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Chairman: Mr. Víctor A. BELAÚNDE (Peru).

Palestine: repatriation of Palestine refugees and payment of compensation due to them (A/1323, A/1324, A/1325, A/1326, A/1346, A/1349, A/1366, A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1, A/1367/Add.1, A/AC.38/L.30, A/AC.38/L.57) (continued)

[Item 20 (c)]*

1. Lord MACDONALD (United Kingdom) suggested that the discussions in the Committee might range through both sub-items 20 (c) of the General Assembly agenda, dealing with refugees and 20 (d) dealing with the report of the Conciliation Commission, in order to cover all the points connected with the refugee question.

2. Mr. AMMOUN (Lebanon) said that that suggestion would amount to a reversal of a decision already taken by the Committee. No new situation had arisen to justify such a step and the debate had already started. A draft resolution submitted by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (A/AC.38/L.57) certainly included sub-items (c) and (d), but that part amounted to no more than an opinion by the representatives of those four countries, and did not constitute a new factor in the case. The Arab States had wanted sub-item (c) to be discussed separately, and not to be combined with other sub-items connected with Palestine, because they felt that it was a separate question.

3. Sub-item (d) was a political question while sub-item (c) was legal and involved rights which should be implemented. By adopting resolution 194 (III) on 11 December 1948 the General Assembly had already recognized those rights, and all that remained to be done was to implement the resolution.

4. The remaining points connected with Palestine would have to be made the subject of negotiations for

peaceful settlement, and would affect both the Arab States and Israel, while sub-item (c) referred to the repatriation of the refugees and therefore concerned only those refugees and Israel. The Arab States were, of course, concerned with the problem of refugees, but negotiation for a peaceful settlement of the problem was another matter, with political implications, and for that reason should be studied separately. It was important that the refugees should be relieved from their sufferings as soon as possible.

5. For those reasons his delegation did not consider that the Committee should change its procedure.

6. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) expressed surprise at the United Kingdom representative's proposal. He had little to add to the remarks made by the representative of Lebanon; like him, he felt that the two sub-items (c) and (d) were quite distinct. Sub-item (c) was concerned solely with human rights and not with politics. It dealt with the right of human beings to live in their homes or to return to those homes, which had already been recognized in the Charter, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by the Committee itself. It was for the Committee to see that human rights were respected, and to provide for implementation of the resolution adopted on the subject in 1948. He saw no reason to complicate the question by adding matters which were purely political. The matter under discussion concerned persons who were natives of Palestine, and any conciliation to be brought about between the Arab States and the Jews was an entirely different subject.

7. He joined the representative of Lebanon in opposing any attempt to combine that item with others having a political implication.

8. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) pointed out that the question under discussion was not, as it might at first appear, entirely procedural. It had come before the Committee three times already, and the decision had

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

been taken to discuss sub-item (c) as it had been transmitted by the General Assembly. It seemed hardly consistent with good procedure to return so often to the item.

9. There were certain relevant facts to which he wished to draw the Committee's attention. First, the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1, A/1367/Add.1) should not have been submitted to the General Assembly, since under the terms of the resolution of 11 December 1948, paragraph 13, the reports of the Commission were to be rendered to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations. By devious routes, however, the report had reached the Committee and was now on its agenda under item 20 (d).

10. There were two reports, one dated 22 September 1950 (A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1) and the other 24 October 1950 (A/1367/Add.1). The first was a statement of facts, and the information it contained might be of some use in the discussion of the question of refugees; the supplementary report, forwarded later to the Committee, was of a different nature. It contained recommendations on questions of peace and other subjects. As the Security Council still had the item on its agenda, the General Assembly was not really ready under the Charter to consider the question.

11. However, the decision to consider the two sub-items (c) and (d) separately had been made by the General Assembly, and if the Committee were to decide to consider them simultaneously, it would amount to a reversal of the General Assembly's decision. It would be in the interest of the Committee's work to keep to the procedure laid down by the General Assembly.

12. The question was raised with suspicious frequency every time an item concerning Palestine was placed on the agenda, and it would appear that certain delegations were seeking to serve other than procedural ends by raising it. The right of the Palestine refugees to return to their homes had already been sanctioned by the General Assembly, and it should be implemented. If it were to be made dependent upon negotiations and peace, it would mean that it would depend directly upon the acceptance of the Jewish authorities. That might be considered a practical way to solve the problem, but he wished to assure the Committee that it was most impractical and dangerous. The combination of the two agenda items might prove to be a misuse of United Nations authority.

13. The fact that the United Nations Conciliation Commission had dealt with the refugee problem did not make it necessary to combine sub-items (c) and (d). It was possible to consider the information submitted by the members of the Conciliation Commission in their report when discussing sub-item (c), but it must be remembered that the members of the Commission were representing the views of their governments and were not acting according to their personal feelings. The Conciliation Commission had been in existence for approximately two years, and no refugees had yet been repatriated nor had any compensation been made to them. There was no clear proof that there was no intention of destroying the right of the refugees to both repatriation and compensation. In the circumstances,

his delegation had been moved to suggest the consideration of sub-item (c). Negotiations must depend upon the circumstances, and it was for the Arab States to decide whether they were prepared to negotiate.

14. If the two questions were to be combined, a new item would be created, very different from either of the original two sub-items. That would indirectly result in the destruction of the right of individual governments to submit items for the agenda of the General Assembly. He appealed to representatives who wanted to combine the two sub-items not to persist in their intention, but to allow the Committee to proceed to discuss them separately. He did not want the impression to be given that the United Nations was prepared to ignore questions of substance and of right.

15. Mr. DEJANY (Saudi Arabia) said that he would confine himself to a few points of a purely procedural nature.

16. He drew the Committee's attention to the decisions previously taken (24th and 31st meetings) concerning sub-items (b) and (c), and suggested that chapter III of the Conciliation Commission's report, dealing with refugees, should be included in the discussion on sub-item (c) so that the subject of refugees need not be reintroduced at the time of discussion of the Commission's report under sub-item (d).

17. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would take the chapter on refugees in the report into consideration with sub-item (c), in order not to repeat the question when sub-item (d) was discussed.

18. Mr. ROSS (United States of America) said that he wished to avoid dealing with the substance of the matters under discussion.

19. His delegation would find it difficult to deal with sub-item (c) without at the same time discussing what it considered to be related aspects of the sub-item. The Egyptian draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.30) itself referred to the consolidation of peace and stability and quoted the first part of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). The last part of that paragraph dealt with the responsibilities of the Conciliation Commission with reference to the two aspects of the refugee question referred to in the Egyptian draft resolution.

20. He was sure that it was not the intention of his own or any of the other delegations sponsoring the draft resolution submitted on the previous day (A/AC.38/L.57) to deny the representatives of the Arab States full opportunity to state their views and to support the draft resolution submitted by the Egyptian delegation. He hoped, on the other hand, that they would not wish to deny any members of the Committee the opportunity to discuss the Egyptian draft resolution and sub-item (c) on the agenda in the light of factors which they considered to be pertinent to the solution of those particular problems.

21. He wondered whether the Committee had not allowed itself to become involved in a purely formalistic discussion, and whether it would not be more appropriate to proceed with the debate without imposing limitations on delegations, one way or the other. His delegation felt, and he thought that the other co-sponsors of the resolution also felt, that the question might be dealt with most effectively by not closing their minds to

either view, but rather by trying to reconcile opposing views.

22. The draft resolution of which his delegation was a co-sponsor had been felt to be pertinent to both sub-items (c) and (d). His delegation and the co-sponsors of the draft resolution had statements to make on the question, and he had no doubt that the representatives of the Arab States also wished to make statements on sub-item (c). He wondered if they could not simply proceed to the business at hand.

23. Mr. NAUDY (France) assured the delegations of the Arab States that he fully understood the concern they had expressed regarding the procedure for dealing with the question of repatriation and compensation for the refugees. On the other hand, even if sub-items (c) and (d) were considered simultaneously, the right of repatriation would in no way be jeopardized. In the interest of a clearer and more fruitful debate, the French delegation supported the position outlined by the United Kingdom. It had no objection, however, to following the conciliatory suggestion made by the United States representative.

24. Mr. VOYNA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) observed that there was no need to lose time in discussing a problem which had already been solved. It had been decided, and the *Journal* clearly indicated that fact, that all delegations should be prepared to discuss sub-item (c) at that meeting. The United Kingdom proposal to consider sub-items (c) and (d) together would not expedite the Committee's work. The matters not included in sub-item (c) should be dealt with separately and the debate on sub-item (c) should proceed immediately.

25. Mr. MORA (Uruguay) pointed out that the report of the Conciliation Commission clearly recognized the over-riding importance of the problem of repatriation and compensation of the refugees in any efforts to restore peace and stability based on normal relations between the States concerned. In its supplementary report (A/1367/Add.1) the Commission emphasized that of all the problems involved, the refugee question was the one demanding the most urgent solution. It concluded that, within the framework of negotiations between the parties to settle all questions outstanding between them, the refugee question should be given priority of consideration, as indicated in paragraph 11 of the supplementary report. In the circumstances, the United Kingdom representative had stated the problem well: sub-items (c) and (d) should be considered jointly to avoid having to repeat the discussion of the refugee question in connexion with the examination of the Commission's report.

26. Lord MACDONALD (United Kingdom) explained that he had raised the question of procedure in an effort to be fair to all parties concerned. He had been somewhat dismayed by the suspicious attitude of the Arab delegations; it would not help to solve any problems and he hoped it would not be maintained. He had no fundamental objection to considering sub-items (c) and (d) separately; he had merely considered that it would expedite matters to deal with them jointly and the United Kingdom had done so in the draft resolution of which it was one of the authors (A/AC.38/L.57). In the United Kingdom's opinion,

it would be a mistake to insist on discussing sub-item (c) alone. As the United States representative had suggested, the discussion should be as wide as possible, and, if the question of procedure arose again, it should be dealt with at that time.

27. Mr. BIRGI (Turkey) also supported the United States suggestion. As a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, he wished to associate his delegation with that of France in assuring the Arab delegations that the proposal for joint consideration of sub-items (c) and (d) had in no way been intended to cast doubt upon the meaning and force of the General Assembly's earlier decisions regarding the Arab refugees.

28. Lord MACDONALD (United Kingdom) expressed appreciation of the compromise proposal of the Saudi Arabian representative and hoped that he would agree that the concluding paragraphs of the Conciliation Commission's supplementary report could also be discussed in connexion with the refugees. The remarks in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the supplementary report were in fact entirely within the scope of the refugee question.

29. Mr. DEJANY (Saudi Arabia) could not agree to include those paragraphs in the discussion: they summarized the general conclusions of the Conciliation Commission and did not refer exclusively to the refugee problem. His compromise suggestion did not extend to the isolated references to the refugees made in connexion with the broader questions dealt with by the Commission and should not be used as an opening wedge to enter into consideration of the whole of its report. His proposal should not be widened; it called for consideration of only one chapter of the Commission's report: chapter III, devoted to the refugee problem.

30. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq), reverting to the United Kingdom representative's remarks about the suspicions of the Arab delegations, pointed out that the history of the Palestine question gave serious grounds for suspicion on their part. It was to be hoped that the actions of the General Assembly would dispel that suspicion.

31. Mr. McINTYRE (Australia) felt that the procedural discussion in which the Committee had engaged was somewhat academic: he failed to see how, if the two draft resolutions (A/AC.38/L.30 and A/AC.38/L.57) were to be considered under sub-item (c), it could avoid dealing to some extent, at least, with the Conciliation Commission's report. Obviously, the joint draft resolution introduced by the United Kingdom dealt directly with matters raised in the report and many delegations would wish to comment upon it, as well as upon the Egyptian draft resolution.

32. Australia was anxious to see a real solution of the problem in the interests of the refugees themselves and of the area as a whole. It would therefore have preferred that sub-items (c) and (d) should be considered together. The only course open to the Committee, however, was to adopt the United States suggestion and proceed with the debate, dealing later with any procedural difficulties that might arise.

33. Mr. SHARETT (Israel) said that, notwithstanding the arguments of formal logic adduced against that procedure, plain common sense demanded that sub-

items (c) and (d) should be discussed together if the discussion was to be fruitful and constructive. Experience had clearly proved to the parties directly concerned that their conflicting views could be resolved only by reference to the global problem and not to any single aspect or individual right. The organic unity of the problem should not be destroyed or distorted by creating an artificial separation between its various aspects and by removing certain items from the general context and dealing with them separately. He feared that some harm had already been done when the Committee discussed and disposed of sub-item (b), concerning the relief and works programme, instead of considering it as part of the whole Palestine problem.

34. Both draft resolutions before the Committee, the Egyptian draft submitted under sub-item (c) as well as the joint draft submitted under sub-items (c) and (d), invoked the basic General Assembly resolution 194 (III). That resolution did not deal separately with the refugee problem, as distinct from the negotiations regarding all questions outstanding between the parties concerned. It did not indicate that repatriation was the sole solution of the refugee problem; the delegation of Israel would comment at a later stage on the practicability of that solution. The various means of settling the refugee problem must be taken together. The approach of the Arab States had proved obstructive in the past and the Saudi Arabian suggestion clearly did not represent a compromise: instead of restoring the organic unity of the Palestine question, it removed the refugee problem from its context. The Conciliation Commission, on the other hand, while it accorded a central position and primary importance to that problem, dealt with it as part of the whole question. He would like to associate himself with the original proposal of the United Kingdom.

35. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) felt that the remarks of the representative of Israel increased the need for the Committee to realize quite clearly how it would proceed with its work. The representative of Israel assumed that the question was global and that all its component parts were inseparable. In that case, the Jerusalem question should also be dealt with, as it was closely related to the refugee problem, more than 100,000 refugees having fled from that city. Moreover, Syria could not accept Mr. Sharett's interpretation of resolution 194 (III).

36. The discussion should be confined to sub-item (c). If the question of procedure should arise again, it would have to be decided at that point.

37. Mr. ROSS (United States of America) desired to clarify the divergence of opinion in the Committee. The United States considered the Conciliation Commission's supplementary report essential in the discussion of sub-item (c). Saudi Arabia would accept only chapter III of the Commission's progress report for consideration. In actual fact, the United States approach to both sub-items (c) and (d), whether discussed jointly or separately, was to be found in the joint draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.57).

38. He appealed to all the parties directly concerned to leave aside the procedural discussion, which had in fact become largely substantive, and to proceed with the business of the meeting.

39. The CHAIRMAN reiterated that appeal and suggested that the work should proceed along the lines of the Saudi Arabian proposal. Discussion would be confined to sub-item (c) and those references in the Conciliation Commission's report dealing with refugees. If any other references to the Commission's reports were made that were not considered pertinent, objections could be raised to them and dealt with at that time.

It was so agreed.

40. Lord MACDONALD (United Kingdom) stated that the Egyptian draft resolution, with its exclusive reference to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), failed to recognize the fact that that resolution must to some extent at least be read as a whole and that those parts of it dealing with the refugee question could not be entirely detached from their context. Moreover, paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) assigned certain specific tasks to the Conciliation Commission in connexion with the refugee problem. The concluding paragraphs of the supplementary report of the Conciliation Commission of 23 October 1950 made detailed recommendations regarding all aspects of the refugee problem, which should be considered in any draft resolution before the Committee.

41. The United Kingdom delegation, which considered that there could be no question of the right of refugees to return to their homes if they wished to do so, welcomed the statement in paragraph 9 of the Conciliation Commission's supplementary report that that body had always been guided by that principle, as contained in resolution 194 (III). The United Kingdom had, however, given serious consideration to the Commission's statement that, having in mind the best interests of the refugees, attention should in future be given to the resettlement of non-returning refugees in the Arab countries, with payment of compensation to them. It was doubtful whether it was in the interest of the refugees themselves to return *en masse*. It was questionable whether the refugees fully appreciated the conditions to which they would return and the implications of their return. Were they aware that they must be prepared to live as peaceful citizens of Israel, accepting all the obligations of citizenship? There was a grave danger that the legacy of mistrust and bitterness would make the task of mutual adjustment of populations extremely difficult. Moreover, it was probable that the Arabs of Palestine would have great difficulty in adjusting to the very highly organized economic structure of Israel, which ran counter to the economic outlook of the Arabs. It was unlikely that an Arab would wholeheartedly accept the regime of austerity, directed toward the achievement of goals for which at the best he had no enthusiasm and which might well arouse his active resentment. In the circumstances, it was the considered view of the United Kingdom delegation that the Arab refugees would have a happier and more stable future if the bulk of them were resettled in the Arab countries. A corollary was that non-returning refugees should as a matter of right receive early and adequate compensation for the property they had abandoned in Israel.

42. The draft resolution of which the United Kingdom was a co-sponsor gave special attention to the question of compensation, in the hope that concrete steps could be taken toward its payment as a result of the work of

the Committee of Experts being established by the Conciliation Commission. It was to be hoped that the studies of that Committee would make it possible to establish machinery for the payment of compensation and the utilization of funds so obtained in the re-integration of the refugees.

43. The United Kingdom delegation had noted with interest the constructive suggestion of the representative of Israel that compensation should be paid into the reintegration fund (35th meeting). It hoped that any funds paid in compensation would be devoted to the reintegration of refugees, but felt that the precise procedure should be considered by the Committee of Experts.

44. With regard to the proposal in the Egyptian draft resolution to set up a special agency to deal with the repatriation of refugees and the payment of compensation to them, the United Kingdom delegation did not consider it desirable or necessary to create a third United Nations body dealing with Palestine, in addition to the Conciliation Commission and the Relief and Works Agency. The latter, if properly financed, was perfectly competent to undertake the technical aspects of the problem of reintegration, which covered both repatriation and resettlement. The draft resolution co-sponsored by the United Kingdom recognized that special consideration was needed in the urgent and complex refugee question, and provided for the establishment by the Conciliation Commission of a special Office to work out such arrangements as might be practicable.

45. Operative paragraph 1 of that draft resolution urged the parties concerned to engage in direct discussions with a view to a final settlement of all outstanding questions between them, in accordance with the recommendation made in paragraph 11 of the supplementary report of the Conciliation Commission, a body charged by the United Nations with the task of resolving the Palestine conflict.

46. Referring to the question of finance, and to the fact that the international community had contributed to the upkeep of refugees in the hope of finding a means for securing their permanent reintegration, he stated that the time might soon come when Members of the United Nations would, because of other financial burdens, find it difficult if not impossible to provide further funds for relief, although he had no doubt that many governments would be prepared to make a supreme effort to contribute to a scheme providing for the permanent reintegration of the refugees.

47. Co-operation by the governments concerned in carrying out the four-Power draft resolution, and the resolution which had recently been adopted in connexion with the Relief and Works Agency (A/AC.38/L.52) would represent a substantial step towards a solution of all the problems outstanding between Israel and its neighbours, and, in particular, towards the re-establishment of the refugees as peaceful and prosperous members of the communities of the Middle East and toward the promotion of peace.

48. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) stated that he would not at that stage consider the four-Power draft resolution, which, in his opinion, did not fall under sub-item (c), but reserved the right to consider it subsequently.

49. The action taken by the United Nations in connexion with Palestine in the last three years was perplexing and paradoxical. On the one hand, the Organization preached and defended human rights, and on the other hand it tolerated and admitted to membership the very people who flagrantly violated human rights and defied the principles and decisions of the United Nations. The Arabs of Palestine had lived in their own homes in Palestine for at least fourteen centuries without any infringement or denial of their right to remain in their homes. Yet now, under the auspices of the United Nations, nearly a million Palestine Arabs, Moslem and Christian, were homeless and displaced, in a state of misery and destitution, because of the ill-fated United Nations resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 to partition Palestine.

50. Unless the world and the United Nations in particular adhered to fundamental moral and human principles instead of to expediency and power politics, modern civilization was doomed and peace and harmony could never be achieved. It was very easy to sacrifice moral principles and human rights to expediency and *fait accompli* and to distort moral principles so that the aggressor appeared to be right and his victim wrong. Highly organized propaganda could mislead world opinion and make falsehood appear true. Truth and justice would, however, prevail. In order to achieve the noble purposes of the Charter, the United Nations must resist power politics, political propaganda and pressure, and seek truth and justice objectively without being swayed by considerations of expediency.

51. The Jewish argument that the exodus of Arab refugees was caused by the invasion of Palestine by Arab States must be exploded and the truth made known. Jewish atrocities, committed by the Irgun and the Stern gang had been inflicted on innocent Arabs long before the Arab States came to the rescue of their brethren in Palestine. Atrocities such as Deir Yasin and many others had terrified Arab inhabitants and forced them to flee from the country even before the United Kingdom had terminated its Mandate. About 300,000 Arabs had left their homes in Palestine before the Arab States came to the assistance of their brethren. Moreover, thousands of Arabs had been evicted from their homes in 1950. Instead of implementing General Assembly resolution 194 (III), facilitating the repatriation of refugees, the Jews had created more refugees since the end of the war in Palestine, particularly during the current year. About a hundred Arabs who had attempted to return to their homes had been brutally treated by the Jews and turned back in mutilated condition to find their way back to Jordan if they could. The Zionists could not disclaim responsibility for the status of the refugees when there were elements among them which had mastered Nazi technique and brutality.

52. The right of the Arabs in Palestine to return to their own homes, a fundamental and universally accepted right, could not be restricted by the United Nations. Even the Balfour Declaration, the starting point of all evil in Palestine, had never denied the civic and religious rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. The League of Nations Mandate had stipulated that the Jewish National Home in Palestine should in no way prejudice the right of the non-Jewish inhabitants to their lands. The United Nations Charter and the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized the right of each people to its own country and its right to live in its own home in peace and freedom. General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 had certainly not intended to deny the Arabs the right to their own homes in Palestine. Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 clearly stipulated that those Arabs wishing to return to their homes could do so, and that those who chose not to return were to receive compensation.

53. Arab rights in Palestine preceded and antedated the creation of the Jewish State and that State could not violate or deny Arabs rights to their own homes. The establishment of the Jewish State was intended by the United Nations to supplement rather than supplant Arab rights in Palestine. The position taken by Mr. Eban on 7 November 1950 (36th meeting) that the immigration policy of his government was a matter of internal jurisdiction in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, was indefensible when it was considered that the human rights of the Arabs of Palestine were violated and jeopardized by Jewish immigration. Internal jurisdiction should never be permitted to violate the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

54. Mr. Eban had stated that his government admitted people who wished to become citizens of Israel because their culture, religion, outlook and aspirations were "fully in tune with the aspirations of the country as a whole". Denial of the right of Arabs of Palestine to return to their homes because their culture, their religion and their outlook were not Jewish constituted discrimination, in violation of the principles of the Charter. The attitude of the Jewish authorities toward the natural right of the Arabs to their own homes was aggressive and reminiscent of Nazi ideology. Eviction of a people, occupation of their homes and preventing their return obviously constituted aggression. There could be no peace in Palestine and the Middle East until elementary human rights were recognized and unless aggression was stopped. The Arabs of Palestine were entitled to their homes and would never give them up regardless of the suffering and sacrifices involved. No solution and no resolution failing to recognize that fundamental fact could ever lead to peace and stability in the Middle East. A letter recently received from representatives of refugees in Lebanon stressed the desperate situation of the Arabs and indicated that, unless the General Assembly's decisions were implemented, the pressure of circumstances might force refugees to resort to all available methods to realize their legitimate demands, regardless of the consequences. If that should prove necessary, the United Nations would be considered responsible.

55. The question would, however, never be settled so long as the Jews were unwilling to yield to Arab rights. The Jews, if left to pursue their expanding ambitions and aggressive designs, would never yield any rights whatever to the Arabs. The history of their growing ambitions in the Middle East, and the various stages of a spiritual home in Palestine, a National Home, a Jewish State, with later expansion beyond the limits set by the United Nations in its resolution 181 (II)

and the entry into territories outside of Palestine, proved that the Jews, unchecked, absorbing unlimited numbers of immigrants into a very small area, would one day attack the Arab world outside Palestine. The Jewish position would not lead to peace, and the United Nations must see to it that Jewish ambitions were checked and the rights of the Arabs in Palestine recognized.

56. The CHAIRMAN appealed to the representative of Iraq to avoid any expressions that might lead to an acrimonious discussion.

57. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) stated that he was trying to present the facts, as he saw them, as sincerely and frankly as he could. The future course of events in the United Nations depended not only on the Organization but on the great Powers within the United Nations. So long as Zionist pressure could, through highly organized propaganda machinery, influence United States policy and lead distinguished American statesmen to make remarks derogatory to the Arab world, the Arabs of Palestine could not expect impartiality and objectivity. The Zionist propaganda argument that the Jewish State existed not alone for its own sake but to raise the standard of living of the Arab populations of the Near East led the Arabs to consider the American people and others, who had been misled by Jewish propaganda, as imperialists in the Middle East, since denial of the right of refugees to return to their own homes and live in peace constituted colonialism. It was to be hoped that American and other Powers would realize that great harm was being done to United Nations prestige in the Middle East thereby.

58. Fortunately, there were indications that the United States was awakening to the realization that dollar contributions to the Zionists were contributions to the homelessness of one million Arab refugees, and were sowing the seeds of war and unrest in the Middle East. Unless the great Powers were freed from Jewish pressure and Jewish influence, the United Nations could not implement its decisions and the refugees would continue to suffer for many years to come.

59. The United Nations must apply uniform and universal standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms everywhere in the world. The Jews must abandon the militant attitude derived from Nazi Germany, cease their persecution of the Arab refugees, recognize Arab rights in Palestine, abandon their aggressive designs and learn to live with other people. The best proof of the sincerity and peaceful intentions of the Jews would be the recognition of the rights of Arab refugees to return to their homes in Palestine.

60. The United Nations, however, must not wait for the Jews to change their position but must make its decisions in the light of the principles of the Charter and use its moral and material weight to ensure implementation of those decisions. Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 calling for the repatriation of refugees and the compensation of those who did not choose to return must be implemented in the interests of peace and justice.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.