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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAÚNDE (Peru).

Palestine: repatriation of Palestine refugees and payment of compensation due to them (A/1323, A/1324, A/1325, A/1326, A/1346, A/1349, A/1366, A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1, A/1367/Add.1, A/AC.38/30/Rev.1, A/AC.38/L.57, A/AC.38/L.60, A/AC.38/L.61, A/AC.38/L.62, A/AC.38/L.64); report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1, A/1367/Add.1, A/AC.38/L.65, A/AC.38/L.66) (*concluded*)

[Agenda item 20 (c) and (d)]*

1. Mr. PISEK (Czechoslovakia) said that the debate had revealed the complexity of the question and the need to solve the basic problem underlying that and allied questions. That could not be done until good-neighbourly relations were re-established between the parties concerned. The establishment of special bodies or the passing of vague resolutions would be useless.

2. The general report of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/1367, A/1367/Corr. 1) and the supplementary report (A/1367/Add.1), together with the discussion which had taken place, revealed that the approach to the problem had been wrong. No grounds for direct negotiations between the parties had been found, and the supplementary report mentioned an increasing number of incidents. During the past few weeks complaints had been submitted to the Security Council on the subject of Egypt, Israel and Jordan.¹

3. The Commission had failed to acquit itself of its task, the Lausanne Protocol (A/1367, chapter I, para. 12) had not been implemented, and neither the refugee nor other allied problems had been solved. The facts had been confirmed by several speakers in the debate.

4. The continued existence of the Commission would appear to be not only useless but even harmful. The USSR delegation had already pointed out (71st meeting) that the Commission was being used for purposes other than those for which it was intended. There were too many commissions and other bodies being set up by the United Nations. Their record was not good, and the results obtained only diminished the authority of the United Nations itself, which should not be turned into a collection of different commissions. The continued existence of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unnecessary, and he would therefore support the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.66) proposing its termination. During the two years of its existence, it had cost \$1,800,000 and a better use could be found for such sums. He could not vote in favour of any suggestions which ran counter to the realities revealed in the debate, and he hoped that no more such organs would be established.

5. Mr. SHARETT (Israel) said that he would like to refer to some of the Bolivian representative's comments (71st meeting). He had been impressed by the latter's sincerity and he was anxious to make him understand exactly why he himself was critical of the Chinese amendment (A/AC.38/L.64).

6. General Assembly resolution 194 (III) had been so ambiguously worded that it could be interpreted as not meaning that governments should enter into direct negotiations with one another, and that ambiguity had been used as an excuse for refusing negotiations. It was clear from the Conciliation Commission's report and from the conclusion expressed in paragraph 11 of the supplementary report, that the Commission had thought direct negotiation the only means of reaching a solution and accordingly recommended that course. The Chinese amendment would provide another excuse for avoiding direct negotiation. As it provided alternative methods, it

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

¹ See documents S/1790, S/1794, S/1824.

might well be that a deadlock would result if the parties chose different alternatives. He recommended that point to the Bolivian representative.

7. He would ask Mr. Palmer, Acting Chairman of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, how far the Commission's experience would lend support to the Chinese amendment. It was very important to ascertain the Commission's attitude because he fully agreed with the Bolivian representative as to its devotion and competence.

8. Mr. PALMER (Acting Chairman of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine) said that he would like to express his appreciation of the tributes paid to the Commission in the Committee. It was difficult for him to answer specific questions because it was important to retain the confidence of all parties.

9. In preparing the report the Commission had had in mind the possibility of some resolution which might give it new tools with which to work.

10. In reply to the Israel representative's question, he read paragraph 11 of the Commission's supplementary report (A/1367/Add.1) and a paragraph from the statement of the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission which had been read to the Committee at the 70th meeting by the Commission's principal secretary (A/AC.38/L.65). He noted that the phrase "without delay" had been omitted from the latter paragraph, but thought that was relatively unimportant. Negotiations could not take place until the atmosphere had improved. He hoped that it would be possible to create an atmosphere favourable to negotiations through the attention that would be given to the refugee question by the office referred to in the four-Power draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.57). Without the co-operation of the Arab States and of Israel, which he believed would be forthcoming, nothing would be possible. He thought the Commission might be able to assist the parties in initiating direct negotiations by drawing up an agenda in consultation with them to serve as a basis for such direct negotiations. While not wishing to comment directly on the Chinese amendment, he felt sure that the Committee would understand that the Commission had not changed its views as to the desirability of direct negotiations.

11. Mr. NAUDY (France), said that the Conciliation Commission's report and the debate in the Committee had made it possible to estimate the difficulty of settling the various issues involved in the Palestine problem. A remedy must be found, however. The uncertainty of the position must have a bad effect on the parties concerned and on the whole region concerned, thus increasing the tension existing throughout the world.

12. The Conciliation Commission's recommendations were really concrete proposals for a settlement of the problem, and the United Nations should prescribe measures to implement them. Among such measures, the agency to be set up under the four-Power draft resolution would appear useful. Conversations between the parties concerned would also probably be useful, and that was why the French delegation had been a co-sponsor of the four-Power draft resolution.

13. Of the draft resolutions before the Committee, those submitted by Egypt (A/AC.38/L.30/Rev.1), Ethiopia and Pakistan (A/AC.38/L.62), and Israel

(A/AC.38/L.60), would result in restricting the scope of the Conciliation Commission. Another, the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.66), was based on premises bearing very little relation to the facts laid before the Committee.

14. The Chinese amendment to the four-Power draft resolution had merit, and the efforts of the Chinese delegation to achieve a compromise were praiseworthy. The four-Power draft resolution as it stood, however, was better suited to the case.

15. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines) said that he wished to explain how his delegation would vote on the various draft resolutions.

16. The Arab States had insisted that the refugee question should be discussed apart from the general question of peace and conciliation in Palestine. The opposing view was that the refugee question, being an integral part of the whole Palestine problem, could not profitably be discussed separately.

17. He agreed that the Arab refugees' right to return to their homes was a basic human right recognized by the General Assembly, which had thus become responsible for seeing that the right was implemented. It should not be made dependent on negotiations between the parties concerned, and, although it was admittedly part of the general problem, its solution could not be made contingent upon the settlement of larger issues. At the same time he did not feel that a resolution on the subject should make no reference at all to negotiation.

18. Earlier that day his delegation had introduced two amendments (A/AC.38/L.67) to the four-Power draft resolution with the purpose of maintaining the refugee question as a separate item.

19. The first amendment provided that the following text should be substituted for the text of sub-paragraph (a) of the third paragraph of the preamble:

"(a) That agreement has not been reached between the parties on the final settlement of the refugee question and other questions outstanding between them,".

20. The second amendment provided that the following text should be substituted for operative paragraph 1:

"1. Urges the governments concerned to engage without delay in direct discussions under the auspices of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, or independently, in order to arrive at a peaceful and satisfactory settlement of the refugee question and of other questions outstanding between them;"

21. The third paragraph of the preamble and operative paragraph 1 did not necessarily deny the separate nature of the refugee question, but the Philippine amendments had been intended as a compromise formula. Since then, however, the Philippine delegation had come to the conclusion that they would not serve that purpose, and it proposed to withdraw them.

22. If the four-Power draft resolution were rejected, his delegation would vote for the draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and Pakistan. It would vote against the draft resolutions submitted respectively by Egypt and Israel because it did not feel that the General Assembly could proceed along the lines therein indicated.

23. He concluded by appealing to both parties to make a fresh attempt to reach a peaceful settlement. The two positions adopted appeared to be irreconcilable only on the surface, and he agreed with Mr. Palmer that good will, good faith and confidence between the parties would do much to heal the breach.

24. Lord MacDONALD (United Kingdom) noted with satisfaction that there had been a definite and encouraging improvement in the atmosphere in the Committee.

25. With reference to the Chinese and Philippine amendments, the United Kingdom could not accept either. The Chinese amendment proposed continuation of a policy which the experience of two years had proved not very successful. The Philippine amendment, he was pleased to note, had just been withdrawn. He appealed to the Arab delegations to accept direct negotiations. They could gain more through direct negotiations than through indirect discussions or no discussions at all.

26. The four-Power draft resolution provided all that was necessary for the continued attempt to settle a very complex and difficult problem.

27. It was most unfair for the USSR representative to place all the blame on the Conciliation Commission, which had had to work under impossible conditions and certainly bore no responsibility for the failure to effect a settlement. He wondered whether the USSR representative was at all interested in conciliation machinery or in fomenting trouble in different parts of the world.

28. Mr. BIRGI (Turkey) considered it unnecessary to restate the reasons for which he would support only the four-Power draft resolution. Although the Chinese amendment to that draft resolution provided for direct negotiations, it failed to stress the point to the same extent as operative paragraph 1 of the four-Power text, which had the added advantage of providing the necessary elasticity. While he appreciated the motives which had led to the submission of the Chinese amendment, he would vote against it. If, however, a majority of the Committee favoured the Chinese amendment, he would still be prepared to support the draft resolution as a whole.

29. The three draft resolutions submitted by Egypt, Israel, and Ethiopia and Pakistan contained acceptable clauses, but as a whole they represented extreme views which were incompatible with the spirit of the four-Power draft resolution. He would therefore be unable to vote for any of them.

30. The USSR draft resolution was based on the premise that the Conciliation Commission had failed to make any progress and should therefore be discontinued. He believed, however, that the Conciliation Commission had done useful work in the matter of blocked accounts. It had also acquired useful experience in various aspects of the problem, which might be valuable in the future. Moreover, it was unlikely that a situation which had not improved in the two years of the Conciliation Commission's existence would improve if that body were dissolved. He would therefore vote against the USSR draft resolution.

31. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) stated that the satisfactory and clear answers given by the Acting Chairman of the Conciliation Commission showed that negotia-

tions could not be undertaken without adequate preparation. Operative paragraph 1 of the four-Power draft resolution called upon all the governments concerned to enter without delay into negotiations on all questions outstanding between them. The questions were not enumerated and the object of the proposed negotiations was extremely vague. Moreover, the basis for negotiations was not established. In the past, reasons other than the method of action had accounted for the difficulty in reaching agreement on the basis for negotiation.

32. The Chinese amendment was a substantial improvement over the text of the four-Power draft resolution, since it provided for both direct and indirect negotiations. If it was accepted, there would be no further substantial difference between the four-Power draft resolution and the other draft resolutions before the Committee. Adoption of the Chinese amendment would gain the support of the great majority of the Committee for the four-Power draft resolution, and would thus contribute towards the solution of the problem.

33. Referring to the United Kingdom representative's remarks, he noted that, if there were to be no indirect negotiations, the Conciliation Commission might have little to do. It might therefore be better not to exclude that type of activity.

34. Although in some respects the Conciliation Commission might have done much more, it should be given a further opportunity to proceed to achieve a peaceful settlement based on principles of justice and international law. The Syrian delegation was therefore unable to support the USSR draft resolution.

35. Mr. FIGUEROA (Chile) said that in Chile a very large Arab colony and a very large Jewish colony lived peaceably together. It was therefore in a position to consider the problem objectively. The problem of the Arab refugees had many aspects: it was a humanitarian problem, a political problem, and a problem involving principles and realities. All those aspects were important, and none should be disregarded if an adequate solution was to be found.

36. The humanitarian aspect of a problem involving hundreds of thousands of refugees and including 400,000 children was beyond dispute. In discussion of political considerations, it should be remembered that a United Nations resolution, General Assembly resolution 181 (II), had established the State of Israel, and that that resolution had been upheld by force of arms. It must also be taken into consideration that the Arabs had lived in Palestine for 2,000 years and that the statement of Israel that it could not admit so large a number of refugees into its territory must be viewed in conjunction with the fact that that State was admitting about 800 Jewish refugees daily. If it was logical for the United Nations to have recognized the right of the refugees to return to their homes, it was equally logical to expect Israel to make room for them.

37. The refugee problem could not be regarded separately because it was closely linked with other problems, but it was of particular importance and urgency. If simultaneous consideration of all aspects of the whole problem was pressed, a vicious cycle would be created and increased hatred would be engendered. If the refugee problem was approached in a spirit of good will, settlement of the other problems outstanding

would be greatly facilitated. On the other hand, the other problems could hardly be settled satisfactorily if the refugee problem remained.

38. She could not agree that it was impossible for groups of different race or religion to live together in peace. Nor could she accept the view that it would be better for the refugees not to return to their homes; peace and well-being were possible only when the individual lived in his own home in his own country. Repatriation, however, was not the only element necessary to effect a solution. Responsibility rested with both sides, and their co-operation was necessary if the international community was to contribute to the economic solution. It was significant that Israel said it could not accept any refugees who desired repatriation while Syria and Jordan were prepared to resettle a given number of refugees.

39. In the light of all those considerations, the Chilean delegation was of the opinion that the problem of the refugees should be solved in a spirit of good will, as a practical basis for solution of related problems. The draft resolutions before the Committee failed to strike a proper balance between the refugee problem and other problems outstanding. Both the Egyptian draft resolution and the joint draft resolution of Ethiopia and Pakistan failed to give sufficient guarantee that solution of the refugee problem would be followed by general negotiations on all other problems.

40. It would have been preferable for sub-paragraph 2 (b) of the four-Power draft resolution to adhere to the text of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III). The Chinese amendment, which reproduced paragraph 5 of resolution 194 (III), filled the gap since there was general agreement that neither of the two paragraphs of the General Assembly resolution could be taken out of context and considered in isolation from the remainder of the text. If the Chinese amendment was adopted, the Chilean delegation would then vote for the four-Power draft resolution, which provided a solid basis for a prompt solution of the problem.

41. The Chilean delegation felt that it was completely unfair to blame the Conciliation Commission for the lack of progress, and it would vote against the USSR draft resolution. There was general agreement that the Commission had done valuable work and that the responsibility for failure could not be laid at its door. If the USSR proposal to terminate the Conciliation Commission was adopted, insecurity and instability would result.

42. Mr. CAJEWSKI (Poland) stated that after two years the Conciliation Commission had made no positive contributions to a solution of the Palestine problem. It could not therefore be argued that it had enhanced the prestige of the United Nations.

43. The Polish delegation was not opposed to conciliation in principle. On the contrary, it favoured it. But it opposed application of the principle which produced negative and harmful results. The Conciliation Commission had become the tool of selfish interests which were seeking to perpetuate their domination of the area involved rather than to promote the welfare of the parties. The refugee problem was no nearer solution and the number of refugees had not decreased. The Conciliation Commission made it even more difficult

for understanding to be reached since agreement was most likely through direct discussion between the parties concerned. Participation of those who were directly responsible for the difficulties in the Middle East could only prejudice a peaceful solution.

44. The Polish delegation would vote for the USSR draft resolution and against all draft resolutions extending the mandate of the Conciliation Commission or broadening its scope.

45. MOSTAFA Bey (Egypt) said that the Egyptian delegation was animated by a spirit of conciliation. In accordance with previous statements of his delegation, the revised Egyptian draft resolution entrusted to the Conciliation Commission the duties which had originally been intended for a special agency. In addition, it had been stated earlier by the Egyptian delegation (62nd meeting) that paragraph 2 of the four-Power draft resolution substantially covered the operative part of the Egyptian text.

46. In view of the Chinese amendment to the four-Power draft resolution, the Egyptian delegation, in a spirit of conciliation and in the interest of reaching agreement on an acceptable text, suggested that the four-Power draft resolution and the Chinese amendment to it be put to the vote first. The fate of the Egyptian draft resolution would depend on the result of that vote.

47. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) noted that, although Mr. Sharett had stated that the time for direct negotiations had come, his speech at the 71st meeting provided adequate proof that it had not. The progress Iraq was making in various fields had no connexion whatever with Jewish influence.

48. Referring to the statement that the Jews were free to admit as many immigrants as they wished because they had the right to occupy all the territory under their control, he pointed out that there were armistice agreements between the Arab States and Israel, and that the territorial question had not as yet been settled. In view of the manner in which the territory had been taken, it was clear that there was Arab territory which was under the control of Israel. In view also of the history of the problem, the various breaches of truce agreements and the handing over of certain territories to the Jews by the British, the statement that the Jews could admit as many people as they pleased was unjustified and constituted a clear denial of Arab rights.

49. Mr. Sharett's statement that the question of repatriation was "illusionary", a statement denying the right of the Arabs to their homes, made it impossible to contemplate direct discussions unless there was a change in his position.

50. As the Acting Chairman of the Conciliation Commission had said, good will was a prerequisite to direct negotiations. He wished to point out, however, that good will must be based on the recognition of fundamental rights and principles. Direct negotiation might be possible if fundamental rights were definitely recognized. Until then, it was very unrealistic of the four Powers to state in their draft resolution that direct negotiation was the only means of settling the Palestine problem. Actually it was not the only means and was not the immediate means.

51. The Chilean representative had stated that 800 immigrants were being admitted to Palestine each day

while Arab refugees were excluded. Fundamental principles must be safeguarded; the four-Power draft resolution would be useless and unrealistic unless the Chinese amendment was adopted.

52. Mr. CHARI (India) supported the suggestion that the joint draft resolution and the Chinese amendment to it should be put to the vote first. If the Chinese amendment was adopted, India would vote in favour of the joint draft thus amended.

53. India shared the view of Israel that no approach could be made to a solution of the problem unless and until there was direct discussion and negotiation between the parties directly concerned. It also agreed with the conclusion stated in paragraph 11 of the supplementary report of the Conciliation Commission, which strengthened that view. The Chinese amendment would permit greater progress toward that desired objective than operative paragraph 1 of the four-Power draft resolution, and Mr. Chari therefore recommended its adoption.

54. The statement of the Acting Chairman of the Conciliation Commission had made it clear that it was not possible for the parties to engage without delay in direct negotiations at that stage, as the four-Power proposal indicated. The Conciliation Commission would have to do preliminary work before such discussions could be initiated. The Chinese amendment gave greater scope for that preliminary work. It was of little use to invite the parties to meet when there was no likelihood that both would accept the invitation. By giving the Commission an opportunity to prepare the ground for such a meeting and by permitting it to engage in consultations with each party individually, the Chinese amendment was more realistic. Moreover, in operative paragraph 2, the joint draft resolution provided for the adoption of certain preparatory measures which were not contingent upon immediate direct negotiations. Implicitly, therefore, it accepted the necessity for preliminary work on the part of the Conciliation Commission.

55. If the Chinese amendment was not adopted, India would abstain from voting on the four-Power draft resolution, reserving the right to vote on the remaining proposals as the situation might dictate.

56. India would vote against the USSR draft resolution. The proposal, however, should not be interpreted as reflecting upon the work of the Conciliation Commission. The fact that it had not yet succeeded in its task was not a reason for discontinuing it.

57. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) took exception to some of the United Kingdom representative's remarks regarding the USSR position. It could not be denied that the United Kingdom continued to exercise its influence in Palestine and the surrounding area and that the Conciliation Commission, which it defended, was a useful instrument through which it brought pressure upon the parties concerned. The Commission's failure to advance towards a solution had been recognized both by the parties and by the Powers championing the Commission. It would be recalled, moreover, that in the earlier debates in the United Nations on the Palestine issue, representatives of Israel and of the Arab States had spoken frankly of the harmful effects of the United Kingdom and later of

the United States policy. After a series of skirmishes between Arabs and Jews, that policy had finally provoked large-scale civil strife, of which the Arab refugees were victims.

58. The CHAIRMAN announced that the debate was closed. The Committee would vote first on the amendments to the four-Power draft resolution submitted by the USSR and China, and then on the draft resolution itself.

59. He put to the vote the USSR amendment (A/AC.38/L.61) to operative paragraph 1 of the four-Power draft.

The amendment was rejected by 39 votes to 5, with one abstention.

60. The CHAIRMAN put the Chinese amendment (A/AC.38/L.64) to the four-Power draft resolution to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

In favour: Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Against: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Israel, Poland, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama.

The amendment was adopted by 33 votes to 13, with 9 abstentions.

61. The CHAIRMAN put the USSR amendment (A/AC.38/L.61) to operative paragraph 2 of the four-Power draft resolution to the vote.

The amendment was rejected by 45 votes to 5, with one abstention.

62. The CHAIRMAN put the four-Power draft resolution as amended to the vote.

The draft resolution as amended was adopted by 43 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.

63. Mr. SHARETT (Israel) withdrew his draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.60) in view of the large majority vote for the four-Power draft resolution. He had abstained from voting on that proposal for reasons given earlier, and particularly in connexion with the Chinese amendment, which Israel had opposed.

64. The Government of Israel could not accept political or moral responsibility for the resolution in the specific terms in which it was framed. It was prepared as in the past to enter into direct negotiations, either independently or under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission, with the four Arab States with which it had armistice agreements. Those were the only Arab States with which the question of a peace treaty arose; however, Israel entertained no hostility toward the other Arab States. It was prepared to co-operate fully,

as in the past, with the Conciliation Commission, but reserved its position on the specific terms of the resolution which the Committee had adopted.

65. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that he had abstained from voting on the four-Power draft resolution because his government considered that the refugee question was not related to the other problems outstanding between the parties and therefore required no discussion or agreements. It was a basic human right of the refugees to return to their homes.

66. Mr. AHMED (Pakistan) said that he had abstained from voting on the four-Power draft proposal for the same reasons as the representative of Iraq. In view of the preponderant support the four-Power proposal had received, however, he would withdraw the draft resolution which Pakistan had sponsored jointly with Ethiopia (A/AC.38/L.62) if his co-sponsor agreed.

67. Mr. MEDHEN (Ethiopia) said that he had consistently believed that a compromise solution of the problem was possible if the efforts of all parties concerned were continued. That compromise had been made feasible by the adoption of the Chinese amendment, which Ethiopia had supported. He was gratified that the four-Power draft resolution thus amended had obtained an overwhelming majority, and agreed to withdraw the draft resolution which Ethiopia had sponsored jointly with Pakistan.

68. MOSTAFA Bey (Egypt) also withdrew his draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.30/Rev.1).

69. The CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the USSR draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.66).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

In favour: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Iraq.

The draft resolution was rejected by 46 votes to 5, with one abstention.

70. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) congratulated the Chairman upon the patience and ability with which he had conducted the debate.

71. Mr. SHARETT (Israel) joined in congratulating the Chairman upon his skill and forbearance.

72. The CHAIRMAN announced that the items which remained for the Committee to discuss would be considered in the order in which they appeared on the agenda. The question of an international régime for Jerusalem would therefore be the subject for the following meeting.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.