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## CONTENTS

	Page
Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943, A/C.1/667, A/C.1/668, A/C.1/669 and A/C.1/670) ( <i>continued</i> ).....	41
International control of atomic energy : report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) ( <i>continued</i> ).....	41

Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943, A/C.1/667, A/C.1/668, A/C.1/669 and A/C.1/670) (*continued*)**

[Item 66]\*

**International control of atomic energy : report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (*continued*)**

[Item 16]\*

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) declared that the necessity for the maintenance of international peace and security was as vital to the small nations, which had no adequate defensive machines, as it was to the big ones.

2. In assuming that both the three-Power resolution (A/C.1/667) and the draft amendments of the USSR (A/C.1/668) were motivated by the same good intentions, one would, nevertheless, have to indicate the general principles which must be followed to obtain their objectives.

3. First, before tackling the whole problem of disarmament one should know the exact present situation, that is, one should have complete and authenticated information about the present state of armaments. That requirement was met by the three-Power draft resolution.

4. Secondly, reduction by one-third in present armaments would logically necessitate the existence of the first condition, since no one could guess the effects of a one-third reduction of armaments if the amount of those armaments were unknown. Moreover this reduction could not be rigidly applied to nations whose defensive organization was still embryonic. Furthermore, the danger of possible aggression would be bred not only by the excessive volume of armaments but also by the lack of balance of armaments, which encouraged the illusion of an easy military victory, thus becoming a temptation for a potential aggressor to strike at will. A mathematical reduction of a given percentage would not change the balance of armaments nor the causes of the present tension.

5. Thirdly, the fact that atomic weapons should be prohibited had already clearly been shown by the proposals of both parties. Though some had proposed the immediate outlawry of the atomic bomb for humanitarian reasons, it should be pointed out that the information on atomic weapons was too inadequate to enable one to make any judgment. Even if those atomic weapons were outlawed, the world still knew nothing of other more destructive weapons which might have been invented and whose offensive potential would not be affected by the outlawry of only atomic weapons. A decision to outlaw immediately the atomic weapon might delude some, but the world would soon see through that spectacular action if it were not accompanied by precise guarantees for strict implementation.

6. Fourthly, the preceding conditions would logically lead to the necessity for a comprehensive and meticulous control, since the least omission might lead to results contrary to what had been expected.

7. His delegation did not oppose the draft resolution submitted by Iraq, Pakistan and Syria (A/C.1/670) as a procedural move designed to facilitate the work of the Committee, since, in view of the gravity of the present situation, nothing should be overlooked which might lead to a greater chance of success.

8. In conclusion Mr. Politis declared that if the four delegations concerned succeeded in submitting a joint draft which in itself would be a complete guarantee of meticulous implementation of the decisions taken, such a draft would gain the unanimous approval of the General Assembly.

9. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) said that both in the title and the text of the three-Power proposal (A/C.1/667) the so-called regulation was placed first. Only after that came the limitation and reduction, and the constant stress on balanced reduction. Evidently, as far as the United States was concerned, that balance was an effort to achieve a monopolistic position.

10. Defence, as understood by the sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution was identical with the plans of the ruling circles of the United States, which were being followed by aggressive " blocs ". This was clearly proven by an article published in August 1951 in the magazine *U. S. News & World Report*.

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

11. The preamble of the three-Power proposal clearly showed that the aim was not prohibition of atomic weapons. It referred to guarantees, but the operative part did not contain any real guarantees. On the other hand, the USSR draft amendments clearly expressed the aim of the draft resolution and also marked in order of importance the various tasks and the manner in which they should be achieved.

12. The only concrete measure proposed by the three-Power draft was the establishment of a so-called disarmament commission with the task of preparing proposals for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments. The primary task, namely the prohibition of atomic weapons and, at least, a beginning of the reduction of armed forces and armaments, did not appear at all. As regards the prohibition of atomic weapons, there was the same formula used in the preamble, namely, control to ensure prohibition at some remote and hazy time. Instead of a concrete proposal for the reduction of armed forces and armaments one heard only of disclosure and verification. The three-Power draft resolution did not instruct the proposed commission to consider the prohibition of atomic weapons, but limited its activities to the so-called plan of the United Nations—the Baruch plan.

13. The Baruch plan did not provide for the prohibition of atomic weapons, but was designed to create a sort of international economic trust under the control of the United States, and it offered unlimited possibilities for the production of atomic weapons. Moreover, the intention of the Baruch plan was to infringe upon the sovereignty and independence of other States providing, as it did, for the subordination to United States control of the atomic energy trust, of industry and of the whole economy of the States concerned.

14. The disclosure and verification of all data which was expected in the three-Power draft resolution was an end in itself. As long as there was no guarantee that concrete measures would be taken, disclosure would have no reason; it would serve completely different purposes. The joint draft resolution aimed at objectives quite different from the reduction of armaments.

15. On the other hand, the Soviet amendments provided for realistic measures. Already the title of the commission was realistic and expressed the nature of its work, and its terms of reference were clear and practical. They proposed concrete measures such as the immediate declaration of an unconditional ban on atomic weapons, reduction by one-third of the armed forces of the great Powers within one year, measures for a general reduction of armed forces and armaments and for the enforcement of all these steps. In addition, the USSR amendments called for an organ of effective international control which would begin immediately its activities, including the disclosure, verification and inspection of atomic weapons.

16. Finally, concerning the functions of United Nations organs the three-Power proposal wanted the General Assembly merely to establish a commission, which would only inform the Security Council and the General Assembly, and did not give any competence to either the General Assembly or the Security Council to convene a world conference. The Soviet amendments, on the other hand, gave the General Assembly an active and important task of declaring measures of the first importance, and made provision for a draft convention which would include measures for the carrying out of tasks set by the General Assembly and which would be submitted to the Security Council. According to the USSR amendments, the General

Assembly itself would invite all States to a conference for the tasks specifically stated in the resolution. In addition, a time limit was set, directly by the General Assembly, for all these measures.

17. The three-Power draft resolution spoke of the regulation of armed forces and armaments and their limitation "to levels appropriate for defence but not for aggression". The term "defence" was used by those who carried on aggression and who pretended that they were being threatened, in order to justify their own rearmament and imperialistic policies. The representative of Czechoslovakia read excerpts from three articles published respectively in the *U.S. News & World Report* of September 1951, in *The Times* of 18 August 1951, and in the *Wall Street Journal* of 26 September 1951, to sustain her argument that Mr. Jessup's statement that the United States' effort to "restore balance" had brought comfort to people all over the world did not reflect the real situation.

18. In conclusion, Mrs. Sekaninova-Cakrtova recalled that certain delegations had spoken of the responsibility of the great Powers. The conception of the Soviet Union proposals started from the responsibility of the great Powers for the maintenance of peace. At the same time, they started with the principle of sovereign equality of all countries, large or small, thereby taking into consideration their interests and serving fully the cause of maintaining and strengthening peace.

19. Sir Benegal RAU (India) recalled that his delegation had always been an advocate of private talks between the Big Four. In this connexion his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Iraq, Pakistan and Syria (A/C.1/670).

20. As for the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/669) the representative of Egypt had expressed some doubt as to its appropriateness or relevancy.

21. Since the authors of both main proposals and everyone desired "to lift from the peoples of the world the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war, and to liberate new energies and resources for positive programmes of reconstruction and development" it would hardly seem inappropriate or irrelevant to ask each Member State specifically what it would be prepared to contribute towards the implementation of these principles.

22. Similarly, it would not be irrelevant to ask of each Member State information about the progressive reduction of its armaments and its contribution to the proposed fund. If a disarmament commission were to be set up as proposed such information as called for in the Indian draft resolution would assist the commission in the performance of its task, particularly in the formulation of general criteria and of particular plans for disarmament for each State. In case, however, no such commission were set up the information supplied would still be of assistance to the General Assembly and the Security Council for a study of the subject.

23. Finally, there was an even more fundamental reason for the submission of the Indian draft resolution. Since the world was engaged in the discussion of the limitation of armaments it would be unwise to rely exclusively on external machinery to carry out that purpose; each nation should be convinced in its own mind of the wastefulness and the futility of the armaments race.

24. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands) said that his delegation believed the proposed establishment of a sub-

committee, provided a time limit was fixed, was a wise step and that the three western Powers had been equally wise in accepting it in principle. One could only hope that the Soviet Union would do as much.

25. Several delegates had already spoken about the possible common ground that existed between the proposals of the two parties. His delegation would support any proposal which would encourage the four great Powers to renew their efforts to discover such common ground, but there did exist some fundamental differences between the two proposals.

26. One significant difference was that the three-Power proposal desired to give very wide and independent powers to the new disarmament commission, whereas the USSR proposal would leave the commission very little freedom of its own. The three-Power draft would establish a disarmament commission, under the Security Council, that would become the real workshop where the machinery for disarmament would be devised and where the blueprints would be made. In the amendments proposed by the Soviet Union, however, the disarmament commission would be instructed to draw up first of all a draft convention which would have to be submitted for the consideration of the Security Council where the exercise of the veto could hold up and frustrate everything. Moreover, the USSR draft amendments were silent about the control of atomic energy as distinct from atomic weapons. Furthermore, the information to be supplied to the international organ was to be disclosed in accordance with the international organ's own decisions. In the circumstances, this important international control organ would require definition of its composition, rights and duties in the draft convention itself, which was to be prepared by the disarmament commission. But that draft convention, as it had already been pointed out, would be subject to the veto.

27. The conference of all States as proposed by the tripartite proposals would be linked up directly with the preparatory work of the disarmament commission. In the USSR draft amendments that proposed conference seemed to be entirely unrelated to any preparatory work and would have to approach the problem of arms reduction as though nothing had happened before.

28. There had been so much talk about atomic weapons that it almost looked as though the dangers threatening from other arms could be neglected. But those who had experienced the horrors of the Second World War knew that there existed non-atomic weapons as ruthless and as horrible.

29. In conclusion, the representative of the Netherlands hoped that the efforts to find a beginning of a solution for the disarmament problem would not be frustrated again by the old and irresponsible tactics of opposing serious practical plans with high-sounding but, in fact, empty slogans.

30. Mr. MAZA (Chile) recalled that his delegation had accepted the three-Power proposals as a basis for thrusting aside the dangers of another war.

31. It had been alleged that the country producing strategic war materials drew profits from a situation where war existed or was imminent. The facts were quite different since those strategic materials continued to be subject to price control, whereas the food products needed by the country had to be imported at an even more inflated price.

32. As for the reduction of armaments he believed it more simple for a special commission to examine theoret-

ically the armaments of each country, to determine its defence needs, and, having done so, to request the country to destroy its remaining armaments. That country would then, together with other countries, meet the special commission which would then be in a position to verify if each country had left to itself the necessary armaments for its own defence. Another practical approach would be an agreement by the Powers to maintain the *status quo* in armaments and not to manufacture any new ones.

33. Turning to the proposals before the Committee, Mr. Maza observed that two principles to govern reduction had been put forward: a rapid reduction by a stated percentage and a gradual progression through systematic stages. The latter method was the more logical in any endeavour. The fact that reduction of armaments as a means of preventing war had previously been attempted without success should not be regarded as discouraging for hitherto there had not been any supervising authority. However, any agreement would fail to be effective if it were not fulfilled by all powers. Nevertheless, the possibility of evasions should not prevent them from trying to take a step forward.

34. With regard to the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/669) Mr. Maza recalled that Chile had supported a similar proposal at the fifth session and would again endorse the proposal. It was entirely in line with the proposal made only a few days before by Chile in the Second Committee for the establishment by the United Nations of a fund for the benefit of under-developed countries.<sup>1</sup> Progress towards economic stability by such measures was no less important than the building of defences. If the Committee did not consider itself competent to deal with the matter it should be forwarded to the Second Committee.

35. The Chilean delegation was in favour of the draft resolution presented by Iraq, Pakistan and Syria (A/C.1/670) but was of the opinion that the sub-committee should follow the normal pattern and be presided over by the Chairman of the First Committee rather than the President of the General Assembly. A time limit should also be set for the sub-committee's deliberations. The Chilean delegation was prepared to submit a motion in that sense.

36. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) observed that none of the other great problems before the United Nations could be fully solved until peace was assured. To that objective two roads lay open: the way of disarmament and the way of organizing defences to discourage aggression. Nations only took the latter course under the pressure of circumstances because of the onerous sacrifices involved. The better way to maintain peace was through disarmament which would put an end to the need for defensive combinations which inevitably through their armament programmes contributed to the vicious circle based upon the lack of confidence. However, if a disarmament plan did not include guarantees it would fail to restore confidence. Foolproof methods were required.

37. The three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667) offered an attractive way. It would provide guarantees during the anxious period of reduction. It also provided two important guiding principles which the proposed disarmament commission should follow in drafting a treaty, namely, the principle of balance and the principle of effective control and inspection. Armaments races began in situations of imbalance. The Soviet Union draft amendments (A/C.1/668) did not satisfy the need to achieve a balance. Moreover, a

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Second Committee, 147th meeting.*

reduction by one-third would not put an end to the danger of war and would not remove the existing disproportion which was the reason for mutual mistrust.

38. The representative of Turkey declared that effective controls were required, for no nation could rely upon promises when its existence was at stake. Controls were particularly essential in the field of atomic energy because the materials from which atomic weapons were fabricated and materials for peaceful uses of atomic energy were produced by the same processes up to the very last stages. Strict and continuous control of materials were essential to eliminate the possibility of their diversion to warlike purposes. The prohibition of atomic weapons could only be effective after controls were in operation.

39. Mr. CORDOVA (Mexico) stated that the task before the Committee was essentially that of removing mistrust and the three-Power proposal represented an advance in that direction. Their goal could only be reached through the agreement of the great Powers, but the small nations could take an active part by helping to mould the opinions of the great Powers. Disarmament differed from most of the problems before the United Nations, upon which the Organization could act directly through a majority decision, because this problem required the general and voluntary agreement of the authors of the two main proposals.

40. In the case of disarmament it was necessary to consider not only the intrinsic merits of any plan but also its capacity to lead to an agreement. Any plan would have to be acceptable to all the great Powers. It had been stated that a majority decision would serve to assign the responsibility for failure to reach agreement. However, the primary aim of the United Nations was the maintenance of peace and only if agreement was clearly impossible should the United Nations resort merely to fixing the blame. It was the duty of the smaller nations, if they wanted concrete results to be achieved, to smooth the road for the great Powers.

41. Mr. SHARETT (Israel) stated that the solution of the disarmament problem depended on the presence of a common determination to come to terms. Rearmament was at first a reflection and later a contributory agent of world tension, but the present debate assumed that it was possible to relax the general tension by an agreed system for the reduction of armaments. If the efforts were successful, the lightening of the burden borne by most nations would be most helpful and confidence would be generated for the solution of other conflicts.

42. Limited progress could be observed already. Both sides maintained objectives and principles which were identical. Nevertheless, there remained a formidable number of substantive issues on which there was disagreement. Until these issues could be dealt with there would be little benefit from the agreement on ultimate objectives. The delegation of Israel believed that it would be worthwhile exploring the possibility of a compromise or synthesis between the seemingly contradictory viewpoints.

43. The delegation of Israel was impressed by the proposal for gradual progress by stages as confidence was restored. It saw little value in passing sweeping resolutions unless there was some certainty that they would be carried out. However, it hoped that it might prove possible to suggest compromise formulations which would have some chance of mutual acceptance or at least reduce the gap between the two positions to more reasonable proportions. In any case, it would be a grave responsibility to abandon the attempt to evolve a common platform.

44. The approach proposed by India seemed inexpedient because it would relegate the question of disarmament to decentralized study by each nation and divert the attention of the General Assembly to the creation of a reconstruction and development fund. While the fund was a constructive idea, there could be little hope that it would be a worthwhile institution as long as rearmament continued.

45. The delegation of Israel supported the proposal for a sub-committee of the four great Powers. However, that course would only be useful if those Powers accepted it with sincere determination to make some initial steps towards the adoption of an agreed programme of disarmament. Even an agreed procedure for further exploration would be of great value in alleviating international tension.

46. With regard to the three-Power draft resolution, Mr. Sharett wished to comment upon the question of criteria with reference to the statement made by the representative of the United States (447th meeting). In that statement a number of factors which would have to be taken into account had been enumerated. The delegation of Israel felt it necessary to place on record its belief that an additional factor should be the state of a country's relations with its neighbours and the disposition of those neighbours towards itself.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.