to bring to the Assembly's attention is that the date for independence is getting closer and closer and that we cannot leave the new State at the inception of its independent existence burdened with two major problems, namely, the precarious economic situation and the political problem deriving from an undefined border.

164. We want the Territory to develop into a healthy, viable, democratic going concern. We do not want it to become the stake of various prejudicial interests at play, interests other than those of the Somali people.

165. The boundary problem should not be laid at the door of Italy's responsibility. It is not a consequence of colonialism, that outworn cliché. Even if the Italians had never set foot in Africa, the Somalis would have acquired, sooner or later, a national consciousness and would have had to face the problem of fixing the border of their own national territory just the same. Neither is the problem a consequence of comparatively recent events. For, as has been acknowledged by the Ethiopian representative himself, the border has been in dispute for well over sixty years. It is not our responsibility if such a problem exists, but it is our duty to tell the Member of the Assembly about it.

166. We believe that it is a fundamental necessity that the boundary be established well before 1960. The lawfully and democratically elected representatives of the Somali people have been telling the Fourth Committee the reasons behind this fundamental necessity and the urgency of a solution. May I add that the urgency is derived also from the advisability of preventing feelings which would jeopardize the existing friendship between the Somalis and their neighbours; the advisability, I say, of preventing negotiations from developing at a later stage into what might become a dispute between the two parties most directly concerned.

167. May I put the opinion of my delegation this way: an end to the uncertainty, both economic and political, is the most urgent and the more important contribution that can presently be made to the future of Somalia.

168. Aware as we are of the importance of the problem—and of the urgency of a solution—in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly, we have undertaken as Administering Authority negotiations with the Ethiopians on behalf of and in the interest of the Somali people. In these negotiations, we have been guided by our friendship towards that country, and we have spared no efforts to achieve a solution that is right, just and fair to both sides.

169. I readily agree that the other side has given in full its interpretation of the negotiations, and stated clearly its negative position in regard to any procedure other than the one we have been following. As far as we are concerned, we have submitted a thorough, objective and factual report on the progress of the negotiations; we have introduced it; we have commented on all salient points of the Ethiopian report and on the remarks which the Ethiopian representative made while introducing such report.

170. In regard to procedure, we have said that we are not against the fixing of a target date for the settlement; that we are not against any proposal of mediation or otherwise which would have as a consequence the waiver of the right of the Somalis to fix their boundaries; that we do not consider the intervention of the United Nations in the negotiations as interference; that we are not opposed in principle to any recommendation as to the best way of finding a speedy solution.

171. In conclusion, we feel that we have stated our case fully and laid all our cards on the table for the General Assembly to make conclusions and recommendations.

172. The result of the debate in the Fourth Committee is embodied in the draft resolution on which a vote is about to be taken. This draft resolution emphasizes the increasing importance of the final settlement, and we are pleased to note that the element of urgency is duly stressed in the last paragraph of the preamble. The draft resolution further recommends to the Governments of Ethiopia and Italy to continue and complete their negotiations, and expresses the opinion that it might be necessary for either Government, in order to achieve a settlement before the independence of Somaliland, to adhere to the procedure laid down by the General Assembly in resolution 392 (V).

173. The draft resolution does not take into account the possibility of the General Assembly's having to re-examine the question—should neither party request mediation—for reasons which came to the fore during the debate in the Fourth Committee.

174. This is the draft resolution that the Committee, in its wisdom, recommends to the General Assembly.

175. We shall abstain in the vote. Our abstention should not be construed as disagreement with the spirit of the draft resolution; it means that we maintain our policy followed all through the debate, that is, to submit the facts—all the facts—and let the General Assembly thereafter be free to decide as to the best course of action. Thereby, we feel that we are laying the responsibility before the proper authority.

176. The Assembly's decision will be brought forthwith to the consideration of the Italian Government for subsequent action.

177. Mr. DERESSA (Ethiopia): In the course of the discussions in the Fourth Committee, the Ethiopian delegation had the opportunity of setting forth in full detail the historical background of this important problem of the frontier between Ethiopia and the Trust Territory of Somaliland, as well as the various details and aspects of the negotiations which have been pursued during the past year in Addis Ababa with a view to settling the matter. Therefore, I need not at this time go into those aspects of the question. On this occasion I only wish to treat with the problem as it was discussed in the Fourth Committee.

178. The importance and delicacy of the question have been revealed by the detailed nature of the negotiations. In view of this circumstance and of the scope and complexity of the factors involved, the fact that the matter has not been solved in the period of the past twelve months, during which negotiations have taken place, should not in itself be a cause for surprise provided, of course, that both sides have exerted every effort to promote the earliest possible completion of the negotiations now under way. I believe that the memorandum which the Ethiopian Government communicated to the United Nations, as well as the explanations furnished my delegation in the Fourth Committee, have served to clarify much in this respect.

179. As I have indicated, the problem is an important and indeed a delicate and complicated one, requiring close attention to a substantial documentation and to all sectors of the frontier. The negotiations in the period under review have been concerned with the northern portion of the frontier. Problems relating to all sections of the boundary still remain to be discussed, and additional documentation is still awaited. Also, as the draft resolution before us indicates, there still remains for negotiation the entirety of the southern sector of the frontier, which must necessarily be closely correlated with the northern half. It is apparent, therefore, that without a thoroughgoing discussion of this southern sector and of all documentation, it will be most difficult to form any clear concept as to the respective positions of the negotiating parties concerning the frontier in general, and the measure of success of the negotiations now under way.

180. The Ethiopian delegation feels strongly that all of the frontier, as well as all of the documentation, must be promptly discussed before any concept can be gained as to the success of the negotiations or the future course of action to be recommended. Resolution 947 (X) calls upon the parties to complete the negotiations, and this is exactly what my delegation has been seeking to do. The six-Power draft resolution sponsored and presented by Burma, Ceylon, Greece, Indonesia, Liberia and the Sudan has accurately reflected this need for completing the negotiations as required by that resolution of last year. Until all the sectors of the frontier have been discussed and a general view obtained as to the respective positions of the parties involved, it is manifestly impossible for the General Assembly to make any fruitful recommendations. Since it carefully took all these considerations into account, the draft resolution as originally proposed by the six Powers had the full support of the Ethiopian delegation.

181. As regards the tripartite amendments adopted in the Fourth Committee, I have already, in that Committee, expressed the views of my delegation on this subject. I need not, therefore, indulge in any further remarks except to observe that my delegation, while fully appreciating the very friendly and helpful spirit in which the three Powers approached the problem and while giving the greatest attention and consideration to their remarks, nevertheless, remains to be convinced that the General Assembly, in advance of knowing the results of the negotiations on the entire frontier, which still remain to take place, could properly issue a recommendation in the matter, still less, attempt to limit its freedom of action at the twelfth session. It would seem normal that each session should remain entirely free and autonomous in reaching its own independent judgement in the light of all circumstances involved at the time of formulating its recommendations. In the voting

on this draft resolution, as amended by the tripartite amendments, my delegation will therefore conform to the position which it expressed in the Fourth Committee.

182. This said, my Government will continue to pursue with the greatest diligence the completion of the negotiations on the entire frontier in the sincere hope that a prompt solution may soon be reached to settle this problem.

183. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now vote on the draft resolution contained in the report of the Fourth Committee [A/3555]. A separate vote has been requested on paragraph 2 of the operative part.

Paragraph 2 was adopted by 54 votes to none, with 19 abstentions.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 71 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

AGENDA ITEM 27

Economic development of under-developed countries:

- (a) **Question of the establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development: report of the Ad Hoc Committee;**
- (b) **International tax problems: report of the Economic and Social Council;**
- (c) **Industrialization of under-developed countries**

REPORT OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE (A/3556)

184. Mr. BANNIER (Netherlands), Rapporteur of the Second Committee: In submitting to the General Assembly the report of the Second Committee on item 27 [A/3556], I should at the outset wish to say that this item has once again demanded the greater part of the time and a great deal of the attention of the Second Committee. The acceleration of the development of under-developed countries has always been and still is one of the major concerns of the United Nations. Through action by the General Assembly and by the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations initiated a number of measures and programmes, contributing to the development of under-developed countries. Limited as the scope of these measures may be, limited also as the scope of the measures now recommended to the General Assembly may be, nevertheless it became clear once again that the Second Committee certainly is not loosening its grip on the action for furthering economic development year after year and endeavours to tighten that grip.

185. During the general debate on the subject many important statements were made. When I single out three of these statements, I do so certainly not to imply that other statements were of lesser importance, but I do so only because these three had considerable influence on the further discussions. I refer first to a statement made by the distinguished representative of Poland who very ably explained the economic problems of his country and then examined the relations between world trade and the development of both the industrialized and the economically less developed countries. Secondly, I refer to a statement by the distinguished representative of Canada, wherein he presented, jointly with the representative from Norway, the new idea of the collection of information by the United Nations concerning international economic assistance of the less

developed countries, both on a multilateral and a bilateral basis. And thirdly, I mention a statement made by the distinguished representative from France, who announced his country's intended material support to the creation of an international development fund.

186. I will not dwell any longer on the general debate nor on specific statements, but I will proceed to the factual results of the discussions.

187. The Committee took up the question of the establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. The Economic and Social Council at its twenty-second session, having examined the interim report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the question, established by the General Assembly at its tenth session, expressed the hope, in resolution 619 A (XXII), that the General Assembly would consider what further steps may help to promote the early establishment of such a Fund. While in the Second Committee no basic changes could be recorded in the views of Governments as explained at previous sessions, it became apparent that all countries were prepared to broaden to a certain extent the terms of reference of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Many countries wanted the *Ad Hoc* Committee to prepare statutes of a special fund for further consideration by the Assembly at its twelfth session. Other countries, and specifically the major potential contributing countries, were unable for the time being to support an instruction to draft statutes and to participate in such drafting; yet they were prepared to consider further action by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, short of the drafting of statutes. I will not go into the many stages of the discussions and negotiations; suffice it to say that two draft resolutions, asking for the drafting of statutes were introduced and later merged into one. That one resolution was sponsored by forty-one delegations. To that draft resolution amendments were made by the delegation of Denmark, which together with Ireland subsequently submitted a draft resolution wherein an effort was made to meet to a certain extent the desires of the forty-one delegations. After protracted negotiations, agreement was reached between all forty-three interested countries, resulting in the draft resolution, which is being submitted to the General Assembly in the report as draft resolution I.

188. The key paragraph of that draft resolution is paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part, which requests the *Ad Hoc* Committee to set forth the different forms of legal framework on which a special United Nations fund may be established and statutes drafted. This could be done on the basis of all material presently available. The outcome can be seen as one of the further steps hoped for by the Economic and Social Council to promote the early establishment of a special fund.

189. It is interesting to note that the original SUNFED proposal of a number of years ago is gradually gaining a broader interpretation and flexibility, without losing any essential element of an international fund for economic development within the framework of the United Nations.

190. A second draft resolution on a special fund, this one sponsored by Egypt, Irak and Pakistan, asked for a decision to increase the membership of the *Ad Hoc* Committee by three members, bringing its membership to nineteen. That draft resolution, appeared in the Committee's report as draft resolution II. The Committee took the liberty of requesting the President to appoint the three additional members.

191. Sub-item 27 (b) of the agenda dealt with international taxation problems. The two major issues were

the measures designed to reduce the risk of double taxation, and the encouragement of foreign investment by special tax concessions. The Committee adopted a draft resolution welcoming the progress made by several countries in eliminating or minimizing international double taxation and requesting the Secretary-General to complete his studies on the subject with a view to the presentation of conclusions at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. That draft resolution is draft resolution III in the report.

192. Sub-item 27 (c) on the industrialization of under-developed countries was placed on the agenda pursuant to a resolution adopted by the Economic and Social Council at its twenty-first session [597 (XXI)] inviting Governments to keep in mind the desirability of and the benefits to be obtained from an integrated and co-ordinated approach in the field of industrialization and productivity. The Secretary-General had prepared a programme of work of the United Nations, designed to accelerate industrialization. During the debate, various views were expressed as to the best course to be followed by the under-developed countries. Some Members laid stress on the importance of a development whereby not only small but also middle and, where possible, heavy industry would balance agricultural development. Other Members emphasized the dangers of pressing ahead too fast with industrialization at the expense of other sectors of the economy. All Members, however, looked at industrialization of the less-developed parts of the world as one of the most challenging problems of our time.

193. Three draft resolutions were introduced. One of them, sponsored by nine Latin-American countries, expressed satisfaction at the work done in this field by the existing United Nations bodies and invited Member States to give close attention to the studies now being made by those bodies. This is draft resolution IV contained in the report. The two other draft resolutions, sponsored by Pakistan and Egypt respectively, were consolidated into one text, which *inter alia* requests the Secretary-General to report at the twenty-fifth session of the Economic and Social Council on such possible forms of organizational and administrative machinery in the field of industrialization and productivity as may be necessary. This draft resolution, unanimously adopted by the Committee, is reproduced as draft resolution V.

194. In connexion with statements made by the representatives of Canada and Norway, one of which I have already mentioned, these two countries, together with Argentina and the Philippines, introduced a draft resolution on the collection of information and statistical data concerning international economic assistance. The underlying idea was to make the United Nations Secretariat a sort of clearing house for information on all economic and financial assistance rendered to under-developed countries. As a first step, the Secretary-General was asked in the original draft to make a preliminary factual survey on the basis of information readily available from governmental and inter-governmental sources. During the discussion, it became clear that many questions had to be answered before the Committee would be in a position fully to comprehend the implications of the exercise. Therefore the sponsors accepted an amendment referring the whole question of collecting the relevant information to the twenty-fourth session of the Council and asking the Council to consider the subject on the basis of information the Secretary-General may provide. The draft is contained in the report as draft resolution VI.

195. Finally, on the recommendation of the Council, the Second Committee changed a request to the Secretary-General made by the General Assembly at its ninth session in connexion with his reports on the international flow of private capital. Whereas the Secretary-General at first was requested annually to prepare a full report, it was now decided to ask for a triennial report, to be complemented annually by a report containing statistical data on the flow of private capital. This decision is to be found in draft resolution VII in the report. It was adopted without vote.

196. These seven draft resolutions are hereby submitted to the General Assembly by the Second Committee.

In accordance with rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the Second Committee.

197. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now vote on draft resolution I submitted by the Second Committee in its report [A/3556]. This draft was recommended unanimously by the Committee. I take it, that the Assembly also adopts this draft resolution unanimously.

Draft resolution I was adopted unanimously.

198. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now vote on draft resolution II.

Draft resolution II was adopted by 65 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

199. The PRESIDENT: In operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution which has just been adopted the President is requested to appoint three additional members to serve on the *Ad Hoc* Committee. I should like to appoint the following members to serve on the committee in addition to those already designated under resolution 923 (X): Italy, Japan and Tunisia.

200. The General Assembly will now vote on the draft resolutions III to VI.

Draft resolution III was adopted by 63 votes to none, with 9 abstentions.

Draft resolution IV was adopted by 68 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

Draft resolution V was adopted unanimously.

Draft resolution VI was adopted by 65 votes to none, with 8 abstentions.

201. The PRESIDENT: Draft resolution VII was adopted by the Committee without a vote. I take it that the Assembly adopts it in the same way.

Draft resolution VII was adopted.

AGENDA ITEM 26

Programmes of technical assistance (concluded):

- (a) Report of the Economic and Social Council;
- (b) Confirmation of allocation of funds under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance

REPORTS OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE (A/3467/ADD.1, A/3551) AND OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE (A/3561)

202. Mr. BANNIER (Netherlands), Rapporteur of the Second Committee: The General Assembly has to take two more decisions connected with Programmes of Technical Assistance. The present report of the Second Committee [A/3467/Add.1] deals with the question of the membership of the Technical Assistance Committee.

203. During the last few years the desirability of expanding the Technical Assistance Committee was mentioned and stressed in various United Nations bodies. The Second Committee has now made a recommendation on the subject to the Economic and Social Council. The Committee noted that the number of Governments making voluntary contributions to the United Nations Expanded Programme reached a total of seventy-seven in 1956, including several non-Members of the United Nations. It was realized that certain countries which play an active part in the Programme are not represented on the Economic and Social Council. The Committee therefore wished the General Assembly to recommend to the Council that it take the necessary steps to expand the present membership of the Technical Assistance Committee by six additional members to be elected by the Council from among the States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies for two-year terms.

204. The Committee could not agree to amend the draft resolution as proposed by the representative of Bulgaria in such a way that the additional members would be elected "from all States". The measure was to be seen as an interim measure only. In the event that the Council was enlarged, it would review the size and the composition of the Technical Assistance Committee in the light of such development.

205. The Committee realized that it was the responsibility of the Economic and Social Council to take a decision on the size and composition of the Technical Assistance Committee. The Committee, however, felt that it was entitled to submit recommendations to the Council on the subject without prejudging the constitutional duties of the Council. The Assembly has before it, for its approval, a draft resolution proposed by the Second Committee in its report.

Pursuant to rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the Second Committee.

206. The PRESIDENT: I will now put to the vote the draft resolution proposed by the Second Committee in its report [A/3467/Add.1].

The draft resolution was adopted by 60 votes to 8, with 1 abstention.

207. The PRESIDENT: The next item relates to the administrative and operational services costs of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. In this connexion the Fifth Committee has submitted a report [A/3561] for information purposes, of which I would ask representatives kindly to take note. I shall now call upon the rapporteur of the Second Committee to present the report on this item [A/3551].

208. Mr. BANNIER (Netherlands), Rapporteur of the Second Committee: This second report on the programmes of Technical Assistance—the last report which I have the honour to submit to the Assembly on behalf of the Second Committee—relates to the administrative and operational services costs of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance.

209. The Economic and Social Council, at its resumed twenty-second session, recommended the General Assembly to authorize the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to co-operate with and to render such advice to the Technical Assistance Committee as might be requested by that Committee and by the Council in the review of the administrative and operational services costs of the Expanded

Programme. This was done in connexion with the desire of the Technical Assistance Committee to have, in discharging its responsibility for the allocation and control of funds for the administration and servicing of the programme by the Technical Assistance Board and by the participating organizations, the benefit of the advice and assistance of the Advisory Committee.

210. The Advisory Committee would have been ready to give all possible assistance to this Technical Assistance Committee except for technical and constitutional difficulties. The constitutional difficulties found their cause in the fact that the Advisory Committee is linked only to the General Assembly and can act only upon express instructions of the General Assembly. It was for that reason that the Council recommended the Assembly to authorize the Advisory Committee to co-operate with and render advice to the Technical Assistance Committee. In compliance with that recommendation, the Second Committee unanimously recommends for approval the draft resolution which appears in its report.

211. The Committee also noted that the Advisory Committee would submit to the General Assembly a report on the work it had done during the year on the review of the administrative and operational services costs of the Expanded Programme. The Chairman of the Second Committee transmitted the draft resolution as adopted in the Second Committee, through the President, to the Chairman of the Fifth Committee; it is understood, and has just now been confirmed, that the Fifth Committee will take note of the draft resolution now proposed to the General Assembly for approval.

In accordance with rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the Second Committee.

212. The PRESIDENT: The draft resolution proposed by the Second Committee in its report [A/3551] was adopted in Committee unanimously without a vote, and I suggest that the Assembly should adopt it in the same way.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.

The meeting rose at 7.5 p.m.