

UNITED NATIONS



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-EIGHTH YEAR

**1726<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 14 JUNE 1973

NEW YORK

## CONTENTS

|  | Page |
|--|------|
| Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1726) .....   | 1    |
| Adoption of the agenda .....   | 1    |
| The situation in the Middle East:  |      |
| (a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973);  |      |
| (b) Report of of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution<br>331 (1973) (S/10929) ..... | 1    |

#### NOTE

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## SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 14 June 1973, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Yakov MALIK  
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1726)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the Middle East:
  - (a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973);
  - (b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) (S/10929).

*The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.*

### Adoption of the Agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

#### The situation in the Middle East:

- (a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) (S/10929)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): In accordance with the decisions taken by the Security Council at previous meetings, I intend, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Chad, the Syrian Arab Republic, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Somalia, Guyana, Mauritania, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iran and Bahrain to take part, without the right to vote, in the Council's consideration of the situation in the Middle East.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. H. El-Zayyat (Egypt), Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel), and Mr. A. H. Sharaf (Jordan) took places at the Council table; and Mr. S. A. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. H. G. Ouangmotching (Chad), Mr. H. Kelani (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. E. O. Ogbu (Nigeria), Mr. A. Bouteflika (Algeria), Mr. M. Zentar (Morocco), Mr. A. Al-Pachachi (United Arab Emirates), Mr. H. Nur Elmi (Somalia), Mr. R. E. Jackson (Guyana), Mr. M. El Hassen (Mauritania), Mr. A. Y. Bishara (Kuwait), Mr. J. Y. Jamal (Qatar), Mr. O. Sakka (Saudi Arabia), Mr. E. Ghorra (Lebanon), Mr. F. Hoveyda (Iran) and Mr. S. M. Al-Saffar (Bahrain) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

2. Mr. SCALI (United States of America): My Government views this meeting of the Council as a challenge and an opportunity. It is a challenge to deal responsibly with one of the most important—and one of the most difficult—of the problems facing the world community. It is an opportunity of a kind we have not had since November 1967, when the Council last met to review the whole problem of the Middle East. It is thus more than just an occasion to hear the complaints of one side against the other. It is an opportunity to create circumstances in which, at long last, Arab and Israeli might engage in a genuine negotiating process.

3. In the more than five and one half years since the Council last dealt with the issue in a comprehensive manner many, many words have been spoken and many resolutions have been passed. In some ways the problem is more difficult today than it was five and one half years ago. Time has a way of giving an aura of permanence to what once seemed transitory. This meeting should be first of all, therefore, an opportunity to reaffirm that we do not consider the present situation in the Middle East either natural or permanent. We should leave no doubt that it is neither natural nor permanent.

4. Time also has a way of subtly altering how we perceive problems and their solutions. This meeting is therefore an opportunity as well to review our perceptions, to see whether they have changed over the past five and one half years. This meeting should be an opportunity, in short, to recapture the hope and to reaffirm the resolve which inspired the Council on 22 November 1967 to give its unanimous approval to resolution 242 (1967). That decision was recognized at the time as a landmark in the long history of this problem in the United Nations. It remains a landmark today.

5. Resolution 242 (1967) reflected the Council's view that the time had come to move expeditiously toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East after three wars with their great toll of human tragedy and devastation and their threat to world peace. The resolution recognized that such a peace must be based on a just settlement not only of the problems arising out of the hostilities of June 1967 but also of the underlying causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict as they have existed now for over a quarter-century.

6. What were the essential elements with which we began the search for peace in 1967?

7. First, it is important to remember that in calling for a cease-fire to end the fighting in June 1967 the Council did

not address the question of who was responsible for the outbreak of that fighting. Nor did it call for unconditional Israeli withdrawal.

8. Secondly, it is important to remember the nature and essential elements of resolution 242 (1967) as they were generally understood at the time. The resolution was the result of compromise by all concerned, and that means that any settlement based upon it must reflect that spirit of compromise. Resolution 242 (1967) did not define the terms of settlement. In the language of the resolution itself, it defined a set of "provisions and principles" which constitute a framework for the terms of a final settlement. It is only fair to note that the terms to be negotiated must therefore be consistent with those provisions and principles—not with just some of them, but with all of them taken together. If the terms of a settlement do not meet that test, they cannot, in our view, form part of the just and lasting peace we seek. Too often one side or the other has sought to emphasize certain elements of resolution 242 (1967) while ignoring others.

9. What are the main provisions and principles of resolution 242 (1967)?

10. First, it includes in its preamble the words "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security". We accept that principle as important and significant.

11. Secondly, resolution 242 (1967) affirms that peace should include the application of two co-equal principles. One is "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied" in the 1967 conflict. My Government endorses that principle in the context of the resolution as a whole. But the principle of withdrawal cannot be separated from the next, balancing, paragraph, which affirms the principle of "Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force".

12. Thirdly, resolution 242 (1967) affirms the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation and for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area. Clearly, the specific measures by which these important interests of the parties are to be guaranteed must be part of the detailed terms of a final settlement. They must be part of the structure of peace.

13. Fourthly, resolution 242 (1967) affirms the necessity "for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem". That too must clearly be part of the structure of peace. My Government has on a number of occasions made clear our view that no structure of peace in the Middle East can be just and lasting if it does not make provision for the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians. In our view it is for the parties to work out what that means in specific terms.

14. Finally, resolution 242 (1967) calls for agreement. In the context of the resolution this clearly means agreement between the parties concerned. Ambassador Jarring, to whom I wish to pay a special tribute today, was subsequently selected to assist the parties to this end. My Government has never seen how such agreement would be possible without an ongoing, serious negotiating process either direct or indirect, which engaged the parties themselves. We believe each member of this Council should do everything possible to encourage the parties to engage in such a dialogue. The recess in these deliberations which now lies before us provides each and all of us with an opportunity to take stock and to consider what can be done to bring about forward movement.

15. In the days just passed, several speakers have attributed to the United States a certain partisanship in its view of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Perhaps in doing so those speakers were reflecting a certain partisanship of their own. In any case, I wish to dismiss these allegations without exception. Like my predecessors, I represent to the best of my ability the interests of the United States, and not those of any other single State. In the Middle East, the overriding interest of the United States is in peace—a peace that will end the fear and uncertainty of the past quarter-century. The interests of the United States demand that we press ahead to seek that peace—a peace that will allow Arab and Israeli alike to reside within secure and recognized boundaries. The United States urgently desires friendly and enduring relations with all countries of the Middle East.

16. In his recent report to Congress, President Nixon solemnly stated, "I have said that no other crisis area of the world has greater importance or higher priority for the United States in the second term of my Administration". I can assure you that Mr. Nixon's judgement and his resolve are unchanged. Our determination to serve this interest has only been strengthened by the passage of time. The disappointments of the past have strengthened the imperative to seek peace. Neither the United States nor any other Power or combination of Powers can negotiate such a peace. Only the parties can do that. But let there be no doubt about our determination to contribute whatever we can to the creation of circumstances in which the parties can achieve peace and security through negotiations.

17. We note, as other speakers before us have noted, that in today's world security means more than territory, more than the stockpiling of armaments and more than merely the absence of belligerency. Security—real security for all the parties—depends on willingness to put aside bitter quarrels, prejudices, fears and misapprehensions of the past and to look ahead positively to developing a broad range of mutual interests which gives each party a vested interest in preserving peace.

18. What are the key issues with which such negotiations must come to grips? In simplest terms they are the issues of sovereignty and security. The parties must find a way to reconcile the two. One aspect of this problem is the question of boundaries. There are many strongly held views about where the final boundaries between Israel and its neighbours should be drawn. Resolution 242 (1967) has often been cited to support one view or another. But the

fact is that resolution 242 (1967) is silent on the specific question of where the final border should be located. It neither endorses nor precludes—let me repeat, neither endorses nor precludes—the armistice lines which existed between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria on 4 June 1967, as the final secure and recognized boundaries. Everyone knew when resolution 242 (1967) was adopted that this was an area of ambiguity. This was part of the compromise to which I have referred.

19. The central message of resolution 242 (1967) is that there should be a fundamental change in the nature of the relationship of the parties with each other; a change from belligerency to peace, from insecurity to security, from dispossession and despair to hope and dignity for the Palestinians. Let me say again: it seems clear to us—logically, politically, historically, realistically—that the question of agreement of final boundaries must be viewed in the context of the total thrust and intent of resolution 242 (1967). This question must therefore be resolved as part of the process of reaching agreement on all the complex factors governing a new relationship among the parties which would replace that defined in the 1949 Armistice Agreements.

20. I have recalled the history of our efforts in 1967 not to argue the past but because I believe we need to restore our perspective as we look to the future. Many sincere efforts have been made, by Ambassador Jarring and by Governments including my own, to help the parties find a way to negotiate the detailed terms of a final peace agreement. Whatever may have been their merits, none succeeded. We are therefore left with resolution 242 (1967) as the only basis thus far accepted by both sides with regard both to substance and to procedure. The principal parties concerned have accepted that basis, each in its own way, and this is what makes it uniquely important.

21. The Council faces a great responsibility. We can by our actions wreck the basis for agreement which now exists with all its conscious ambiguities, or we can preserve that basis and try to move forward with renewed energy. My Government strongly believes that we must take the latter course. We are prepared to support a fresh attempt by Ambassador Jarring based on his mandate in Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

22. We shall be guided by this approach in judging whatever proposals may ultimately be placed before us. We agree with those who have argued that the Council has a responsibility to help bring about the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). Implementation requires agreement, and agreement requires a process of negotiations. This is what the Council must encourage and facilitate. Such a process, in our view, must involve a patient, practical step-by-step approach. It could begin, as we have long favoured, with an agreement on some Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai and a reopening of the Suez Canal within the context of an extended cease-fire, as the first stage on the road to a final settlement. Such a first step would be firmly linked to a final agreement settlement. But whether a beginning is made in this or some other way is less important than that such a process be started without delay. I assure you that my Government is fully prepared to

do its part to facilitate and sustain objectively and fairly any such process of negotiation until the goal the Council set for itself more than five and one half years ago is achieved. This we will do in the interests of true and lasting peace in the Middle East for all concerned in this and future generations.

23. Mr. BOYD (Panama) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on presiding over the Security Council during the month of June. Knowing full well your parliamentary ability, your wide experience in the work of this Organization and the respect felt for you by all those sitting around this table, I am convinced that you will discharge successfully the very heavy historic responsibility that has fallen on your shoulders. The delegation of Panama, which every day enjoys increasingly cordial relations with the delegation of the Soviet Union, is pleased to offer you all its co-operation in the fulfilment of your duties—among other reasons, as proof of our appreciation for the outstanding assistance that the Soviet Union gave us and your own brilliant participation in the memorable series of meetings that the Council held in Panama in March of this year.

24. We should like also to express our appreciation to the outgoing President, Ambassador Rahmatalla Abdulla of the Sudan, for the very wise and correct way in which he presided over our meetings last month.

25. From the sixth of this month the Security Council has been holding special meetings to examine the situation in the Middle East. The Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, has submitted and very satisfactorily introduced a very detailed report [*S/10929*] on the efforts made by the United Nations since 1967 to deal with the difficult situation confronting that region of the world. In that report very justifiable stress was laid on the outstanding role played by Ambassador Gunnar Jarring as Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in the fulfilment of the mission entrusted to him to ensure that the existing tension in the Middle East is ended—a region where we can safely say that the people are living in a situation that is neither peace nor war.

26. After having listened very carefully to the very complete statement of the Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. El-Zayyat, who on behalf of his country asked for this series of meetings, we have heard the Foreign Ministers of Nigeria, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea, Algeria and the Sudan, designated by the Organization of African Unity as spokesmen for Africa, who made very moving and eloquent statements.

27. We have also listened with great interest to the important statements made daily by Mr. Tekoah, representing Israel.

28. The members of the Council who have participated in our deliberations on the Middle East have spoken with great erudition, as have also the representatives of the Members of the United Nations that have been invited to participate in the debate. We are very happy to express the view that this debate has been a constructive one and that the parties to the conflict, without ceasing to defend their interests,

have nevertheless attested to the sincere desire of the inhabitants of the region to arrive at a just and equitable solution that will allow them to live in peace.

29. On 30 June 1967 the Latin American Group of the United Nations presented to the General Assembly at the fifth emergency special session a draft resolution<sup>1</sup> dealing with the situation in the Middle East on which the Assembly was called upon to vote. The operative part of that draft resolution read as follows:

*[The speaker read out the text of the operative part of the draft resolution.]*

30. By one of those ironies of fate, this draft resolution was not supported by the Arabs.

31. Panama was a member of the working group that prepared the rough draft of the Latin American draft resolution, which, unfortunately, was not adopted by the General Assembly. However, as far as my country was concerned, the fact that the draft resolution was rejected did not leave us in a political vacuum. In the years that have elapsed since June 1967 we have always defended the basic principles underlying that Latin American draft.

32. Now that the problem of the Middle East is once again being considered by the Security Council, since in the past six years no adequate solution has been found to it, the Government of Panama wishes to state that in all this time it has spared no effort to help to find a solution that will bring peace and stability to the countries of the region, so that all the members of the region may soon be able to enjoy the benefits of co-operation and understanding.

33. Without setting aside any of the fundamental principles expressed in the Latin American draft resolution, we should like the Security Council to explore all avenues that might lead us to the establishment of the conditions necessary for peace in the Middle East.

34. We believe that resolution 242 (1967), adopted on 22 November 1967 by the Security Council, possesses the elements which, through negotiations and agreements, might enable the parties to reach an acceptable solution in the search for peace. And if we have referred to a number of aspects of the Latin American draft submitted at the emergency session of the General Assembly, it has been primarily to make clear Panama's position regarding our interpretation of resolution 242 (1967).

35. Through its most important organ the United Nations must prove itself capable of playing an effective role in the search for peaceful solutions.

36. The Palestine problem is an explosive situation that could threaten the peace and security of the world, and is one of the most difficult situations that has confronted the United Nations since its very foundation, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, as well as in a number of subsidiary bodies.

37. Panama considers itself linked by special ties of friendship to both parties to the conflict, and it is for that

reason that we shall always endeavour calmly to find just and equitable solutions within the framework of the principles and tenets of the United Nations Charter and in keeping with the norms of international law.

38. The Jews of Panama have contributed significantly to the nation's economic development and to its social and cultural progress; they constitute a highly respected community in our country, and one that exerts considerable influence on important facets of the life of the country.

39. The Arabs of Panama, because of their own attributes, because of the many customs they have inherited from Spain, and because they are hard-working and industrious and have mixed with the other people of the country, have earned the affection of the Panamanians. The nationalist policy of that great leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, with regard to the Suez Canal, and also his ideas regarding the permanent sovereignty which our peoples have a right to exercise over their natural resources, captured the imagination of the majority of Panamanians, by virtue of the great similarity that exists between his country and my own because of the Panama Canal, which bisects our nation.

40. We know that in matters of war and peace it is very difficult to avoid an exacerbation of passions, while we prudently try to find acceptable solutions. The Government of Panama, guided by the fundamental principles that have always dictated our behaviour in the international field, principles such as that of the non-use of force and the refusal to accept the negative results that such use might produce, and as a good friend of the parties in conflict, is desirous that a solution be reached that will avoid future explosions of violence in the Middle East.

41. That is why we repeat that the Latin American draft resolution seems to us to contain the necessary ingredients and constructive suggestions which might, in our opinion, help us to interpret resolution 242 (1967) in a clear and balanced way so that a just and equitable solution can be found to the problems confronting the Middle East.

42. Speaking in favour of the Arab thesis in 1973 as it did in 1967, Panama believes that it is prudent to reiterate that we support the principle of the inadmissibility of the annexation of territories by force or military conquest.

43. Speaking in favour of Israel's claim to the right to live, and without wishing to lay down conditions, Panama believes that the Arab States, simultaneously with the troop withdrawal, should reach agreement with Israel on the way in which to guarantee to Israel not only recognition as a free and sovereign State, but its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

44. The refugee problem should be approached by Israel with its Arab neighbours with all the special interest which such a situation merits, a situation in which more than 2 million human beings are clamoring for an equitable and permanent solution. This is not only a political problem, but also one of human rights.

45. As you all know, the overwhelming majority of the Panamanian people is of the Catholic religion, and it is for

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Annexes*, agenda item 5, document A/L.523/Rev.1.

that reason that my Government feels obliged to concern itself over the fate of the Holy Places. Thus we are at one with the aspirations and appeals of the Holy See for the necessary guarantees of freedom of access to the Holy Places of Jerusalem, not for devout catholics alone but also for the believers of the three greatest religions in the world.

46. My delegation believes that solutions to the Middle East situation must be based on general rather than partial agreements. Therefore the spirit of belligerence existing in Israel and the Arab States must come to an end.

47. Surely sufficient time has already elapsed for us to feel deeply concerned over the fact that this objective has still eluded peaceful achievement, and Panama firmly believes that a just settlement of controversies of this nature must be achieved without resort to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

48. We would not want this series of meetings of the Security Council, which has been called to examine the situation in the Middle East, to end without a practical conclusion, since we believe it our bounden duty to prove to the world that the United Nations—specifically through the efforts of the Security Council—can play an effective role in the search for peaceful solutions.

49. I sincerely believe that, little by little, the appeals for the elimination from the hearts of Arabs and Jews of the hatred and belligerency that have caused so much pain and suffering and mourning in the Middle East are reaching their targets.

50. With the industrial energy crisis which is besetting the modern world, and in the light of the enormous oil resources possessed by the Arab nations, surely the most intelligent and human thing would be for us to help in finding permanent peace, which will allow the full social and economic development of the countries of the region. Mankind cannot complacently stand aside while these resources are being squandered on arms expenditures which can only result in pain and death, when we know that, properly exploited, they might well serve the Arabs and Jews alike, helping them fulfil their creative purposes, living as good neighbours in a new era for civilization.

51. With affection, understanding and friendship for both Arabs and Jews, the delegation of Panama would like to serve as a bridge so that those friendly delegations might enter into more direct contact with one another and thus start towards the permanent solution to the Middle East crisis. We agree with what the Secretary-General states in his report:

“The Security Council is, as far as I know, the only forum where all the parties to the conflict have been able to meet together in the same room. In the forthcoming debate it is to be hoped that this advantage may be used for constructive moves towards a settlement.” [S/10929, para. 116.]

52. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I thank the representative of Panama for his statement and for the

kind words with which he referred to my country. Like him, I too note with satisfaction the development of good relations between the Soviet Union and Panama, and I hope that they will continue to develop favourably in the future.

53. The next on the list of speakers is Qatar. I invite the representative of Qatar to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

54. Mr. JAMAL (Qatar): Mr. President, allow me to extend to you and to the distinguished members of this august body my thanks and appreciation for permitting my delegation to participate in the discussion concerning the situation in the Middle East. I would, furthermore, like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. I am sure that, with your able guidance and wide experience, you will successfully lead the Council's deliberations to the right path of finding a just solution to the complex issue of which the Council is now seized.

55. I should also like to extend a warm and sincere welcome to the distinguished African Ministers for Foreign Affairs, who have eloquently pronounced the African solidarity with the just cause of the Arab people.

56. Turning now to the Secretary-General's report, I should like, with your permission, to voice my Government's views on the subject of the report. At the outset I wish to extend to the Secretary-General our sincere thanks and appreciation for his efforts to secure a just and meaningful settlement to the situation in the Middle East. His comprehensive report bears witness to his concern over the gravity of the situation and his dedication to the continuing search for a lasting peace in that troubled area of the world.

57. My delegation has carefully examined this report in an attempt to appraise the progress achieved so far towards reaching a peaceful settlement. It is regrettable to note that after six years of negotiations and tireless mediation carried on by the various instrumentalities of the United Nations, the Secretary-General's report reveals the discouraging and disturbing fact that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East question have reached a dead end. We, however, wish to express in this connexion our appreciation for the admirable and tireless efforts of Ambassador Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for his attempts to carry out the difficult task with which he was entrusted.

58. In pondering the various chapters of the report, the Council can easily indicate which party has failed to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring or has put obstacles in his way to the reaching of a suitable solution. The Arab Governments, on their part, have always demonstrated a keen interest in a peaceful settlement. They have responded in a positive and co-operative manner to Ambassador Jarring. They have shown in their replies to the Special Representative's aide-mémoire proof of a genuine and constructive attitude and a sincere search for a peaceful settlement.

59. At its twenty-sixth session, the General Assembly, in resolution 2799 (XXVI), noted with appreciation “the

positive reply given by Egypt to the Special Representative's initiative for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East".

60. The Arab people, over the long history of mankind, have always maintained the best relations with other nations, and have always been known as peace-loving people. Nations with a long history of civilization, from Ancient Greece to the Roman Empire, witnessed the great and leading role of the Arabs in promoting culture and science for the benefit of mankind. This role has established a firm basis on which science and technology presently stand. The Arabs have continued to contribute to the world development in different fields. The Arab countries entertain the most cordial and close ties with the greater number of countries all over the world: in Africa, Asia and Latin America and in Eastern and Western Europe. These are clear indications that the Arab people are peace-loving people, and that their search for a peaceful settlement is not unfounded.

61. These are the Arab people, and this is their attitude towards a peaceful settlement. But let us for a moment consider the stand of the other party to the conflict. Israel's evasive replies to Ambassador Jarring's aide-memoire and its negative attitude needs no evidence. The Secretary-General's report, now before this Council, is a clear testimony to this fact. But what is more disturbing is the negative attitude which Israel has consistently taken towards the United Nations and its various bodies. The General Assembly, expressing its anxiety over Israel's attitude towards peaceful negotiations, deplored, in resolution 2949 (XXVII), the non-compliance of Israel with General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI), which in particular called upon Israel to respond favourably to the peace initiative of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East.

62. I do not think I need to elaborate on the miserable and inhuman conditions which the Palestine refugees are experiencing. This has become a matter of common knowledge and the subject of countless United Nations resolutions. The Arab people who live in their own homes in the occupied Arab territories are in no better a condition. The Israeli authorities have consistently denied them their basic human rights. The letter dated 26 October 1970 transmitting the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories stated:

"The evidence given before the Special Committee has revealed the grim situation of the refugees living inside the occupied territories. The Special Committee visited some of the refugee camps outside the occupied territories and was deeply moved by the unhappy plight of their occupants."<sup>2</sup>

63. By what standards can we tolerate such inhuman conditions; and by what scale of justice can we justify the right of a certain people gathered from all over the world to create the so-called "Jewish Home" in Palestine while denying such a right to the Palestinian people?

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-fifth Session, agenda item 101, document A/8089.

64. My Government believes that there will be no peace in the Middle East as long as Israel is arrogantly occupying Arab territories and denying the Arab people their fundamental right to freedom and self-determination. It is not the intention of my delegation to cite all the resolutions passed by various bodies of the United Nations condemning Israel for its continued aggression against the Arab countries and its flagrant violations of the basic principles of the Charter and the fundamental norms of international law. This has become a matter of common knowledge.

65. I should only like, in this context, to point out that the United Nations is not the only forum in which Israel has been constantly condemned for its continued occupation of Arab territories. A resolution adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Georgetown, Guyana, from 8 to 12 August 1972, expressed, *inter alia*, the solidarity of non-aligned countries with Egypt, Jordan and Syria in their legitimate struggle to recover by every means their territorial integrity. The Conference furthermore acknowledged that the acquisition of territory through force is wholly impermissible [see S/10944].

66. In the last few weeks the Heads of State and Government of 41 independent African States members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) who met in Addis Ababa unanimously adopted a resolution which, *inter alia*, strongly condemned the negative attitude of Israel, its acts of intimidation and its obstruction of all efforts aimed at a just and equitable solution of the problem. The African countries further called upon Israel to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from all occupied African and Arab territories. They drew the attention of Israel to "the danger threatening the security and unity of the African continent as a result of its continued aggression and refusal to evacuate the territories of the States victims of that aggression". The African countries declared in this regard—and I quote from the same resolution—"that the attitude of Israel might lead OAU member States to take, at the African level, individually or collectively, political and economic measures against it, in conformity with the principles contained in the OAU and the United Nations Charters." [See S/10943.]

67. The time has now come for the world family to proceed in a more effective and positive manner in working out a formula whereby a meaningful result could be achieved. Such a formula should take into account the diverse and complex issues that have various historical, humanitarian and political dimensions. I can find no better expression of the complexity of these issues and the diversity of their dimensions than the words of the Secretary-General in introducing his report:

"In the Middle East we see in an acute form the interaction of historical developments and situations of various kinds giving rise to emotion and resentment, to fear and conflict, to a vicious circle of action and reaction, violence and reprisal, and to a series of seemingly insurmountable obstacles to the process of conciliation and settlement." [1717th meeting, para. 17.]

68. The gravity of the situation in the Middle East not only threatens peace and security in that area but contains



a far-reaching threat to the peace and security of the whole world which is attaching many hopes and aspirations to the efforts of this august body whose main task is the maintenance of international peace and security. Let us not fail to live up to these hopes and aspirations. Let us make the year 1973 a year of peace and development. During this year the world has witnessed an important encouraging achievement in which peace has been restored in one troubled area of the world. Viet-Nam, which has for decades experienced the ugliest scourge of war, has now approached a happy settlement. Let us add another achievement by restoring peace in the Middle East. In doing so, the United Nations, whose involvement in the Middle East dates back more than a quarter of a century, should not forget its special commitment to finding suitable terms for a lasting peace in the Middle East. This involvement started with the General Assembly's famous resolution which partitioned Palestine and resulted in the illegitimate birth of Israel. Since then, the United Nations has adopted numerous resolutions in an attempt to find a just and lasting peace for the Middle East. The fact that these resolutions have not as yet borne their fruits should not discourage us from continuing our search for a lasting peace.

69. In considering a just and equitable formula, due regard must be given to the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland. In a revealing remark in the letter of transmittal of the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of Occupied Territories, the Chairman of the Special Committee stated:

"The plight of the refugees—persons who have been deprived of their homes and denied the right to return to them and who are, therefore, victims of the violation of the most fundamental of human rights—and the tone of bitterness and despair which marked every reference of theirs to the United Nations' failure to protect their human rights, have created a profound and disturbing impression on the Special Committee."<sup>3</sup>

70. In considering alternative solutions to the refugees' plight we should not be misled by the erroneous and naïve thinking once expressed by the representative of Israel before the Council that if 1 per cent of the Arab resources are utilized for the settlement of the Palestinian refugees, the Middle East problem will come to an end. Let us make it clear that the Palestinian people will not accept anything less than their own homes and the return to their country, Palestine. Those people can no longer tolerate living on international charity, whatever its source may be.

71. Let us now move in a more positive way to alleviate the miseries and injustice suffered by the Arab people. Let us avoid disappointing those people, or for that matter the whole world, by living up to their expectations and aspirations for a just and meaningful solution to the Middle East problem.

72. Finally, we sincerely hope that the United Nations will spare no effort in reaching a peaceful settlement lest the whole world witness another catastrophe.

<sup>3</sup> Document A/8389 and Corr.1, pertaining to agenda item 40 of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, issued separately (offset).

73. Mr. SEN (India): Mr. President, we offer you our warmest congratulations on and our best wishes for you as President of the Council for June this year. For you, with your long years at the United Nations, this responsibility can be taken as a matter of course, but for us it is most fortunate that during the debate of one of the most important subjects before the Council we shall have the fullest benefit of your experience and knowledge. In paying you compliments several speakers have mentioned bilateral relations with your country. I do not think it is necessary for me to elaborate on Indo-Soviet relations, for they are some of the best. We assure you of our fullest co-operation.

74. We should also like to express our appreciation for the calm and competent manner in which the outgoing President, Ambassador Abdulla, conducted our proceedings in May. We are grateful.

75. We welcome the presence of so many Foreign Ministers from African and Arab countries; this is indeed a measure of the interest and concern with which the tense situation in the Middle East is viewed in various parts of the world. In consonance with that outlook, the Council decided at its 1710th meeting on 20 April, on a suggestion by the Foreign Minister of Egypt, that it should review comprehensively the situation in the Middle East since June 1967 on the basis of a report to be prepared by the Secretary-General and in the presence of his Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring.

76. We now have before us the excellent, clear and astute, if indeed depressing, report of the Secretary-General. We congratulate the Secretary-General on it. We are fortunate also to have the benefit of Ambassador Jarring's being with us, both inside and outside the Council Chamber. We welcome and wish to record our appreciation of the determination, objectivity and devotion with which he has tried to carry out his most complex and difficult mission. If success has eluded him, and many other men of goodwill, in the effort to bring to an end this nearly insoluble and dangerous problem of the Middle East, the responsibility for such a lack of success is certainly not that of Mr. Jarring or of other people who have also tried, but tried unsuccessfully. But we cannot relax our efforts, and must continue to hope that, given the good intention of the main parties, this Council must still find a solution. This task is urgent, as indeed the situation is critical. The Secretary-General has reported that 17 complaints were taken up by the Security Council since July 1967—16 from the Arabs and 1 from the Israelis—and yet he states that most important violations of the cease-fire did not come before the Council. One needs little imagination to realize what the situation will be if the cease-fire becomes untenable in the absence of any prospects of a solution without much delay.

77. The Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 stands by itself and was the basis of action during the last six years. It contains two basic principles which were accepted, so at least it would seem, by the principal parties. But when it comes to implementation, we are confronted with an Israeli interpretation which makes further progress impossible. Ambassador Jarring, after most careful study and detailed discussion with the parties, formulated his aid-mémoire of 8 February 1971 [*S/10403, annex I*] to which

the Israelis objected as, in their view, it went beyond the mandate given to the Special Representative, and as also, again in their view, it was counter to the interpretation Israel had given to resolution 242 (1967). Ambassador Jarring's initiative was therefore unacceptable to Israel. Israel later went to the extent of suggesting that the aide-mémoire should be withdrawn.

78. Those developments require closer scrutiny. We have heard much about the omission of the definite article "the" and of the adjective "all" or of the mention of any date regarding the line to which Israeli troops should be withdrawn. I may add in parenthesis that at least one of those omissions is not noticeable in the French text, which is equally authentic. But, apart from those technicalities, let us take the words as they are, as indeed Israel would wish us to do. Paragraph 1(i) of the text reads: "Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." What territories could have been meant except the Arab territories? No one has suggested that Israeli armed forces occupied lands in other territories. What could be meant by "the recent conflict"? If it were not the conflict of six days in June 1967, could it be interpreted to refer to conflicts which might have occurred even before 5 June? Even if such an interpretation were most welcome to the Arabs, neither the records of the Council of 1967 nor the present membership would give resolution 242 (1967) this interpretation. So, the "recent conflict" in this resolution could only refer to the conflict of the six days in June 1967.

79. Then we are given a second line of argument which maintains that all the boundaries of Israel since its establishment inside the mandated territory of Palestine had been in the nature of military lines—cease-fire line, armistice line and truce line. This would seem to us a dangerous argument, even from Israel's point of view.

80. But I suppose it is so strong militarily that it finds no danger to its negotiating position with a completely undetermined border. However, this argument of Israel's that no boundary for it has ever been worked out is not valid. First, the boundaries of Israel were defined by the United Nations with precision when Palestine was partitioned. That was accepted by Israel. Secondly, the international frontiers between the old Mandated Territory of Palestine and the neighbouring territories of Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were never in question or doubt. Israel was to be carved out of the Mandated Territory of Palestine and at no point—at no point, I repeat—were its boundaries to be outside the old frontiers of the Mandated Territory of Palestine.

81. Conscious of that fact, and without apparently commenting on the Israeli claim that the political borders of Israel have never been defined, Ambassador Jarring carefully drafted his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 and asked Israel to "give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine". Israel's reply was a blunt "Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines". [*Ibid.*, annex III.]

82. Thus, Israel told the Special Representative that it would no longer respect the international boundaries either in Egypt or in Syria, or anywhere else where it had occupied territories beyond the old Mandated Territory. That attitude, taken together with Israel's refusal to confirm the principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war is inconsistent with the Israeli claim that it has accepted resolution 242 (1967). It is also inconsistent with the present Israeli assertion that all claims of either side are open to negotiations—at least, that is the impression we received from the Israeli statements of 6 and 7 June to the effect that everything is negotiable. That is perhaps what led the representative of France yesterday to state the following in the Council:

"That is why the Israeli response to Mr. Jarring's aide-mémoire constitutes a prior condition which nothing can justify. The dialogue should be stated on a footing of equality and not on a footing of relations of force. In stating that it will not withdraw to the lines obtaining prior to 5 June 1967 Israel is undermining the balance in resolution 242 (1967)." [1724th meeting, para. 57.]

83. Much was also said about this resolution providing for negotiations between the parties. Since we are examining the resolution as it stands, without any additions or subtractions even of a dot or a comma, it is worthwhile to point out that the word "negotiations" does not occur in the resolution at all. Paragraph 3 simply

"Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution".

That was Ambassador Jarring's task, and he set about assiduously and delicately to bend all his efforts to carry out his most explicit mandate. He failed because of the Israeli attitude. Perhaps contacts have been maintained all through these years, but very little progress could be made beyond clearing up the issues.

84. During these years many attempts were nevertheless made to have indirect negotiations, but all of those failed too, because of Israel's refusal to vacate the Arab territories acquired as the result of the 1967 conflict. I need mention only three such attempts: the good offices of certain Heads of State or Government of African countries; the suggestion of "proximity" talks; and what has come to be known as the Rogers Plan. These days, Ambassador Jarring is being criticized for having interpreted resolution 242 (1967) in the only possible way, and yet the Rogers Plan was essentially based on the same interpretation of this resolution. The four great Powers supported Ambassador Jarring in his interpretation of resolution 242 (1967) and on the nature of his mandate. Only this morning [1725th meeting], the Secretary-General once again confirmed that attitude of the four great Powers. Thus, so far as is known, Israel alone, among all 132 Members of the United Nations, interpreted Ambassador Jarring's activities in a different way.

85. Meanwhile, the four great Powers were making their own efforts, and many of us had hoped that at least one of

them would be able to persuade Israel to be more reasonable. That was not an idle hope. When a country has so many special ties with a great Power there are many ways of persuasion. That has happened in the past elsewhere, and even in the Middle East—for example, the abandonment of the River Jordan scheme—and therefore it was reasonable to expect that if, on whatever grounds, sense of justice, national interests or the wider cause of international peace and security, a change of course was decided upon. Israel could be expected to co-operate, not as a matter of coercion or imposition but as a result of persuasion that Israel's interests too were best served by such a change. We still hope for such a change in attitudes and policies.

86. We are always in favour of negotiations, and we were pleased to hear from the Egyptian Foreign Minister, to whom a special word of welcome is due, that his country would be ready and willing to negotiate, provided there were no pre-conditions. But, pre-conditions apart, the objective circumstances are as follows.

87. First, Israel's refusal to implement resolution 242 (1967).

88. Second, Israel's assertion that it must have Jerusalem; a good part if not the whole of the West Bank; the Golan Heights; Sharm-el Sheikh and many other selected Arab lands. It gives the impression that its full hand will be shown only at the negotiating table, but Israel's intention has been made clear through many authoritative statements.

89. Third, its settling of Jewish populations in the captured lands at the cost of the Arabs, with many fundamental changes, of which the United Nations has disapproved, in the texture of life and economy of these territories.

90. Fourth, its importation of more Jews—will that lead to the doctrine of *lebensraum* being put into effect?

91. Fifth, its policy of having more Arab lands with as few Arabs as possible coming with them.

92. Sixth, its refusal to recognize Palestinian rights. Without a settlement of this problem, a permanent solution of the crisis in the Middle East will not be available. Rhetoric will not disperse this issue. It is immaterial whether these people are called Palestinians or by any other name. The fact is that this is where they have lived for untold centuries, and unless their fundamental civil, religious and political rights are protected, and unless every effort is made to facilitate their return home in full dignity, the problem will not be solved and the troubles will continue.

93. Seventh, Israel's refusal to settle the refugee problems in accordance with United Nations resolutions it has accepted. The resolutions of the General Assembly may not be binding, but no country can say that some of those resolutions are binding and the others are not. If Israel claims that the resolution on the refugees is not binding, it must concede that the resolution on the admission of Israel

is also subject to challenge by the Arabs. But we do not wish to enter into these legalistic arguments.

94. Eighth, Israel's increase in military strength and its capacity to strike at will anywhere it likes in the Arab world.

95. Ninth, its desire for time, which allows it to consolidate its hold and to plan further ahead. It has already had six years.

96. Tenth, its refusal to abide by innumerable United Nations resolutions.

97. Eleventh, its desire to treat the Jews everywhere as its responsibility in spite of what Mr. Sharett had to say on this subject at the time of Israel's admission to the United Nations.

98. Twelfth, Israel's policy of retaliation and reprisal, and its failure to punish the guilty.

99. Thirteenth, Israel's ideology, about which we have heard so much.

100. In these prevailing circumstances, therefore, the call for negotiations rightly appears to the Arabs as a call for surrender, or at least as a call for more time to continue with the present stalemate, which inevitably brings advantage to Israel.

101. On the other hand, we believe that the present policy of *laissez-faire-laissez-passer* is of the utmost danger. Some may calculate that, given time, Israel will settle down in its newly annexed lands and, with the Arabs admittedly weaker and seemingly divided, a stage will come when they will accept Israel in its present grandeur. Fortunately, we do not share that view, and if any one of us feels that the present situation is moving towards some form of stability, the statements made before the Council by a succession of Arab representatives must have dispelled such feelings and theories.

102. What then can be done? We believe that in spite of Israel's reservation, if not rejection, of resolution 242 (1967), it can still serve as a basis for progress. We should therefore suggest a few immediate measures.

103. First, we would recommend a declaration, in formal and unequivocal terms, by Israel, accepting the principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force, and, as a consequence, committing itself to withdraw from all Arab lands it occupied as a result of the June 1967 conflict.

104. Secondly, we would suggest that the Arab countries concerned make a declaration, again in formal and unequivocal terms, committing themselves to respect and acknowledge the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

105. Thirdly, both Israel and the Arab countries concerned should, simultaneously but separately, declare that

all of them would respect the rights of the Palestinian people in every field.

106. It is both unjust and unacceptable to expect non-Jewish people to live with any degree of security or peace of mind in a Jewish State that affords them no legal or constitutional protection from the arbitrary exercise of power.

107. As for the Palestinians living in exile, there is simply no incentive for them to return, which sadly confirms the hope of the Israeli authorities that they will, in fact, not return home, and that others, who remained in both Israel and the occupied areas, will follow them into exile.

108. Israel must be fully aware that constant postponement of the Palestine problem is no solution at all. Inevitably, Israel, if it intends to be a democratic State, will have to accommodate these Palestinians by guaranteeing them basic civil liberties and political rights. By simply placing non-Jews under their arbitrary authority, Israel is bound to exacerbate the situation and hasten those very problems which it surely wishes to avoid.

109. For years now Israel has been claiming that those Arabs living in Israel or Israeli-occupied territories are economically better off than at any time previously. This statement or this argument is as relevant as the South African claim that the blacks in South Africa are better off than the blacks in the neighbouring independent countries. Such an attitude reflects a simple-minded approach and fails to recognize the tragedy of these people and the agony of their plight. They, and we, are interested in their rights, their human values, and not merely in their creature comforts, however welcome and useful they may be.

110. Since so much has been made of it, I should like to draw the attention of the members to a full account of the conditions of the Arabs in the occupied lands, published in the magazine section of the *Daily Telegraph* of London on 1 June 1973. This article, with several pictures and a good map, is described by the journal, as a part of its advertisement, no doubt, as "The first detailed story of the disputed areas". The author is Mr. John Bulloch, who observes: "The Israeli occupation of the Arab lands is no better and no worse than any other occupation. Sympathizers who believe that the Israelis are more benevolent than other countries are wrong; detractors who believe them more ruthless are equally wrong." All this simply means that these unfortunate Palestinians are under military occupation, have no rights and can only receive what treatment the conquerors may decide to give them in their homeland.

111. There must be an accommodation between the Arab rights and the Israeli rights, whereby they live together. No one is suggesting that the Israeli rights should be unilaterally sacrificed in order to safeguard Arab rights or vice-versa. Just as the Israelis have their homeland, as defined in the United Nations decision, in part of the old mandated territories, the Palestinians have a right to their homeland and self-determination in the rest of the Mandated Territory partitioned in 1947.

112. Fourthly, the Secretary-General or his Special Representative could publish a document containing the points on which both sides have agreed in response to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971. Such a document should specifically cover the solution of the problem of refugees as decided by the United Nations resolution, the opening of the Suez Canal, transit facilities and demilitarized zones.

113. As soon as these declarations have been made, particularly the first and the second, indirect negotiations can begin, as a first step, between the interested parties with the help of the Special Representative. Once an agreement has been reached, the Palestinians should be brought into the negotiations, so that any final settlement may be satisfactory to all the parties concerned.

114. We are not making any formal proposals but would hope that between now and our next meeting, which I believe will be no later than 16 July and presumably still in New York, some progress along these lines may still be possible.

115. Many speakers have referred to the concept or the principle of a secure and recognized boundary. This is mainly a political concept and only secondarily a military affair. In the geographical position of Israel and in the context of modern arms, a secure boundary is only feasible for all the States of the Middle East, and not merely of Israel, by mutual respect, friendship, co-operation and understanding. In the absence of such a development, the military aspects, however insignificant in themselves, are bound to be exaggerated, particularly in the eyes of the military men. Possibly because of its armed victory, Israel expects some return from the Arabs. But the Israelis have already obtained it—perhaps the most glittering prize of any military action—that is, the possibility of living in peace with one's neighbours.

116. In the Tel Aviv museum hall, Mr. David Ben Gurion read on 14 May 1948 the Proclamation on the Rise of the State of Israel and said:

"Accordingly we, the members of the National Council, representing the Jewish people in Palestine and the Zionist movement of the world, met together in solemn assembly today, the day of the termination of the British Mandate for Palestine; by virtue of the national and historic right of the Jewish people and of the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations; hereby proclaim the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine—to be called Israel."

I have many other clearer and stronger statements on the subject from other Israeli sources, but I thought I should quote from the most ceremonial document adopted at the birth of the State of Israel.

117. Nevertheless, Israel often states that if it has been condemned or its actions deplored or criticized in the United Nations, it is partly because of the structure of the United Nations, especially of the Security Council, and partly because of the influence the large number of Arab States and their friends have in this Organization—because of

what it calls a mechanical majority. Apart from the pertinent question why so many States—non-aligned countries, socialist, practically all Asian, all 41 African, several European and Latin American States and several others besides—support and sympathize with the Arabs in varying degrees, the fact remains that when Israel was established by the United Nations and admitted to this Organization, there was considerable sympathy for it, as is evident from the voting figures, but it has forfeited that sympathy by its own actions and attitudes. Many of the resolutions critical of Israel were passed at a time when even Israel could not complain, and did not in fact complain, of Arab influence and of a mechanical majority. And yet Israel failed to carry out several decisions taken in good faith and in a friendly atmosphere by the United Nations in order to render easier its continued and assured existence in the middle of Arab lands, and in conditions of peace and security of all the States in the Middle East.

118. But Israel does not draw any particular lesson from this experience. It falls back on the racial pride of suffering through the ages, of struggling as a minority, surrounded by a vast hostile majority. "This condition is not new. We have lived with it throughout the ages. We have always been small in number. That has never weakened our determination to survive. There is no solitude when justice and history are with us." The Jewish people are not alone in believing that, with justice and history beside them, irrespective naturally of what conception of justice and history one may have, they can ignore solitude and struggle on. But this sentiment, which we must all admire, loses some of its romance when we recall that Israel has, at least in recent years, received the unquestioned support of the most powerful country in the world today. In the circumstances, solitude may not be all that unbearable. Besides, this rugged determination to fight on, even in isolation, has always the danger of being perverted.

119. Starting off with the doctrine that nothing good can be achieved without sacrifice, we are apt to delude ourselves that sacrifice itself means achievement. But Israel does not have to be in such a self-lacerating mood. It has won a spectacular armed victory and obtained most remarkable prizes—the most important of which is that the Arab States have now solemnly offered to live in peace and harmony with it, as soon as it has withdrawn from its territory, which it must do by all rules of law. Must Israel throw away this golden opportunity and relapse into a sullen posture of denouncing everyone else for its misfortunes? Or will it allow its appetite to grow with what it feeds on? The answer is for Israel to give.

120. We should not like General Burns's gloomy analysis to come true. General Burns, who was Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East from August 1954 to November 1956, says in his book *Between Arab and Israeli*:<sup>4</sup>

"It is not unreasonable to deduce that a society whose young elements have passed their most formative years in an atmosphere in which the military virtues and especially aggressiveness are given the highest values, and where the

Arab is always the enemy, to be made to submit to Israel's demands by ruthless force, will grow increasingly militaristic and less inclined to the solving by negotiation of external problems. The Sabra, or the Israeli who has come to the country as a young child, shut in as he is on all his borders by hostility, and precluded from travel abroad by lack of money, does not know much of the world beyond the bounds of Israel and does not at all care about its opinion. And so, born of the success of the campaigns of 1948 and 1956, there is a certain arrogance, an inability to see that Israel should yield anything for peace, an inability to compromise. Such an attitude in what will soon be the majority of the population does not promise a peaceful solution of Israel's problems, or a peaceful future for the Middle East."

121. The victories of 1967 strengthened these attitudes. Unless this process of continuous generation of hate, this ignorance and this arrogance is reversed and replaced by healthier trends, our efforts, however made, will make no headway. Many speakers have mentioned the duties and responsibilities of the Security Council, as also of its permanent members. We believe that the world has a right to expect fair and timely decisions from the Council, but it cannot be unaware that these decisions are not possible, because of the Charter provisions, and also that, even when such decisions are taken, they cannot be implemented in the absence of great-Power agreement. Because of the daily awareness of these circumstances, the Council entrusted to the great Powers some informal tasks of negotiation to supplement and complement the efforts of Mr. Jarring, but these Powers failed to achieve any results, for reasons well known to us, and for nearly two years now they have not met at all—not even the four of them—and a mentality of "time alone will solve the problem" has developed. In our view, this is a most dangerous trend.

122. We have heard much about history. History has been pushed and prodded here, there and everywhere, and she has spoken to her votaries in voices they wished to hear. The other deities who were so served and who were equally accommodating were Truth and Justice. The debate provided the protagonists with an opportunity to recount historical events which cannot be attributed to the present generation and which find their roots in a rather vague and distant antiquity. All these expensive historical lessons may have a purpose and some of them may even be interesting, but our work is much more urgent, for we are dealing with a grave situation in which the safety and welfare of countless millions is involved. Unless we proceed with a sense of fairness and practical sense, we shall only contribute to tension and despair.

123. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I thank the Ambassador of India for his statement and for his words about me. I fully share the high opinion he expressed of the state of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and India, and I sincerely hope that the relations of friendship and co-operation between our two countries will continue to develop in the future.

124. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has studied the Secretary-General's report submitted in pursuance of the Secur-

<sup>4</sup> Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd., Toronto, 1962.

ity Council resolution of 20 April 1973 and has listened attentively to the statements made by the Foreign Ministers and representatives of a number of Arab and African countries as well as other members of the Security Council. We now would like to state our views and position on the Middle East question.

125. For many years, people have set forth one argument or another on the Middle East question. However, anyone facing up to the reality cannot but admit that the history of the Middle East over the past two decades and more since the Second World War is one of repeated aggression and expansion carried out by Israeli zionism with imperialist support and of resistance to aggression and expansion put up by the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. The reactionary Zionist movement was a product of the imperialist policy of aggression in the Middle East. The large-scale immigration to Palestine has long been carried out by the Zionists with the support and abetment of imperialism. In 1947 the General Assembly, under the manipulation of imperialism, rejected the Arab countries' demand for terminating the British Mandate and declaring the independence of Palestine and adopted the plan on "the partition of Palestine". Since the establishment of the State of Israel, Israeli zionism, with the support of the United States Government, has carried out repeated aggression and expansion and within the short space of two decades unleashed three large-scale wars of aggression, occupying large tracts of Arab territories and driving the Palestinian and other Arab peoples who had lived there for generations out of their homeland. Displaced and homeless, they have been leading a most miserable life. In their speeches quite a few Arab representatives gave a true picture of the suffering and misery of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. While maintaining in their speeches that Israel must withdraw from all the Arab territories it has occupied, quite a few representatives have strongly held that the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to national existence must be restored. This is perfectly just.

126. Since the 1967 war, the Israeli Zionists have hung on to the large tracts of occupied Arab territories, where they have been energetically pushing their plan of Zionization. Truculent and unreasonable, they have incessantly perpetrated fresh military provocations and armed aggression against the neighbouring Arab States under this or that pretext, in an attempt to stamp out by armed force the just struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against aggression and to create a fait accompli so as to perpetuate their occupation of the Arab territories and realize their ambition for further expansion. The theory of so-called "secure boundaries" they have been advertising so vigorously is a typical theory for expansion.

127. In fact, this theory of "secure boundaries" of the Israeli Zionists is not their creation. Did not the Hitlerite Nazis put forth the notorious theory of what they called *lebensraum*—living space—long ago? And even today are there not people who clamour for extending their so-called "secure boundaries" to this or that ocean? In order to realize their wild designs, all aggressors and expansionists, whether in the past or at present, invariably pick up similar gangster's logic of jungle law to serve their aggression and expansion. To accept the argument of the so-called "secure

boundaries" is tantamount to recognizing the Israeli Zionist aggression and expansion as totally legal and recognizing all aggressors as having the right to the acquisition of others' territories by force at any time. This, of course, is absolutely intolerable.

128. The facts are clear: The essence of the Middle East question is aggression versus anti-aggression and a question of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples fighting for national liberation. There is certainly no room for compromise on this question. The restoration of the Palestinian people's right to national existence and the Arab countries' struggle to recover their lost territories constitute an integral whole. As long as the lost territories of the Arab States are not recovered and the Palestinian people's national right is not restored, there can be no true settlement of the so-called Middle East question.

129. For centuries, the Middle East has been a place of rivalry between the imperialist Powers. Today imperialist rivalry in the Middle East has taken a new form, in which new tactics have been employed. As pointed out by the just Arab public opinion, today the two super-Powers have taken the place of former imperialist Powers as the principal rivals for hegemony in the Middle East. The 1967 war of aggression was launched by the Israeli Zionists with the support, connivance and acquiescence of one or two super-Powers. Thereafter, echoing each other, they have been spreading the idea that the Palestinian and other Arab peoples must not wage armed struggles against Israeli aggression, that resistance would immediately lead to a world war, and that whoever supports such armed struggle against aggression is provoking confrontation between the two super-Powers. In other words, only the aggressors are allowed to commit wanton expansion, while the victims of aggression are not allowed to resist. The Palestinian and other Arab peoples, as well as all the people who support the struggle against aggression, are to be bound, hand and foot, so that the two super-Powers can do whatever they please to manipulate and dominate the situation. In recent years, the two super-Powers have been both contending and colluding with each other, taking advantage of the temporary difficulties facing the Palestinian and other Arab peoples to make dirty political deals at the expense of their right to national existence and their territories and sovereignty. Thus the two super-Powers are deliberately creating and maintaining a situation of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East so as to facilitate their contention for important strategic points and oil resources and the division of spheres of influence there. Everyone can see that herein lies the crux of the prolonged non-settlement of the Middle East question.

130. However, the time has gone when imperialism could run amuck and rule the fate of other peoples at will. The Palestinian and other Arab peoples have taken up arms in face of the armed aggression by the Israeli Zionists, determined to fight to the finish against aggression and for their national liberation. The Palestinian and other Arab peoples persevering in struggle will surely take their destiny into their own hands. Is not the history of the two decades and more after the Second World War replete with brilliant events in which the Asian, African and Latin American peoples took up arms, persevered in struggle and eventually



won their national liberation after defeating imperialist and super-Power aggression and interference?

131. The Chinese Government and people have always firmly opposed and strongly condemned the Israeli Zionist aggression and expansion against the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. We are not opposed to the Jewish people or the people of Israel; but we are firmly opposed to the Israeli Zionist policies of aggression and expansion.

132. We have cherished profound sympathy for the Palestinian and other Arab peoples who are subjected to aggression and bullying. We resolutely support their just struggle to resist aggression, recover their lost territories and restore their right to national existence. This position of ours is firm and unshakable.

133. The United Nations has been discussing the Middle East question for more than 20 years. Regrettably, however, under the manipulation and domination of the super-Powers, the United Nations has failed to adhere to principles and uphold justice and failed to fulfil its duties under the Charter. It has failed strongly to condemn and firmly to put an end to the Israeli Zionist expansion and aggression, nor has it given its due support to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. Evidently, this is unfair to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. Today, when the Middle East situation is being reviewed in its totality, the Security Council should truly act upon the principles of the Charter, draw a clear distinction between the right and the wrong, uphold justice and speak up for the right.

134. The Chinese delegation firmly holds that the Israeli Zionists must be strongly condemned for their prolonged aggression against the Palestinian people and other Arab countries and peoples; the Israeli authorities must be asked to withdraw immediately from the Egyptian, Syrian and all the other Arab territories they have occupied; the right of the Palestinian people to national existence must be restored; all Governments and peoples should be called upon to give firm support to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle to resist aggression, recover their lost territories and restore their national rights.

135. We firmly maintain that the destiny of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples can only be decided by themselves, and we are firmly opposed to anyone making political deals behind the backs of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples at the expense of their territories and sovereignty and their right to national existence. In our opinion, the adoption of any resolution which in effect shields the Israeli Zionists and encourages aggression in the name of "maintaining peace" is in violation of the United Nations Charter and will bring new disgrace upon the United Nations and the Security Council and is, therefore, impermissible.

136. The Arab nation is a great nation; the Arab and Palestinian peoples are heroic peoples. For many years, they have waged heroic and tenacious struggles for their national liberation. Neither the military suppression, nor the political deception by the enemies could subdue them.

137. On the contrary, their just struggle is developing in depth. Through their struggles they have made important

contributions to the Asian, African and Latin American peoples' cause of unity against imperialism, and they have gained increasingly wide sympathy and support from the revolutionary people all over the world. Although the Palestinian and other Arab peoples are facing protracted and arduous struggles, and there might be twists and turns and even reversals of this or that kind on their road of advance, yet so long as they rely on and mobilize the broad masses of the people, strengthen their anti-imperialist unity and persevere in protracted struggle, they will, with the sympathy and support of all the justice-upholding countries and peoples of the world, surely defeat the Israeli aggressors, restore their national rights, recover their lost territories and win complete victory in their struggle for national liberation.

138. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): The next speaker on the list is the representative of Bahrain, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

139. Mr. AL-SAFFAR (Bahrain) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, first of all I should like to thank you and the other members of the Security Council for having given me the opportunity to take part in this discussion. It is an honour and a great pleasure for my delegation to participate in the discussions on the subject of the Middle East under your presidency.

140. My delegation has listened attentively to the voice of Africa as reflected in the speeches made by several Ministers from African countries. We have also been listening to the voice of the third world. All these countries have called for the evacuation of all the Arab territories occupied by Israeli force. Is the Israeli Government going to heed these appeals and put into effect the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on this subject?

141. Previous speakers have dwelt at length on the problem of the Middle East. I would like simply to submit the opinion of my Government on this problem. I shall be very brief.

142. My country has much confidence in the Security Council, whose role is to strengthen international peace and security in spite of all the obstacles it meets in the performance of its task. If Bahrain has become independent and a Member of the United Nations, it is thanks to the efforts of the Secretary-General of this Organization, for in March 1970, under the aegis of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the people of Bahrain were able to exercise their right to self-determination and decide in favour of a sovereign and independent State. In this way, the historic dispute with Iran was settled, a dispute which had lasted for so long. By this solution, foreign influence, which had lasted a century and a half in Bahrain, also ended.

143. I should like now to say that your great country, Mr. President, was one of the first to recognize our independence and congratulate us upon it. The Government and people of Bahrain are grateful to your country. I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the efforts of the Secretary-General in his search for inter-

national peace and security. Of course, if the parties concerned had not demonstrated their good will in the search for a solution, such a settlement would not have been possible.

144. Today, we are faced with a dangerous situation in which the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East has been blocked by the intransigence of a party to the conflict. Egypt and Jordan have demonstrated their good will in applying resolution 242 (1967) adopted by the Security Council in November 1967. That resolution, as is well known, affirms, among other things, the need for bringing about a settlement of the problem of the refugees and the withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel from the Arab territories occupied during the 1967 conflict. While the Government of Israel states that it accepts this resolution, it nevertheless gives a different interpretation to the last paragraph to enable itself to amputate some of the territories which it had acquired during the six-day war. The Government of Israel would like to have it believed that resolution 242 (1967) is in favour of the definitive occupation of part of the territory of its Arab neighbours—Egypt, Jordan and Syria—in order to resolve the problem peacefully.

145. To the Israeli authorities, the pre-June 1967 frontiers no longer exist. They want to draw new frontiers which will promote their policy of expansion. They even go so far as to call for the legalization of the occupation of the territories they invaded. We hope that the Security Council will assume its responsibilities and bring about respect for and the implementation of the resolutions adopted on this problem so as to bring about the reign of peace and stability in the area.

146. Indeed, there is nothing to show that Israel intends to implement those resolutions. It has even opened these territories to foreign investors, to exploit natural resources and to make use of the labour of their inhabitants. In this way the Israelis are proposing to develop the occupied territories and raise the standard of living of the inhabitants.

147. Even if one accepts this argument as valid, this can not justify the occupation of the territory of others. Otherwise, colonized peoples would owe thanks to their colonizers. By refusing to evacuate the occupied Arab territories Israeli leaders seem to prefer territory to peace, because no people can consent to the occupation of its territory. Many Israelis are today asking whether their leaders do not prefer, in the final analysis, territories to peace.

148. Mr. Annon Rubinstein, Dean of the Law Faculty in the University of Tel-Aviv, has written in the important independent daily *Haaretz* the following:

“Instead of taking the path, doubtless arduous and hazardous, which may lead to peace, the Government of Israel is making a fetish of territory.

“We should not be surprised that many people are convinced today that the policy of Israel is pursuing a very well-defined objective: to cling to the occupied

territories, play for time and accustom the world to our domination of these territories.”

149. Indeed, for six years the Government of Israel has tried to win time in order to consolidate its position in the occupied territories. In our view to defend the present policy of Israel is to defend all its conquests; and the countries which encourage this policy are, practically speaking, making of it an anti-Arab policy.

150. The Israeli Government is always claiming the right of the Jewish people to live in peace and security. But has it recognized the right of the Palestinian people to live in peace and security? It completely disregards their existence. Throughout this debate the representative of Israel has never mentioned this people. For him, perhaps, only the Jewish people has the right to live in peace. Only yesterday again, the representative of Israel developed a new argument by which he attempted to deny the right of the Palestinians to a land where they have lived for centuries, a right recognized by all international communities. As the debate continues the expansionist intentions of the Israeli authorities become clearer. The systematic raids of the Israeli forces into the Palestinian refugee camps in neighbouring countries are designed to terrorize and eliminate the Palestinian people. Repeatedly this Council has met to hear complaints with regard to Israeli aggression. The people of Palestine have the same right as all other peoples of the world to live on their soil in peace.

151. The Israelis must recognize the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to a national life, like all other peoples. No solution of or answer to the problem in the Middle East is possible without the recognition of the fundamental and undeniable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, and consequently its right to return to the land of its birth.

152. On 7 May last Israel celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of its creation in the Middle East; in spite of all the protests of the inhabitants on the West side of the Jordan and the resolutions of the Security Council adopted in previous years the Israeli authorities organized a military parade in the Arab part of Jerusalem. At that time hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, driven from their homes, were crouching in their tents, in misery, bitterness, despair and frustration. This should prompt the Members of our Organization, particularly those States which defend the policy of Israel, to give some thought to the lot of this people and to do something positive to relieve their wretched and inhuman plight.

153. In our view the situation in the Middle East is a single problem. The basis of this problem is the question of the Palestinian people driven from its homeland. The war of June 1967 was only an aggravation of the situation through the occupation of the territories of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In 1947 the United Nations adopted the resolution to partition Palestine between Palestinian Arabs and Jews. Well, where is this Palestinian State? The Israelis have not only usurped the land of the Palestinian people but also occupied other territories in neighbouring countries. Have the States Members of the United Nations which recognize



the State of Israel asked themselves what are the boundaries of this State? We wonder whether the Israelis themselves have ever made them clear. Without any doubt the boundaries of the State of Israel do exist in the minds of the Zionist leaders, just as, in April last, the Israeli representative stated in this same room that the State of Israel has existed in the minds of Israelis for 2,000 years. Now the Government of Israel seeks to impose on the neighbouring Arab countries acceptance of the frontiers of this State.

154. We hope that the members of the Security Council will bring the Israeli authorities to declare unequivocally their support of the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, to withdraw their troops from all the Arab territories occupied during the six-day war and to recognize the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination. Without that, peace will not be established in the Middle East.

155. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): The next on the list of speakers is Israel. I call on the representative of Israel.

156. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): I have asked to be allowed to speak in order to make a brief statement and I shall not therefore use this opportunity to exercise my right of reply to the speeches delivered by the Chinese and Indian representatives. The abuse of fact and logic, of history and of law contained in these two statements is enough to leave them in shambles. To both of them I would simply recall an old Chinese proverb: "Slander cannot destroy an honest man. When the flood recedes the rock is there."

157. It was Egypt's initiative that brought about this debate. Israel has always held the view that public polemics cannot contribute to the solution of the complex Middle East situation. In fact, despite the effort made by my delegation to channel the discussion into meaningful exchanges we were soon confronted by the usual vituperation, calumny and one-sidedness. The debate has made it clear once more that serious, constructive examination of the situation must be conducted through quiet diplomacy and not in public arenas of recrimination. Nevertheless, the debate has thrown light on a number of important questions.

158. Egypt has charged that Israel undermined the peace-making efforts of the last six years. The Egyptian Foreign Minister had undertaken to reveal Israel's responsibility for the failure of these efforts. However, the analysis of developments since 1967 presented in my delegation's opening statement on 6 June [1717th meeting] and corroborated by the Secretary-General's report demonstrated that it was Egypt that, at one stage after another, prevented progress toward peace. Egypt brushed aside all Israeli peace proposals. It resorted to violence and force. It rejected Ambassador Jarring's invitation in 1968 to hold conferences in Cyprus, thus blocking the initiation of negotiations and thereby dooming the Special Representative's mission. Egypt's only counter-argument was that Israel refused to accept the Egyptian position on withdrawal transmitted in the 8 February 1971 aide-mémoire, a position which had

been rejected by the Security Council repeatedly in 1967. Neither Egypt's Minister for Foreign Affairs nor any other representative found it possible to seriously challenge this analysis and its central theme that had Egypt responded favourably to the many opportunities offered it by Israel and by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, peace might have already been attained in the Middle East.

159. Minister El-Zayyat set out to prove that under resolution 242 (1967) Israel was to withdraw to the old line of 1967 and to accept that line as the secure and recognized boundary between the two States. The Security Council records will show that a thorough examination of this question was made in the course of this debate and that nothing that transpired in it has cast doubt on the fact that resolution 242 (1967) had left the secure and recognized boundaries undefined so that they could be determined, for the first time, through agreement between the parties. Even the Minister of State of the United Arab Emirates, who was present at the Security Council deliberations in November 1967, confirmed that the Arab delegations had in fact been informed at the time that the purpose of the omission, in the resolution, of the words "all" and "the" before the term "occupied territories" was to leave the possibility of frontier rectifications. This understanding was confirmed also on 22 November 1967 by India's representative on the Security Council, when he voted for resolution 242 (1967), though his successor today, for obvious reasons, chose not to mention it in his somewhat surrealistic interpretation of truth and history. The extent of the border changes will be, of course, determined through agreement between the parties. Thus the Egyptian thesis on the alleged immutability of the old line has crumbled, and Egypt's demand that the Security Council call specifically for Israeli withdrawal to that line was shown to be nothing but a demand for a basic change in resolution 242 (1967).

160. Egypt's Foreign Minister put forward another demand to change resolution 242 (1967). He asked for the introduction into the resolution of what he called the problem of inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to live in secure and recognized boundaries. The true nature of this demand became evident when it was shown to imply the dismemberment of Jordan and the protests this demand has provoked in Jordan speak for themselves.

161. Egypt's Minister claimed that it was incumbent on the Security Council to impose on Israel the Egyptian *diktat*. Soon it became apparent that our deliberations focused not on the the question of imposition from the outside, an idea that faded out, but on negotiations between the parties. Egypt alleged that Israel's refusal to restore the old vulnerable line and Israel's insistence on establishing secure and recognized boundaries constituted a prior condition preventing negotiations. Israel made it clear, however, and I reiterate, that it desires free negotiations without pre-conditions and that it does not ask of Egypt to accept in advance any Israeli view or position. Egypt further claimed that negotiations were impossible because Israel remained in the territories held by it since 1967 and that the occupation *per se* constituted another Israeli pre-condition. It has been demonstrated that withdrawal could come only after agreement and therefore after negotiations. Moreover, attention was drawn to the fact

that the only agreements between Israel and the Arab States, concluded in 1949, had been the result of negotiations which the Security Council had called for, and that those negotiations took place while parts of Israeli territory remained under Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian occupation.

162. In the light of these facts Egypt's refusal to negotiate with Israel appeared in this debate again as an indication of the continued non-acceptance of the justice of Israel's rebirth as a sovereign nation. The Egyptian Foreign Minister's references to Israel's attainment of independence as "the original sin" and his repeated declarations that Israel's recognized boundaries were those of 1947, have strengthened the doubts and suspicions regarding Egypt's ultimate objectives.

163. These are the salient facts and conclusions which emerge from the debate. In furtherance of its case Egypt can point only to statements of political support. These statements, however, do not add any new element to the situation. I repeat, for this is the crux of the reality with which we are dealing: all are aware that Israel is permanently outnumbered by the Arab States. This does not affect the merits of Israel's position or our determination to safeguard Israel's fundamental rights and legitimate interests. Such statements cannot alter the situation. The only way to bring about a transition from the present impasse to an accepted peaceful settlement is by negotiations between the parties.

164. I understand that the debate is about to be adjourned as the eyes of the world turn to a meeting between the leaders of two great Powers. Their example is one of resolving differences and achieving understanding by means of constructive dialogue. In the forthcoming weeks let us all ponder the question whether the Middle East conflict can remain the only one in the entire world in which a process of negotiation has not yet been initiated. Let us give thought to the facts highlighted by this debate and to the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from them, namely, that negotiations between Israel and the Arab States are long overdue and are essential to end the present deadlock, as has been pointed out by several members of the Council.

165. Israel again calls on the Arab Governments to join it in building peace, for that is the only way in which peace in the region can be achieved.

166. At this stage I should like to express appreciation for the opportunity that has been given my delegation to present to the Security Council a full view of the situation and to indicate the road that would lead to peace, Israel's most cherished hope and objective. I should like to thank also those members of the Security Council who have, each in his way, contributed to a deeper understanding of the crucial fact that peace between the parties can be attained only by agreement between them on all the outstanding questions and that the central aspect of the settlement—the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries—cannot be artificially excluded from the process of agreement.

167. I should also like to address a word of gratitude to the representatives of the international media of informa-

tion who have accompanied our deliberations and have made it possible for world public opinion, reflecting the true conscience of mankind, to realize that peace is within the reach of the nations of the Middle East if they free themselves of the errors, obstacles and failures of the past and join hands to construct peace through respect for each other, through mutual understanding and accommodation.

168. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): The last speaker on the list for today's meeting is the representative of Saudi Arabia, who wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

169. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): As usual, after listening to Ambassador Tekoah very carefully and intently, I find myself constrained to set the record straight—be it the historical record, the political record or even the religious record.

170. I do not say Mr. Tekoah wilfully distorts the truth. He may do so inadvertently, because I have no doubt that since youth he has been indoctrinated with the Zionist ideology. Therefore I do not take exception to what he says in the sense that he wilfully distorts the truth. But since Ambassador Tekoah in the last part of his speech said that he should thank the mass media of information for having covered this debate I should like to draw his attention and the attention of the members of the Council to the fact that to a large extent the mass media of information in the Western world are manipulated by the Zionists, and many newspapers are owned by them.

171. Nowadays we find scarcely any reference to what Arab representatives say on this subject. In fact, the press has engaged in what, at Lake Success in 1952, when we were engaged in writing the draft convention on freedom of information, I once referred to as the three "S's": slanting the news; scissors—in other words, cutting out what does not suit certain parties; and the conspiracy of silence.

172. Of course Mr. Tekoah had to thank the international press, the mass media, including radio, television and other mechanical media for transmitting news. As I have mentioned, 10 or 15 per cent, and sometimes perhaps 20 per cent, of news space in this host country is allocated to the question of Israel or related subjects.

173. Yesterday I asked to be allowed to speak today in order to correct certain statements made by Mr. Tekoah—especially when he dived into the historical background of Palestine.

174. I shall not proceed chronologically because my intervention might become tedious were I to do so. But if I remember correctly, and I am paraphrasing, Mr. Tekoah said that Palestine had been barren. He mentioned something about a land without a people—meaning that the Zionists came to occupy a land without a people.

175. I need not at this stage go into the genesis of the presence of Jews—or call them Hebrews—in Palestine. I shall do that later. Suffice it for me to mention that in 1839 Sir

Moses Montefiore, a well-known British Jew, wrote: "In the Holy Land the Jewish settlers would find a greater certainty of success. Here they will find wells already dug, olives and vines already planted and a land so rich as to require little manure."

176. The well-known Zionist writer Ahad Haam, who later changed his views about Zionism, wrote on this subject in 1891, before Theodor Herzl wrote his Zionist manifesto in 1896 in Paris. At that time the Dreyfus affair had divided France in two and there was a lot of anti-Semitism. That is what drove Herzl to write his Zionist manifesto. That was in 1896 and the well-known writer Ahad Haam wrote the following in 1891:

"We abroad have a way of thinking that Palestine today is almost desert, an uncultivated wilderness, and that anyone who wishes to buy land there can do so to his heart's content. But that is in fact not the case. It is difficult to find any uncultivated land anywhere in the country. We abroad have a way of thinking that the Arabs are all savages on a level with the animals and blind to what goes on around them. But that is quite mistaken. The Arabs, especially the townsmen, see through our activities in their country and our aims, but they keep silent and make no sign because, for the present, they anticipate no danger to their own future from what we are about. But if the time should ever come when our people have so far developed their life in Palestine that the indigenous population should feel more or less cramped, then they will not readily make way for us."

177. Since we are in the host country, my good friend Mr. Scali, I shall tell you what someone said in 1911, when I was six years old. You were not born then. The famous American geographer, Ellsworth Huntington, described Palestine as follows in *Palestine and its Transformation*: "The fertile well-watered strip of the Philistine coastal plain." He also said: "The modern Arab *fellah*"—meaning peasant—"like the peasant of the past, raises his grains and figs with no water except that furnished by rains, but for oranges, lemons and other more valuable crops he must have moisture during the long dry summer. Accordingly, he digs numerous wells and from them obtains a continuous supply by means of pumps."

178. I shall not go beyond 1911, but the first time I personally visited Palestine was in 1925. I was told that 85 per cent, if not more, of the famous orange orchards belonged to the indigenous people of Palestine. Mr. Tekoah says, "It is a desolate land, desert".

179. Now we come to ancient history. Ambassador Tekoah mentioned that Jerusalem was called El Quds, which was from the Hebrew word *Hemikdash*, meaning the Holy Temple. "Whose Holy Temple? The Jewish Temple.", he said.

180. Mr. Tekoah should know that when our Jews came to Jericho and Jerusalem there was a city, one of the most ancient in the world, called *Uru Salim*. "Uru" is a Semitic word, like Ur of the Chaldees—Uru Salim, the land of peace. Egyptian sources dating from 1400 BC speak of that city of Uru Salim, or City of Peace, that existed before our

Jews—not the Khazar Jews, from which our colleague is descended and whose ancestors embraced Judaism in the eighth century AD in what today is southern Russia, about 200 years before Rurik came and unified the land. That Rurik was, as you know, the precursor of the Romanoffs. I stand to be corrected if I am wrong. Then Mr. Tekoah forgets that during the days of the Romans our Jews—and there were no Khazars then, of course, for that was eight centuries before some European tribes were converted to Judaism—spoke Aramaic; they did not speak Hebrew. He tells us what El Quds means and that it is derived from Hebrew. The word "El Quds" is an Arabic word, from Kadassah. The word "El Quds" is a substantive. Arabic is one of the most ancient languages, one of the six basic languages, and by "basic" I mean that there was an interrelationship between verbs and substantives. It means "the sacred". "Kadis" means "saint". "Kadassah" means to pray in sacred places. The word happens to be Arabic, but it does not precede "Uru Salim", which is of Semitic origin and not of Hebraic origin. It existed with Jericho, before the sons of Jacob started to come from the Ur of the Chaldees in Western Iraq, because they were tribal and followed the pasturage, which was the common thing to do. When there was drought they came from Western Iraq and descended through the Hauran to the land of Canaan. If you read the Bible—I do not know if you do, because you are too busy, but I still read it—look at Genesis, how the sons of Jacob, farther north from Jericho or Jerusalem, took a small town. Those towns were called city-states, with a king. The twelve sons of Jacob came. Jacob is one of our prophets. Do not think that I am quoting now from the Bible. If anybody has the Bible, I will read chapter and verse from it. I think it is either the 32nd or the 34th chapter of Genesis. I do not commit myself. The sons of Jacob came down to the land of Canaan—I am paraphrasing now, it is not word for word—and the son of the King, it seems, fell in love with one of their sisters, Dina. There is nothing wrong with that. A young man fell in love with a young girl. Benjamin was the last son of Jacob. I know you are secular, but you can be religious too—it does not matter. The mothers of the 11 sons were Aramaic or from other tribes. Jacob had many concubines in those days—wives and concubines—according to the Bible, and but for the mother of Benjamin they were not Jews. I do not know, because the Jews say that if you are a Jew you have to be born from a Jewish mother. What would you say about the mothers of the 11 sons, because, according to the Bible, there were 12 sons of Jacob, and Benjamin was the youngest?

181. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): They were converted to Judaism.

182. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): We will convert you to be an Arab one of these days. That will solve the problem. One day—I will not be around—you will be Arabs, all of you. It is like what happened to those Crusaders. The Sulbiya tribe, who live in northern Arabia, were Arabized. We assimilated them. But you are diverting the attention of the Council. What are you laughing about? This is history, Sir. I take it from the Bible.

183. In those days, you know, they were conservative people and tribal. They went to the king and told him,

"Your son molested our daughter, Dina." Then it seems that by that time the son had told his father, the king, that he was in love and would like to marry the girl. So the sons of Jacob, without their father's knowledge, according to Genesis, were taken aback. They wanted to pick a quarrel with the king, to fight. The king told them, "Why don't you come and settle amongst us, we marry your daughters and we give our daughters to you in marriage?". It seems that they needed labour. They were urban, and the others were tribal. What did the sons of Jacob say? They said, "Please give us time to think these things over." Then they came two or three days later and said, "We cannot give our daughters in marriage unless the males are circumcised." That is in your Bible. Are you ashamed of the Bible? So the town-crier was sent out and he said: "The king and his son are going to be circumcised—what about you people of the town—and let these people live amongst us." They circumcised them, and on the third day, when the pains were at their height, the sons of Jacob put those Canaanites to the sword and killed every one of them. These are some of the tricks that were used in those days, not only by Jews but perhaps by tribes in order to seize part of the land of Canaan. When Jacob found out, according to the Bible, he was so upset, because he was an honourable man, that he said, "Let us get out of here, because tomorrow their relatives will come, and perhaps they will put us to the sword too." Then they moved southward and later they took Jericho and then Uru Salim—before it was called "El Quds", which means "the Holy City", owing to the fact that it was the first Qibla in Islam, before Mecca. The Moslems, when they prayed, turned their faces to El Quds, to Jerusalem. The word is not Hebraic—Jerusalem: Uru Salim. I grant that Hebrew, Arabic and many tongues of tribes of the area were interrelated. We have nothing against the Jews. Our problem is with zionism, a political movement based on Judaism.

184. As you remember, the First World War was fought allegedly to save the world for democracy. It was not against German militarism but against German mercantilism. People have to find a motivation. The European Zionists had an excuse. They were persecuted in Europe. But what had we to do with it in our area? We had nothing to do with it in our area. So they had to have a motivation, and Herzl thought that the only way would be to go to Palestine and establish a State, but he forgot—and probably Mr. Tekoah wishes to forget—that, ironically, many of the indigenous people of Palestine were originally Jews. Who were the disciples of Christ? Were they Romans? They were Jews. They embraced Christianity and later, because of the tyranny of Byzantium in the area, many Christians embraced Islam, but ethnologically the original Jews are our Jews. It does not matter whether they are Jews, Moslems or Christians. They are Semites. Zionism sprang from Eastern and Central Europe. Many Jews who are friends of mine are opposed to zionism and say, "The Zionists are besmirching our religion".

185. I have nothing against European Jews, do not get me wrong, but once you become an aggressor we have to defend ourselves.

186. Now, here I have the record of our oriental Jews who came to Palestine, as I have told you many times before, from Western Iraq. There is the Davidic Kingdom down to

the fall of Jerusalem—and I mean the fall of Jerusalem when Nebuchadnezzar conquered Palestine in 586 B.C. That lasted 464 years. Then there was a revival during the Maccabean Kingdom: 166 to 63 B.C., 103 years.

187. But let us see how many years some of the other conquests lasted. Look at the Roman conquest of Jerusalem and the fall of paganism in 63 B.C. It lasted 386 years. Then, from the Constantine to the Persian conquest, 291 years. The period of Persian rule was 14 years. Reconquest by the Byzantine, 11 years. Conquest by Moslem Arabs, 435 years. Rule by Moslem Turks, 1072 A.D. to 1092 A.D.: 20 years. Reconquest by Arabs: 1092 A.D. to 1099 A.D.: 7 years. Then the Crusading Kingdom: 88 years. Reconquest by the Arabs: 42 years. And then the City ceded by treaty—that is Jerusalem—to Frederick II. He was one of the Crusaders. Revived Arab rule: 278 years. And Jerusalem under the Ottoman Turks, who were Moslems: 400 years.

188. So if you add up the Moslem and Arab rule, it comes to 1,000 years. The others come to 500 and some years. So regarding this fallacious argument "we were in Palestine", where were you in Palestine? In Judea and in Samaria. And you call that Israel? They were small enclaves—and it was not you, but our Jews. And you say that the Jews have flocked from all the Arab lands. To where? To the land of Palestine, because of your zionism. You created a problem in the Arab world and outside the Arab world, indoctrinated those people to come. They were happy. I lived with them. We were classmates. We spoke Arabic. We ate the same food. Incidentally, I did not eat pork either. So you do not have to worry about your diet. I know Jews who eat pork. I say that because Mr. Tekoah said that Judaism is a way of life, and a question of food. There are many Jews who eat pork and do many other things. They are marrying *Shiksas*, Gentile girls. Therefore, Mr. Tekoah, please do not talk as if you did not know what is happening nowadays.

189. I am not trying to make a historical dissertation. We are seized here of a problem that has perpetrated tragedy on Jew and Gentile alike, and I would like at this meeting to attack that problem from the humanitarian point of view as well as from the pragmatic point of view, to use a phrase of William James, an American: *Pragma*, from the Greek—the practical, the way that the problem could be perhaps attacked and solved.

190. I think that my colleague, Ambassador Huang—and although I do not use his terminology, he is entitled to use it—was correct. I understood him to be making the assumption, or perhaps the assessment, that the two super-Powers—if you do not like to be called super-Powers, that is your privilege, but I think that you the super-Powers—meaning the United States and the Soviet Union—have it within your means to solve this problem if you want to.

191. As I said in a previous intervention, I was present at Lake Success. Israel was created by the two super-Powers. I shall begin with the United States. I have here the memoirs of the late President Truman, and I shall quote from them:

"Shortly before noon, Dr. Stephen S. Wise, Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council, came in to

talk to me about the Jewish victims of nazi persecution and the serious problem of resettlement of the refugees, which led, naturally, to a discussion of a proposed Jewish State and homeland in Palestine. I had before me President Roosevelt's record and statements regarding Palestine, and the Secretary of State had sent me a special communication two days before expressing the attitude and the thinking of the State Department on Palestine:

"'It is very likely', this communication read, 'that efforts will be made by some of the Zionist leaders to obtain from you at an early date some commitments in favour of the Zionist programme which is pressing for unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish State. As you are aware, the Government and people of the United States have every sympathy for the persecuted Jews of Europe and are doing all in their power to relieve their suffering. The question of Palestine is however a highly complex one and involves questions which go far beyond the plight of the Jews in Europe. There is continual tenseness in the situation in the Near East, largely as a result of the Palestine question, and as we have interests in that area'"—you mentioned interest today, Mr. Scali—"which are vital to the United States, we feel that this subject is one that should be handled with the greatest care and with a view to the long-range interest of the country.'"

That is the end of the quotation from the State Department communication.

192. Mr. Truman continues:

"Since I was in agreement with the expressed policy of the Roosevelt Administration on Palestine, I told Rabbi Wise that I would do everything possible to carry out that policy. I had carefully read the Balfour Declaration, in which Great Britain was committed to a homeland in Palestine for the Jews. I had familiarized myself with the history of the question of a Jewish homeland and the position of the British and the Arabs. I was sceptical as I read over the whole record up to date about some of the views and attitudes by the 'striped pants boys'"—

meaning the "boys" of the State Department; unlike today, they used to wear striped pants in those days—

"in the State Department. It seems to me that they did not care enough about what happened to thousands of displaced persons who were involved. It was my feeling that it would be possible for us to watch out for the long-range interests of our country while at the same time helping these unfortunate victims of persecution to find a home. And before Rabbi Wise left, I believe I made this clear to him."

193. Now, there is a revealing quotation from someone who was in the State Department, whom I happened to know personally: his name was Colonel William Eddy. Colonel Eddy was sent by United States ambassadors in the area—in the region of the Middle East—to brief the President about the Palestine question before partition. He writes:

"The spokesman for the group, George Wadsworth,"—who, incidentally, at one time was United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia—"presented orally an agreed statement in about 20 minutes"—on behalf of the United States Ambassadors in the region.—"There was little discussion, and the President asked few questions in the meeting, whose minutes had been carefully guarded by the Department of State. Finally, Mr. Truman summed up his position with the utmost candour: 'I'm sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs amongst my constituents.'"

In other words, if there had been enough Arabs amongst Mr. Truman's constituents, the question would have been different. There is no justice here; it is a matter of votes.

194. Now, Mr. Tekoah, you have probably read the book by Mr. David Horowitz, because he wrote it in Hebrew. It was translated into English in 1953, and I believe it was Alfred Knopf who published it that year in the United States. The name of the book is *State in the Making*.

195. I want to show you how the State of Israel was created amongst us—and I shall quote David Horowitz, an executive of the Jewish Agency, who indicates how the initial disillusionment with the Committee vote was dispelled and how the period of feverish activity commenced:

"The fighting spirit rose in us. We met at the Agency offices and consulted on ways and means to turn the wheel of events once more. The struggle began. The telephones rang madly. Cablegrams sped to all parts of the world. People were dragged from their beds at midnight and sent on peculiar errands. And, wonder of it all, not an influential Jew, Zionist or non-Zionist, refused to give us his assistance at any time. Everyone pulled his weight, little or great, in the despairing effort to balance the scales in our favour."

196. And then, when Forrestal, on 13 December, spoke to then Governor Dewey, who was a candidate for the presidency, about removing Palestine from the realm of partisan politics, the Governor said that while agreeing in principle with Forrestal, he was sceptical that the Democrats would really abide by any such decisions. This is taken from Forrestal's diary.

197. And then at Lake Success—I witnessed this—my friend Mr. Gromyko, now the Soviet Foreign Minister, and Hershel Johnson—I think it was Hershel Johnson; he was the deputy of Senator Austin, the first Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, and had made three speeches on behalf of partition in 1947—asked that the partition question be put to the vote forthwith. At one time Mr. Austin, after consulting with the State Department, had thought we might place Palestine under the authority of the Trusteeship Council pending search for a solution to that problem. But Mr. Truman precipitated a vote, and none other than my good friend General Romulo—he is still alive; may God prolong his life: he is a fine man—made a speech against partition that lasted for an hour. And then, according to General Romulo, who

told me this, Mr. Truman called the President of the Philippines on the telephone and told him: "If you do not ask your representative at the United Nations to vote for partition, American aid will not be forthcoming."

198. That is why I am addressing you, Mr. Scali: your Government is responsible for the creation of Israel.

199. And I do not not know what made Mr. Gromyko vote for partition. He probably felt sorry for the Jews, as we all did, after all. Both major Powers voted for the partition of Palestine, but the major efforts were on the part of the United States. Later the Soviet Union found itself left out in the cold by the Zionists; the Zionists turned their backs on the Soviet Union—and began to do what? To work with the United States, probably because they had the money, while the Soviet Union was emerging from the war: it had lost 20 million lives in that war; of course it had to reconstruct the country. All this probably contributed to the Soviet Union's disillusionment. I do not know; I am just thinking aloud.

200. But anyway you are the two major Powers in the area and, as Ambassador Huang mentioned, I think you should be considered responsible for finding a prompt solution to this problem. I am not going into the words of resolution 242 (1967). I told you in this Council that the result would be zero, and I circled my hands in the air. It is below zero now.

201. Mr. Scali had a well-balanced speech today, and that reminds me of Ambassador Goldberg's famous phrase, "We want to treat this question even-handedly". The United States, the arbiter of the destiny of peoples. They have a scale 6,000 miles away from Palestine, even-handedly. What for? Mr. Truman wanted the votes. He probably also was a good man and felt sorry for the Jews. But why did he not feel sorry for the indigenous people of Palestine? Are they subhuman? This is logic. We felt sorry, everybody felt sorry for the persecution of the Jews.

202. Mr. Tekoah always speaks about Haj Amin Hussein going to Germany during the Hitlerite régime. There was a price on his head. Where did you want him to go? Did you want him to go to New York or to London?

203. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): He collaborated with the Nazis.

204. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Collaborate? You collaborate with everybody to seek your own ends. Rosenberg wrote that book about the racial superiority of the Nordic people. He was a Jew, or descended from Jews.

205. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): It is a German name. He was not a Jew. You do not know your history.

206. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): The history is clear. I was told many years ago before Hitler why the German Jews got German names, which is human. They were disabled in many parts of Europe and all of them were called either Isaac or Jacob or other Biblical names, and when the tax collector wanted to levy taxes and some of them perhaps wanted to evade these taxes, so they were

asked to choose German names so as to be able to identify those who paid their taxes.

207. I have treated this subject for so many years. I spare you a reading of *The Jewish Mystique*, which bolsters a lot of my arguments. The author is a Jew, an objective Jew. I have nothing against the Jews or Judaism.

208. In a few days the illustrious Mr. Brezhnev is meeting with another illustrious gentleman by the name of Mr. Nixon in Washington. They are not only going to wine and dine, they are going to discuss various questions and I think that the Middle East is high on the list of their discussions according to various semi-official communiqués which we read in the press of this country and in newspapers from abroad.

209. Who is Baroody to make remarks to Nixon and Brezhnev? Baroody is a human being with two ears, a tongue and two eyes, descended from a people with a long heritage—with all due respect to the Russians, who are more ancient than the Americans. So Baroody has something to say through you, Sir, here in the Council. For those who have ears, let them hear, and those who do not want to listen can block their ears. It is their privilege to do so. But there will be no peace in Palestine if those two gentlemen do not adopt a new pattern of policy that is in contradiction with the ancient policy predicated on the balance of power.

210. The United States has certain interests in the area, we know that, but more so Europe in so far as the oil is concerned, because after all I think that the American and British concessionaires there sell only 5 per cent of the oil to this host country. The Arab world is the hub of the Moslem world. If you draw a straight line from Morocco, which is on the Atlantic, it goes through all of North Africa which is Moslem and happens to be Arab. Then it extends to the confines of China. You have Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and from the north you have Turkey and Iran and you go down and reach the Sudan. I am not talking about our Moslem brothers who live in enclaves and are not in a majority in certain African countries. There are 600 million Moslems. Do you mean to contain them, you two super Powers? We do not threaten anybody. Six hundred million Moslems in a rectangular bloc that is one of the largest on this earth. They mean well by everybody. They mean well by the Soviet Union just as they mean well by the Western world. Even if we wanted to we are not in a position to wield power, to go against the Soviet Union or, for that matter, the Western world. But in that rectangle, that big territorial geographical rectangle, Israel was established by the United States to become a pretext for intervention inasmuch as this has been an antiquated policy of States since the days of Plato's *Republic*. Balance of power. If Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon are going to shelve this problem because the balance of power policy still obtains, the world will come to an end, not because of Palestine, although Palestine will be a catalytic agent that may perhaps set the spark of a conflict that may draw the big Powers. Who wants a conflict? We do not want the Jews to be erased from the world, but they might do something like the Biblical Samson if and when there should be a revival amongst the Arabs—not to wield power



for aggression, but there are many other ways and means they can wield power. I am not going to mention them lest it be said that Baroody is threatening, but do not underestimate the Arabs and the Moslem world.

211. Are you—the United States and the Soviet Union—going to jeopardize your security because of miscalculation? We know where the spheres of influence are. I do not have to name them. I do not wish to embarrass some of my brothers who are here. Some are with this camp and others are with that camp. And what are you doing, Sir? We sell you oil and you sell us military hardware. To fight whom? Of course, to fight the United States interests, if it is provided by the Soviet Union, or to fight the Soviet Union interests if the arms are provided by the United States.

212. Your secret agencies have evolved from agencies of collecting information for self-defence—which is legitimate, espionage for self-defence. These agencies have evolved into organizations that can bring about coups d'état, use *agents provocateurs*. I am saying this advisedly, drawing it from books that were written by those who were agents. We are living in curious days. You should be proud, Mr. Scali, of those journalists who uncover many things. You, yourself, are a journalist; you are seeking after the truth. Of course, the Russians have an older civilization than yours. They are more circumspect. Former members of the KGB—or whatever you call it—do not do the same as the former CIA workers who have left the service and write their memoirs.

213. Billions are used, not to collect news, but to subvert people when it suits you. And I am sorry to say, in fairness to you, that the smaller Powers are aping you, doing the same thing. While this is taking place, Chiefs of State smile and photographs are taken of them. But their agencies are busy. The intelligence agencies of the smaller States also are busy doing these things to one another.

214. From a humanitarian point of view it is your responsibility, my good friend—because you are still young, and I will not live very long—to tell your leaders, through us here, to change that pattern that has backfired. You, Sir, gave us a speech here, my good friend, Mr. Scali. It was marvellous in its diction, well-balanced, nothing wrong: compromise, five points. Let us take the mathematical sort of equation or parallel: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Now if both parties should compromise on certain points on the basis of those five points, do you know how many combinations you can make out of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5? And if one does not want to accept this solution, then it will be a compromise. Umpteen combinations of figures and umpteen combinations of abstract ideas for a solution!

215. Where there is will there is a way. Why do not you and the Soviet Union speak to that State that was created by you in 1947? I think the Soviet Union may have regretted it—I do not know—or it may not have regretted it. You may have regretted it but it does not show, because the Zionists are still very, very powerful. They have permeated your Congress, your Senate, your banking.

216. You know who sells the gold. They made a good profit, Mocatt and Goldman, in London—I know who they

are. Yes, the Jews know how to control markets. There is nothing wrong. Perhaps we all should have been in the gold business. And we, whether we are Jews or Gentiles, suffer because of those policies that are still predicated on the balance of power and power politics.

217. This is not my swan song. You will hear from me again. I have other matters which you know, because you are a highly intelligent gentleman, otherwise your illustrious President would not have put his faith in you to represent the American Government. And I would be embarrassing my good friend, Ambassador Malik. I have known him since 1948. He is one of the most adept and skilful diplomats and I am sure Mr. Brezhnev is not so haughty as not to heed what he tells him.

218. It is time that we representatives should talk loudly. I do talk loudly, to my Chief of State. He has not hanged me. And I talked loudly to many in the Arab world and they did not hang me.

219. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): They might.

220. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): They will hang you. He says, "They might". You might be hanged by your own people if you go too far, but I will feel sorry for you because we have gotten to know you by sitting next to you here. A joke? This is how you want to relieve the tension. Sometimes I crack a joke to relieve the tension, but what I am saying is not puerile or childish. I am saying this seriously.

221. It is high time that a new page was turned, and we diplomats should not be automata, hardly able to function because of the straitjackets of instruction provided to us by our respective Governments or hardly able to walk because of the tight pants of procedure that we provide ourselves with in so many semantical terms. The time is ripe for something drastic to be done lest things get out of hand. I have had my pulse on the situation. Time and again I have told you. I come from the region, from the area, and believe me I am talking to you sincerely. Act before it is too late, you two Powers. China? What can China do? It has its problems. We have its sympathy. I told my good friend Ambassador Huang that I was not asking for his support. But he said that it depends on the super-Powers, and today he confirmed it—or the two major Powers, if you do not like to be called super-Powers.

222. You will meet again in July, you will repeat the same thing here over and over again. And then I will bring more books and more documents to quote from, and the prefabricated replies of Mr. Tekoah will be read—some prepared by him or prepared for him by others. Where will it get us? Perhaps this is what Israel is aiming at: the *status quo* so that it may consolidate its rule over the place.

223. And will the Israelis always be living in a fortress—surrounded, as the Crusaders were surrounded in different military fortresses? Look at what happened to the Crusaders.

224. If the Jews want to live among us, they can do so. But they cannot lord it over us. They cannot cast the

Palestinian people by the wayside. The Palestinian people have their personality. They are the indigenous people of Palestine. The Sykes-Picot-Sazonov agreement, which was signed in 1916 by the three allies of the First World War, partitioned the Ottoman empire. And in order to disguise their colonialism they called it mandates. I lived under a mandate, in Lebanon and Syria. I know what I am talking about. That was colonialism in disguise. There was a mandate over Syria, a mandate over Lebanon, a mandate over Iraq, and a mandate over Palestine. They were distinct people. We knew a Palestinian from the inflection of his voice. They happened to speak Arabic. They embraced Arabism. But many of them, I must say, were the original Jews. And the Khazars came and wanted to displace them.

225. Sovereignty lies in a people. And there was a people—the people of Palestine, whether we like it or not. Even if they had not been Arabized, they would still have been the people of Palestine. There was the people of Lebanon; the people of Syria; the people of Iraq. They were separate entities. The mere fact that for 400 years they had been ruled by the Ottomans did not rob them of their personality. The British wanted to establish the State in order to preserve the roots of the empire.

226. And the Zionists railroaded your country, Mr. Scali, into the war in 1917, when the Germans were beating the British. You must remember that hotel—the Savoy Plaza, facing the Plaza Hotel. That was where the Zionists met in order to intensify the British propaganda to railroad the United States into the First World War. And the price was the Balfour Declaration. I was a contemporary of those days. I knew people who attended that conference. And one of your ambassadors to Turkey, Mr. Morgenthau, was against Zionism because he considered himself American. Therefore, after the British lost their empire and became insolvent and had to throw the question into the lap of the United Nations, it became your responsibility. You emerged as a great Power after the Second World War. The two World Wars were not brought to your homeland. You fought, you sent boys. You had no business being involved with those Europeans—that is hindsight—but you were.

227. And look what is happening now to you and to your dollar. And that touches us, because our patrimony is being eroded also.

228. Therefore, prime responsibility is with the United States Government—to restrain Israel and not to delay and to see how, in the words of Ambassador Goldberg, we can even-handedly solve this problem. We hope you will talk to your leaders—if not face to face, by communication; you have the wherewithal to do so.

229. Baroody is warning you that it will be a question of years. I do not know how many. But I know through analysis, through my knowledge of the region, that if you do not act to find a really just solution, then, by the law of retribution, there may be a point from which there can be no return. And we all stand to lose.

230. I must thank you, Mr. President, for your indulgence, and I must thank my colleagues for having been so patient with me. But, after all, we do not wield world power. All

we can do is come to you with our problem, hoping we may move you towards influencing your Governments as a departure from the antiquated duty of the diplomat to do nothing but what his Government tells him.

231. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I will limit myself to one observation. When, Mr. Baroody, you address yourself to two great Powers in the Security Council, it would be better if you addressed your remarks to the five permanent members, and to all members of the Council. However much they might wish it, two Powers in the Security Council cannot adopt any resolution without the support of the other Council members. Please bear that in mind.

232. Mr. SEN (India): After the most eloquent speech by Ambassador Baroody what I am going to say will come as an anti-climax. It is on a point of fact. I should like as briefly as I can to tell the Security Council of the Indian position on resolution 242 (1967) in 1967. I could, of course, read out the entire text of the speech by the then permanent representative of India, Mr. Parthasarathi, but that would take too long. Instead, I shall read three paragraphs from a document circulated yesterday. Mr. Parthasarathi said:

“The principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force is absolutely fundamental to our approach and we cannot accept or acquiesce in any decision that leaves out territories occupied by military conquest from the provision of withdrawal.”

“It is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by the Council, will commit it to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories—I repeat, all the territories—occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict which began on 5 June 1967.”

“This being so, Israel cannot use the words ‘secure and recognized boundaries’... to retain any territory occupied in the recent conflict.” [*See S/10948.*]

The Council has already heard what I had to say.

233. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Saudi Arabia.

234. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, I feel duty bound to answer you with a few words, because you put a question to me. The bulk of my statement that had to do with the two major Powers was directed to our good friend Ambassador Scali. If the Soviet Union would also like to establish peace, it could co-operate with the United States, instead of having each Power look at its traditional national interests in the area by resorting to a policy of balance of power. That is all I meant. But you know, Sir, that I gave you the benefit of the doubt. I said that after Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Hershel Johnson voted for partition, you seem to have had either qualms or regrets, or perhaps followed a policy that I do not understand, and were favourable to the Arabs because, as I said, the Zionists probably turned their backs on you—I do not know why; you could ask them why—after you helped them to have a



homeland in Palestine. That is why I addressed our American friends and asked them to co-operate with you, and I asked the same of you. But I think the United States counts more in this matter than does the Soviet Union, because the United States provides not only arms but also aid to Israel. I think that I have made myself clear.

235. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): With all due respect to you, Mr. Baroody, I again request you to bear my comment in mind. You yourself recognized that Western Europe has no less an interest in the Middle East and its oil than the United States. I think that interest is much greater than that of the Soviet Union, since the USSR has its own oil.

236. I call on the representative of Israel.

237. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): I should like to refer very briefly to the observation made by the representative of India. In my earlier intervention I said:

"Even the Minister of State of the United Arab Emirates, who was present at the Security Council deliberations in November 1967, confirmed that the Arab delegations had in fact been informed at the time that the purpose of the omission, in the resolution, of the words 'all' and 'the' before the term 'occupied territories' was to leave the possibility of frontier rectifications. This understanding—that resolution 242 (1967) left open the possibility for territorial adjustments—was confirmed also . . . by India's representative . . . though his successor today, for obvious reasons, chose not to mention it . . .". [*Supra*, para. 159.]

238. I could have added that for the same obvious reasons Egypt's Minister for Foreign Affairs chose also not to include in the documents submitted by him to the Security Council the statement to which I referred. The operative central sentence in the Indian representative's statement on 22 November 1967, as it appears in the verbatim record, is as follows: "Of course, mutual territorial adjustments are not ruled out . . .". [*1382nd meeting, para. 53.*]

239. What I have been trying to point out throughout this debate is that resolution 242 (1967) leaves the possibility for negotiation and agreement in order to define something that has not been defined in that resolution. That is the thesis which is contrary to that propounded here by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, who spoke of the immutability of the old line.

240. Now once the principle that border changes are possible has been established—and I think this debate makes it very clear that that principle has been recognized by all concerned, including the representative of India at the time who was critical of resolution 242 (1967)—then the actual extent of these border changes would, of course, have to be agreed between the parties in negotiations resulting in an agreement.

241. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I now call on the representative of Egypt.

242. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): I should like first to tell the Council that we were not informed of any such

intention, and that we were indeed informed to the contrary. I do not like to say this in the absence of the then representative of the United Kingdom and the then representative of the United States. Lord Caradon told our Foreign Minister, half jokingly, half seriously, that he knew English better than the Egyptian Minister did, and therefore he assured him that the words "territories occupied" meant all territories occupied. Of course, I was not present, but I heard that from Mr. Riad himself. I have repeated it to Lord Caradon, and he did not deny it. As for the United States, we have verbatim records of private conversations and Mr. Goldberg also told Mr. Riad, "I assure you that not an inch of Egyptian territory is going to be touched". I do not have the papers in front of me—I did not think that I would need to use them—and I state this now with a little diffidence because I do not want to speak about people who are not present.

243. But the distortions alluded to in the very beginning have gone as far as Mr. Tekoah quoting, in the presence of the Council and in my presence, something that I never said when he spoke about the original sin. I do not know where he got that, but I just want to say that I did not say it.

244. Having heard all the members of the Council, having heard the statements made on behalf of Africa and on behalf of the non-aligned world, and having heard also the statements in exercise of the right of reply and other exercises of the Israeli representative, I feel we were fully justified when we asked for this series of meetings of the Council to examine at this historic time the situation in the Middle East. The meetings have rightly been described by the representative of the United States as a challenge and an opportunity.

245. Our two main questions have now been answered. They have been answered by the world, represented by the overwhelming majority of the members of this Council, by the representatives of Africa, Europe, Latin America and the third world, on the one hand, and they have been answered by the Israeli representative, on the other hand.

246. The first question centred around the continued military occupation of the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian lands, illegally exploited, and maliciously disfigured by the Israeli military forces in order finally to usurp them or parts of them. The answer of the world was that this occupation was inadmissible and intolerable. You have indeed in the Council said "No"—"No" to occupation, "No" to coercion and "No" to usurpation. The answer that the Israeli representative had to give boils down to the naked confession that what the Israelis have occupied by force they intend to keep—or to keep whatever they want to keep of it. "No evacuation without negotiation", they say, meaning no negotiations will ever be allowed to succeed without resulting in further expansion and annexation.

247. The representative of Israel not only refuses to answer my explicit and repeated questions about what his people think of the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force but he has angrily rejected and objected to your stating this principle from the Chair.

248. The second question concerns the right of the people of Palestine—two and a half million people, whom, as I have said, you cannot wish away—to live in peace, free and independent, in the homeland of their fathers and grandfathers. The answer of the world, here again, was clear. It was an affirmation that it was impossible without respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people for any meaningful, just or lasting peace to be attained. The sad answer of Israel is that the Palestinians have no place in Palestine. They are not a nation. They are indeed invited to cross the river out of Palestine and conquer the Kingdom of Jordan, if they really need a country of their own.

249. Those are the answers clearly revealed to this Council, regardless of what the mass media of this town, the host of the United Nations, have found fit to print or fit to omit. In regard to the Palestinians, this Council should never be made to forget that hundreds of thousands exist in Gaza, hundreds of thousands exist in Lebanon, and thousands and thousands of others are without homes all over the world. They are not only the people living on the West Bank.

250. It is obvious that we should have by now passed to the submission and adoption of a resolution. Such a resolution could indeed sum up this debate, condemning without ambiguity the military occupation of our lands, condemning without ambiguity the usurpation of the rights of the Palestinian nation, calling without ambiguity for the respect of established international borders. We understand, however, that, because of the seriousness of the situation, more time is needed by the members of the Council to deliberate on the future course the Council is to take.

251. The representative of Israel referred to what he called the need for the establishment of frontiers between Israel and its neighbours. He alleged that frontiers never existed in our area and he seems to have some support here from the United States delegation. I have a very short comment to make.

252. In support of his allegations the Israeli representative invoked certain provisions of the 1949 Armistice Agreements and in particular article V, paragraph 2, of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement,<sup>5</sup> which stipulated that the Armistice Demarcation Line was not to be construed as a political or territorial boundary. He deliberately omitted any reference to the statement in the same provision that the delineation of the Armistice Demarcation Line was without prejudice to the position as regards the "ultimate settlement of the Palestine question". As I have pointed out to the Council before, the purpose of this saving clause was to avoid any prejudice to the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, pending, as I have just stated, the ultimate settlement of the Palestine question. This provision has no relevance to and no bearing whatsoever on the character of the international frontiers between Egypt and Palestine under the Mandate, and clearly recognized in the Mandate over Palestine as approved by the League of Nations.

253. Article II, paragraph 2, of the same Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement provides that the military forces of

the parties shall not advance beyond or pass the Armistice Demarcation Line and "shall not violate the international frontier". We also find a reference in article III, paragraph 2, to "the Egypt-Palestine frontier", in article VIII, paragraph 2, to the "Egyptian-Palestine frontier", and in the first paragraph of annex I again to the "Egyptian-Palestine frontier". There are many other provisions which prove conclusively that the international frontiers of Egypt were never at issue even for the Israelis at the time of the Armistice Agreements, or indeed anyone at any other time. Similar provisions are also to be found in other Armistice Agreements, between Israel and other Arab countries.

254. The United States delegation will, I hope, give these remarks some attention. Surely the absence of the reference to the international borders in one resolution of the Council does not wipe them away.

255. Before I end these brief remarks I wish to thank the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for the unambiguous answers to the three queries I put to them. It should be obvious to everyone now that Egypt never accepted and Egypt will certainly never accept a so-called separate or partial solution which will in reality solve nothing since it will leave dormant the seeds of more aggression, strife and future conflict.

256. We sincerely agree with the United States representative when he judges this series of meetings to be an opportunity to review our perceptions; to find, in fact, where we are after the almost six years since the Council last met to put an end to the war, then called the Six-Day War, but now running into its sixth year.

257. We have heard once more the Israeli explanations of resolution 242 (1967), given under the cloak of what was called "constructive ambiguity". Is it not time to remove this ambiguity? Is this the resolution that you have passed? Are these the decisions that you would take: partitioning Egypt, Syria, and Jordan? Is it not time for the Council to assert the principles you have pronounced today, Mr. President? If one text is not clear, other texts are, can and should be. Certainly, the Charter is; it is the Charter only that we here cannot alter or change.

258. Mr. President, you and your colleagues around this table have given the situation in the Middle East much of your time and certainly much of your attention. Every State member of this highest Council of the world has participated in this debate, serious and conscious of the grave situation our countries in the Middle East are facing today. We have come to the community of nations seeking the shelter of the Charter. Only if we find that shelter will the road to justice and peace be open.

259. May I end by again expressing my special appreciation to the Foreign Ministers of Africa who conveyed to the Council what Africa had resolved. May I also request Mr. Cissoko, who is present here, to convey Egypt's thanks to Africa. Other Foreign Ministers and colleagues from the Arab world certainly do not expect me to convey thanks to them. But allow me, Mr. President, to register—and I do this not merely because it is customary to do so—my esteem and admiration for the way in which you have conducted

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 3*.

this debate and kept the light on the problem that is before the Council, the problem that has brought me here.

260. It seems we are now concluding, and I shall soon be going back home. I shall be leaving with a great debt of gratitude and appreciation for each word, which we have carefully listened to, and which we are going to study further, and for the spirit of help that has sustained me through this debate. I do hope that besides expressing appreciation for the words said I shall be able to express real appreciation for action undertaken.

261. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I now call on the representative of Israel, who wishes to exercise his right of reply. I believe I will be speaking for all members of the Security Council if I express the hope that his statement will be short.

262. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, in his last remarks, referred to two substantive points. First of all, he spoke again on the question of Palestinian rights and tried to explain away his suggestion as being made simply out of concern for the rights of Arabs of Palestine.

263. My response will be in the words of a broadcast of today, 14 June, over Radio Amman, the capital of Jordan:

"The Prime Minister of Jordan reported to the Jordanian Cabinet on 14 June 'regarding the memorandum that he sent to Arab Foreign Ministers concerning the meaning of the Egyptian Foreign Ministers's call in the Security Council to create a Palestinian State in the occupied West Bank and the dangers inherent in this call with regard to the Palestinian cause'."

264. This is precisely the reason why I, from the very first meeting in this debate, pointed out that Minister El-Zayyat's references to the so-called inalienable rights of the Palestinians to live within secure and recognized boundaries are in fact a suggestion, a proposal, a call to dismember Jordan.

265. The second point of substance which Minister El-Zayyat referred to was the question of resolution 242 (1967) and its interpretation. I take note of the fact that he too repeated today that there is much ambiguity—I repeat: ambiguity—in resolution 242 (1967).

266. Yes, we all realize that; I think this debate has made it clearer than ever before. The ambiguity, the openness, the possibility for interpretation, the invitation to accommodate each other, the invitation to conduct negotiations and conclude agreements applies also to a central provision of that resolution: the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries.

267. Minister El-Zayyat quoted from the General Armistice Agreement concluded between Israel and Egypt in 1949. As far as I could follow the quotation it was correct. He will find the same quotation in at least one of my statements in order to emphasize that if both Egypt and Israel undertake not to consider the Armistice Demarcation Line as determined in the said Agreement as prejudicing the

claims and positions of the parties in the ultimate, peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem, then, obviously, they do not recognize that Armistice Line as an international boundary; then, obviously, both parties reserve the right to come to the negotiations on a final peace settlement with whatever suggestions they may feel would be appropriate at the time of such talks.

268. I also pointed out that that particular paragraph appears in all four of the Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel and its Arab neighbours: in the Israeli-Egyptian, Israeli-Lebanese, Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Jordanian Agreements

269. But the Israeli-Egyptian agreement went even further and included a clause quoted by me yesterday [*1724th meeting*] which specifically said, if I remember the text correctly, that the Armistice line should not be interpreted as a political, territorial boundary. I think that this has been basically confirmed and understood as a result of the exchanges that we have heard in the course of the last week around the Security Council table. I again repeat, even an Arab representative and the representative of India at the time in the Security Council, who identified himself entirely with the Arab position, made it very clear that resolution 242 (1967), which was adopted unanimously, left open the possibility for border changes. Now obviously these border changes can be arrived at only through negotiation and agreement between the parties. If we were to accept the thesis as put forward by the Minister of Egypt, we would find ourselves confronting a rather bizarre theory in addition to being completely wrong as far as the basic documents involved in this problem are concerned; the Armistice Agreements, resolution 242 (1967), the statements of representatives on the Security Council when that resolution was adopted. We would be confronting a strange theory of a line—and all of us know what a line is—and that cannot be even one millimetre wide—which is to be considered an international boundary as far as one side to the agreement is concerned but not as an international boundary as far as the other side of the agreement is concerned. A line after all is only a theoretical line. Now does Minister El-Zayyat propose that what was intended in 1949 was that Israel recognized this theoretical line as constituting the international boundary for Egypt, while for Egypt it remained a purely theoretical line without any width at all because Egypt itself reserved the right for what? Expansion? Aggression? This is a theory which would be untenable in any court, in any committee that would try to interpret from the legal point of view or from the political or historical point of view what was actually agreed on both in 1949 and in 1967.

270. I shall end my brief comment by saying that despite these differences of view and interpretation we still hope that Egypt will agree to enter into a process of negotiation—of free, honourable negotiations without any preconditions, without Israel asking of Egypt to accept in advance any Israeli view and position—and that these negotiations will at long last bring peace to the Middle East, peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

271. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): For the information of those speakers at the Security Council

meeting who take part in the discussion of the item and refer to resolution 242 (1967), I should like them also to bear in mind the fact that the resolution provides for United Nations machinery on the Middle East.

272. I call on the representative of Egypt.

273. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): I am taking the floor on just a few points, because I have never seen such an exercise. Fortunately I was reading from a piece of paper. What I said about ambiguity is this. "We have just heard once more the Israeli explanations of resolution 242 (1967) given under the cloak of what was called constructive ambiguity." I did not say that the resolution had ambiguity. I was saying politely that the Israeli representative was trying to deceive the Council into giving explanations that were not the wish or the will of the Council.

274. Secondly, I have never said and I wish the record to show that I have never said, what he again alleged I said—quoting this dispatch or radio broadcast from Amman—asking for a Palestinian State in the West Bank. The records show clearly that I never said that.

275. The third exercise was this question of the line which would be a boundary for Egypt and not a boundary for Israel. Is this really so difficult? The boundaries of Egypt were the boundaries with Palestine. They were not the boundaries between Egypt and Israel, and Israel is not the State that inherited all of Palestine. The only legal basis which you have recognized and which Members recognizing Israel have recognized for Israel is a line inside Palestine, as shown on the map accompanying the 1947 resolution partitioning Palestine. What is left after that line—and this is the armistice line—is the land of Arab Palestine, and it is with this Arab Palestine that Egypt has its international borders.

276. The next point was about accommodation. The representative of Israel was asking that we both accommodate each other. We have no wish to be accommodated inside Palestine, and Israel must rest assured that this year, next year, this generation or the next generation, Israel will never—but never—be accommodated in Egypt.

277. The last point is about negotiations. I am not going to say anything. The Foreign Minister of Israel has apparently failed to convince his Ambassador. Yesterday I quoted here what Mr. Abba Eban said about negotiations under duress. I stand on his declarations. I like it.

278. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Jordan.

279. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan): The Israeli representative has tried again to drive a wedge between Jordan and Egypt. The issue before this Council is not inter-Arab relations, nor is it our view of the future of our relationships or of how our countries and peoples should reconstitute or restructure their relationships. These are matters for the Arabs to decide among themselves. If there are common grounds, there is a common position shared by the Arab countries who come to the United Nations in 1967 complaining of the attack and the occupation by Israel of their territories.

The common ground today is that they all agree that Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories it occupied in 1967. That means Gaza, it means Sinai, it means the West Bank of Jordan, it means Arab Jerusalem, it means the Golan Heights. If there is an interpretation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) which was accepted officially by two Arab countries, Jordan and Egypt, it is this interpretation.

280. This interpretation is not attributed by me or by the Arab side to the resolution. It is one which was governed by the preambular paragraph, as I said this morning of the 1725th meeting: no acquisition of territory by war. It is also governed by the norms of international law and international relations and the law of the United Nations. This is an interpretation that the Arab Governments which accepted Security Council resolution 242 (1967) all share.

281. It is with great apprehension and sense of shock that one feels and witnesses the evolution in the Israeli position between 1967 and today. It is an evolution from a position which then was that Israel wanted peace and wanted guarantees for the future, and not territory, something that is to be testified to by the fact that Israel in June 1967, led by its Foreign Minister, did not vote against the Latin American draft resolution<sup>6</sup> which said that Israel should withdraw "all its forces from all the territories occupied as a result of the recent conflict", meaning the one in June 1967, to a position where it now speaks of agreed borders.

282. Now, while the principle of agreement is introduced in the Security Council resolution with regard to the machinery of the United Nations—introduced in that resolution, as you yourself, Sir, so rightly said—it does not apply to borders or to the concept of withdrawal. Withdrawal is governed by the lines, by the concept of no acquisition of territory by force and by the fact that the principle that the attacking forces should, in the context of a peaceful settlement, withdraw to the lines from which it crossed at the outbreak of the hostilities.

283. The agreement is a matter that pertains to procedure. It is a matter which is associated with the work and the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It is a concept that applies to the manner in which the resolution is to be implemented. It is a very serious and very dangerous concept to speak of agreed borders and give this interpretation to the clear and categorical call for withdrawal by a party which at the moment not only occupies and holds under occupation the national soil of three Arab countries but also speaks through a number of its leaders of retaining slices, perhaps all of the occupied territories.

284. I wanted to draw the attention of the Security Council to this serious evolution in the Israeli position and the fact that it clearly depicts an appetite for territory and a rejection of the basic concept on which resolution 242 (1967) was based, which is a balance of obligations between peace, a guaranteed peace, and a withdrawal by the forces of occupation to the lines from which they had started. Jordan's concept and understanding of resolution

<sup>6</sup> See foot-note 1.

242 (1967)—a concept and understanding which, from the statements I heard from the Foreign Minister of Egypt, I think Egypt also shares—is that withdrawal should be total and that it is only in that context, the context of a balance of obligations between total withdrawal and a guaranteed peace, that resolution 242 (1967) is to be applied. That is our understanding of it and that is our concept of the future just peace in that area.

285. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): We have now come to the end of the list of those wishing to speak at today's meeting, and also the list of representatives who expressed a desire to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

286. Before closing the meeting, I should like to make the following statement.

287. Some tentative suggestions have been made to me concerning the desirability of suspending for a reasonably short period the formal Security Council meetings dealing with the examination of the situation in the Middle East. Among delegations which have informed me that they think such a suspension might be appropriate are those of Austria, France and the United Kingdom.

288. The exchange of views on this matter with the members of the Security Council has revealed a common view that such a suspension would be useful. It can be used for further pondering on the results of the discussion of the question in the Security Council by both the members of the Council and the representatives of the States participating in the consideration of this question. In the light of the report of the Secretary-General on the efforts undertaken by his Special Representative and the statements made by all States participating in the present debate, the suspension could also be used for further unofficial consultations among the members of the Security Council as to the next steps of the Council.

289. There is a general understanding that the Security Council would resume its examination of the situation in the Middle East, for which purpose a meeting of the Council will be convened in the middle of July on a date to be determined following consultations among the members of the Council.

290. I call on the representative of Egypt.

291. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): Mr. President, because of the seriousness of the situation, because what we are facing in our area is the question of having to end a war imposed on us and having to end the military occupation of our land, and because of our respect and esteem for the three States mentioned in your statement—Austria, France and the United Kingdom—Egypt accepts suspension of the present debate. But may I take it that you, Mr. President, together with the President for next month—I believe it will be the representative of the United Kingdom—and the Secretary-General will keep in touch with the situation in order to determine when we shall next meet on the subject and what we shall meet for.

292. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Jordan.

293. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan): Mr. President, following the example of my colleague the Foreign Minister of Egypt, I simply wish to extend to you the thanks of Jordan for inviting my delegation to participate in the Council's deliberations on the acute and serious problem we are all facing. I wish to extend to members of the Council my thanks and the thanks of my delegation and Jordan for giving us this opportunity. I also wish to thank everyone who has upheld the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force and expressed hope and determination that in the Middle East there will be peace based on justice.

*The meeting rose at 8.05 p.m.*

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